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Introduction 
 
A gift is sometimes accompanied by a story that places it in a certain light, making 
it more precious to the receiver than it would be without this context. The story 
gives meaning to the object: “This watch belonged to your grandfather”, “This 
tissue was woven by the duchess” or “This book is the only thing rescued from the 
disaster”.  
Language is a gift to every newly born human infant, except in cases of severe 
retardation or maltreatment. We have been telling stories about it for a long time. 
I suspect that the biblical story about the Tower of Babel was not the first in its 
genre. In evolutionary linguistics, this narrative tradition assumed a scientific 
form.  
The gift of language invites such stories, because when we think of the role 
language plays in our lives, we understand that it is as important as oxygen. It 
seems so distinctly human that we want our fellow humans to recognize its 
preciousness. However, on closer reflection, we discover that this intuition is as 
problematic as it is strong. Distinctly human? Surely, animals communicate. Why 
not call their signals “language” as well? Such questioning brings this 
dissertation’s field of inquiry into focus: the field of language evolution. We can 
enter this field from two perspectives: the human and the non-human. The first 
has been illustrated by the linguist and educator Wilhelm von Humboldt:  
Humans are only humans through language, but to invent language, one 
has to be human. It is thought that this invention occurred gradually, 
alternately making humans more human so that they could invent more 
language which makes them more human and so on,- but this misconstrues 
the inseparability of human consciousness and human language. . . . 
[Language] originates necessarily in man, indeed gradually but not in a 
process in which the organism of language dwells in the subconscious as a 
lifeless body, on the contrary, from the start it determines the functions of 
thought. In the first word, the whole of language can be heard: the former 
presupposes the latter. (Humboldt 1963, 11)1 
                                                     
1
 Quotations from German and Dutch sources are translated by the author of this 
dissertation.  
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In Humboldt’s view, the fact that humans only gradually became aware of the 
whole of language does not mean that the whole was not there from the start. 
Although human language must have started with words, a word without a 
language is not a word.  
The second approach starts with non-human facts, in so far as its gradualistic view 
explains human capacities from prehuman ones. A decade after Humboldt’s views 
had been published, Charles Darwin embarked on a journey around the world on 
the H.M.S. Beagle, during which he observed, for example, a different kind of 
finch, and turtle, every time he reached another of the Galapagos Islands. By 
reflecting on these differences, he developed arguments for a biological gradual 
view, similar to the one Humboldt rejected in the quotation above (Darwin 1859). 
In The Descent of Man, Darwin would later write, “The formation of different 
languages and of distinct species, and the proofs that both have been developed 
through a gradual process, are curiously parallel” (1871, 465).   
Darwin’s theoretical concern was the origin of biological species. In the passage 
quoted above he parallels biological species with languages. Both species and 
languages have predecessors. Just as every animal population is adapted to 
surroundings, so does every language have specific words to denote or connote 
the activities of its speaker population. Had Darwin wanted to use the image of a 
complex fabric, he could have pointed to the spider’s web. Someone who has not 
seen the weaving process cannot imagine that the web is woven one thread at the 
time by a small insect unable to observe its activity from a distance. Language 
differs from this example in that no one sees it woven thread by thread. Humboldt 
might have answered that the first woven thread presupposes the entire web as 
the instinctive goal of the spider, - but this answer obviously does not explain the 
first webs woven by the first spider-like creatures. 
Darwin’s concept of species has since been confirmed by an overwhelming 
amount of scientific research (see overviews in e.g. Skelton 1993; Mayr 1982; 
Lewin/Foley 2004; Jones 1999). However, that Darwin was right in general does 
not imply that Humboldt’s view on language was wrong, for they took different 
perspectives on language. Humboldt was impressed by the fact that the meanings 
of words are connected and in speech rulewise combined, similar to the threads 
in a web. This infinite structure is presupposed by every word and sentence. 
Humboldt, the contemporary of Goethe, Fichte and Hegel, could not believe that 
this structure had evolved gradually, nor that it had an external cause. In contrast, 
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Darwin did not speak of a web of meanings, but perceived language as a biological 
phenomenon, a behavioural element of one species. He saw parallels in the 
differences between languages and the differences within and between species. 
Remarkably, linguistics enabled this idea: the linguistic discovery of a “family-tree 
of languages”2 inspired Darwin to impose this model on the connections between 
biological species (Fitch 2007).  
If the views of Darwin and Humboldt on language evolution differ because of their 
focus, we must ask how language as a biological phenomenon relates to language 
as a fabric of meanings. Given the dominance of Darwinism in science3, and given 
the well-earned authority of science in contemporary philosophy, this should be 
reframed to: How does the evolution of language fit within Darwinism? This 
question motivated the research that resulted in this dissertation. 
Darwinism and language evolution 
A narrow definition of Darwinism is: an explanation of evolution through the 
interplay of three factors, variation, heredity and selection. All three understood 
as unintentional and unintended processes. Therefore, the resulting process of 
evolution is also undirected and unintentional. Since Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species, the abundant variety of organisms adapted to their environment need no 
longer be seen as the work of, and therefore a proof for, a supernatural 
Intelligence responsible for its creation (Dawkins 1982; Dennett 1995). 
A broader definition of Darwinism understands “heredity” not only in the genetic 
sense, but also in the cultural sense of tradition (Kendal et al. 2011, 785), which 
includes learning (Bateson 2000, 205). This is still Darwinism, in so far as (a) the 
ability to learn has evolved through the factors mentioned (Flinn 1997), (b) this 
ability potentially has evolutionary consequences (like brain plasticity) and (c) 
                                                     
2
 Humboldt indirectly contributed to this familytree by collecting knowledge on many 
different languages (Arens 1974, 170ff). 
3
 I use “Darwinism” synonymously with “evolutionary theory” because Darwinism is the 
orthodox view of evolutionary science. Although fundamental discussions about several 
aspects of Darwinism are ongoing, I expect them only to adapt, not abolish, it. Among the 
currently debated issues are evolutionary psychology (Laland/ Brown 2002; Rose/Rose 
2000), selection (Roughgarden 2009; Fodor/Piatelli-Palmarini 2010), tempo and mode of 
change (Gould/ Eldredge 1977), adaptation (Rose/Lauder 1996), convergence (Conway 
Morris 2003), directed mutation (Lenski/Mittler 1993), the subject of evolution (Mayr 
1997) and the role of genes (Jablonka/Lamb 1995; Bauer 2008). Cf. Laland et al. (2014). 
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especially human evolution depends on learning to such a degree that without it, 
human evolution would be unthinkable. The chief example of human learning 
concerns the ability to speak and understand language. Indeed, language is the 
medium through which most subsequent learning takes place. As no evolutionary 
theory may exclude a species, not even our own species, Darwinism should 
provide a theory of the gradual acquisition of linguistic abilities by humans. - 
Similarly, a broad definition of Darwinism allows for a conscious version of 
variation and selection.  
Language evolution counts as the last of the major evolutionary transitions. The 
other transitions brought forth life, the genetic code, cells, sex, multicellular 
organisms, and societies (Maynard Smith/Szathmary 1997). The “language 
transition” opened a completely new way of transmitting information, compared 
to animal communication or the transmission of signals between cells. However, 
apart from means for information transmission, language is a competence, an 
abstract structure, social behaviour, a term referring to more than 6,000 
languages and a medium for cognition and designation; it is sound, sign and 
gesture; it is national identity and convention, grammar, and lexicon; it includes 
expression, metaphor, and irony. (cf. Hurford 2007, xii) 
To handle this complex phenomenon for our research, I propose to define 
language as follows: a communication system resting on a web of symbolic 
meanings which enables its users to refer to concrete and abstract things (Deacon 
1997, 43; cf. Dreyfus 1978, 233). Some symbolic systems, like chess, do not refer 
to something outside the system. Some signalling systems, like animal signals 
(“danger!”), enable its users to refer to other things, but they do not rest on a 
symbolic system. Language harmoniously combines these two aspects. “Language 
evolution” is the gradual acquiring of language competence by members of a 
linguistic population.  
The use of language involves a certain amount of intentionality, intention, and 
intendedness. Of course, I am not aware of the brain events preceding my 
speaking or listening, nor of all the psychological mechanisms, such as those 
connected with uneasiness, that cause me to speak or remain silent. A 
linguistically able human being does not display “awareness all the way down”. I 
sometimes listen to myself hearing in surprise what I apparently wanted to say. 
However, these caveats do not deny that, at least from the moment I know what I 
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said or what I am going to say, I am in the position to correct my linguistic 
expressions. Language involves awareness and intention in this sense.  
The language evolution paradox  
The evolution of language therefore incorporates mindless, unintended and 
unintentional processes as well as intentional processes of mind and awareness. 
One might call the first processes “blind” and the second “seeing”. So “blind” 
Darwinist processes have led to the development of a species that understands 
these processes by “seeing”.  
However, this concerns a fundamental difference of perspective. The first kind of 
process requires a description of causation, in a vocabulary of substances and 
forces. The second kind requires deliberation, it depends on meaning and the 
power of argument. In the first perspective, an event is understood by discovering 
the natural laws that govern it. In the second perspective, an event, e.g. human 
action, is understood by discovering the reasons that had a meaning for the 
actors. The second kind must have emerged gradually from the first – but this 
emergence challenges our imagination. How does something blind start to see? 
What does the first appearance of intention look like? To imagine it, one must 
switch perspectives first – but then, one might ascribe intentionality to organisms 
that do not have it. 
Therefore, many evolutionary theories on human evolution only take the first 
perspective and do not make, let alone thematize, the perspective switch. They 
describe linguistic behaviour as governed by natural laws, i.e. as reducable – in 
the ideal situation - to the unintentional level. However, the ultimate 
consequence of this strategy is that science in itself becomes problematic. What 
seems a rational argument would, in this view, be nothing but the effect of 
something irrational. Human deliberation, as used in scientific reasoning as well as 
in language, depends on the second perspective. Yet if it has evolved, it must be 
described in the first perspective, driven by blind forces - but that should be 
unacceptable to the scientist. This is the paradox: it must have evolved, yet it 
cannot have evolved.  
I call this paradox the “language evolution paradox”. A paradox literally is a 
statement which runs counter to what we think is true. Usually, we use the term 
paradox for those statements that seem both true and not true. The language 
evolution paradox is a problem about science, that is: about scientific results and 
concepts. Its solution cannot be found at the level of experimenting and 
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theorizing because it is a conceptual problem: the kind of problem for which 
philosophy can be helpful. (cf. Sellars 1962)  
However, to assert that the paradox is a problem to be solved by philosophers 
does not mean that evolutionary science can return to business as usual: the 
paradox is also a problem for science. Evolutionary scientists should be concerned 
and possibly worried about the paradox, because scientific reasoning should be 
unequivocal and unambiguous. When a result is paradoxical, a scientist must 
either change the theory in order to let the paradox disappear, or accept it and 
show that it is not a contradiction.  
Luckily, a paradox is not necessarily a contradiction. We can aid by not aiding, be 
dead while living and speak eloquently but say nothing. However, some paradoxes 
are contradictions, such as the proposition “this is not an English sentence”. Other 
paradoxes are potential contradictions, depending on the assumptions. For 
example, if I define “speaking” as producing meaningful sounds, then “speaking 
while remaining silent” is contradictory because a “sound” rules out “silence”. The 
language evolution paradox is a potential contradiction. I claim that an 
assumption that makes it a contradiction is naturalism. I will first describe this 
assumption and then discuss why it makes our paradox contradictory.  
Naturalism 
“Naturalism” has many meanings (Katz 1998, xii). In ontology, it is called 
materialism or physicalism; in epistemology, it is called logical positivism; in 
methodology, it is often pejoratively referred to as scientism.  
This inquiry uses the third meaning of the term naturalism, that is, the 
methodological position. To define its meaning sufficiently for the purposes of my 
investigation, I will follow Chomsky and Charles Taylor, for whom it is a position 
regarding the science of humans and human societies. Taylor, who opposes 
methodological naturalism, characterized it as “the belief that we ought to 
understand human beings in terms continuous with the sciences of extra-human 
nature” (1989, 80). Chomsky, who endorses methodological naturalism, said it is a 
monism, “seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories with the hope of 
eventual integration with the ‘core’ natural sciences”. He contrasts it to 
what might be called “methodological dualism”: the view that we must 
abandon scientific rationality [apparently something along the lines of the 
‘core’ natural sciences+ when we study humans ‘above the neck’ 
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(metaphorically speaking), becoming mystics in this unique domain, 
imposing arbitrary stipulations and a priori demands of a sort that would 
never be contemplated in the sciences, or in other ways departing from 
normal canons of inquiry. (Chomsky 2000, 76) 
This passage suggests that the naturalist investigation of the evolution of 
language first selects connected natural phenomena, such as linguistic behaviour, 
neurological events and the anatomy and physiology of the vocal tract. These 
phenomena are then investigated through methods of the natural sciences (i.e., 
physics, chemistry, geology and biology) and sciences continuous with them. 
Chomsky studied language through linguistic behaviour, searching for deep quasi-
mathematical structures in syntax. In other words, naturalism only accepts the 
narrow definition of Darwinism. 
In the passage quoted, Chomsky defined naturalism by discussing its opposite. 
Unfortunately, the quoted passage is more polemical than illuminating. It reveals 
more about his distance to “mysticism” (which is no discipline; it is an abusing 
term in this context) than about its possible meaning. We could try to improve the 
approach by exploring the opposite of methodological naturalism. I propose as a 
candidate for this opposing position something called “hermeneutics”.  
Hermeneutics 
I propose to distinguish three fields of hermeneutics: (quotidian) interpretation, 
historical interpretation and philosophical hermeneutics. “Interpretation” is the 
grasp of meanings, or: their understanding (Ziff 1972). A “meaning” is to be 
distinguished from a “cause” by two characteristics. One, a meaning can be 
misunderstood. Its influence on the receiver depends on his/her cooperation. This 
in turn supposes our being awake: when we sleep, we are not influenced by a 
meaningful sign near our bed – but we are influenced by someone pushing us out 
of the bed (the meaning of which subsequently, once we have woken up, can be 
misunderstood). Two, the ascription of meaning depends on a pre-understanding 
of the context, i.e., on other meanings, in a symbolic system. This system is also 
an element of our language definition.  
The change of life-expressions that work on us, urges us to renew our 
understanding continuously. However, this is also urged by understanding 
itself, which, noticing how every life expression is connected with others, is 
directed more and more towards the whole. (Dilthey 1927, 147) 
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This is why, according to Humboldt, a word without a language is not a word. 
Causes, by contrast, are not in such a way internally connected. 
Quotidian interpretation is the everyday activity of grasping the meaning of 
expressions, signs, gestures, and events. - There is not a day in which we do not 
interpret many spoken and written messages. Along the same line, we also 
interpret the sound of a lamb as “crying”, the sunset as “majestic”, sounds of 
footsteps as “angry”, not to mention our ongoing cueing of the persons around 
us. We cannot help but read many perceptions by interpreting them.   
Historical interpretation, including philological hermeneutics, is the craft and 
theory of the interpretation of historical objects, ancient texts (e.g., Spinoza 
2010), works of art and historical developments (Ankersmit 1995). In contrast to 
quotidian interpretation, the objects belong to well-defined classes, and the 
method is self-consciously applied. According to Schleiermacher, it is “the art of 
avoiding misunderstanding” (cit. in Gadamer 1960, 188). Nonetheless, how can 
we be sure that we have found their real meaning? Especially through Dilthey’s 
reflections on the historical science, the awareness grew that our understanding 
of meaning is derived from sharing experiences, traditions or cultural context with 
the creators of the cultural objects. In other words: we are always in a meaning-
yielding context. This awareness is made explicit in the third field. 
Philosophical hermeneutics was initiated by Heidegger (1927) who asserted that 
we exist as hermeneutical beings. We can only understand ourselves as parts of a 
subject-transcending context. We live our lives in that context and we know it 
much more deeply than we are ever able to express verbally. We move in it, we 
breathe it, we know when to give attention to what. A world without 
interpretations, a world of bare facts, is an artefact only obtainable by hard 
theoretical work, whereas the “life-world” (Husserl 1935) carries meanings from 
the beginning.  
Philosophical hermeneutics is an interpretation of our ongoing interpretations. It 
radicalizes quotidian and historical interpretation, by pointing to our implicit 
understanding of the context, the “horizon”: it is not what you are looking at, but 
it is still in your view, and it offers the background of what you see. This basic 
understanding is logically prior to perception. It prepares what we perceive. Both 
metaphors, basic and prior, refer to its implicit contribution to our experiences of 
phenomena. It makes no sense to speak of phenomena that are purely “given”, 
without this contribution. This goes for scientific phenomena, said to be “theory-
Introduction 
15 
 
laden” (Hanson 1959), but philosophical hermeneutics asserts that it also applies 
to the way humans live their daily lives. Our experiences depend on the prior 
understanding. However, the reverse is also true: our understanding depends on 
what we have experienced before. This interdependence of observer and object 
in the process of human life, that is: of interpretation, is called the “hermeneutic 
circle” (e.g. Heidegger 1927, 152f). We find the hermeneutic circle also on a 
smaller level. For example, when I understand a text, I interpret its sentences in 
the context of the full text, just as I understand the text in its entirety on the basis 
of having understood its sentences.  
Quotidian interpretation is normally not done with the awareness that “I am 
applying my interpretative faculties”. Historical interpetation includes an 
awareness of what one is doing, but only in relation to the circumscribed object. 
Philosophical hermeneutics articulates the awareness that the object depends on 
the same context as the interpreter does: this horizon discloses the object to the 
interpreter because he or she is in it. In other words, philosophical hermeneutics 
is self-aware quotidian interpretation. Philosophical hermeneutics shares this self-
awareness with historical interpretation, but contrary to the latter, it is not 
restricted to a well-defined class of objects. In my view, all three are in a 
continuum, to which I shall refer as “hermeneutics” (in accordance with the 
terminology of e.g. Dreyfus 1978, 234).  
By accepting quotidian and historical interpretation as a part of one’s scientific 
method, one’s theory has acquired a hermeneutical aspect. As such, the theory 
relates harmoniously to (or at least: has no defense based on methodological 
principle against) hermeneutics in general.  
To offer a brief glance at my destination: in this dissertation, I aim to defend the 
view that Darwinism – in the broad definition, of course - has such a 
hermeneutical aspect as far as human evolution is concerned. Subsequently, I aim 
to elaborate on what Darwinism can mean for philosophical hermeneutics as well. 
In this respect, I will keep proximity to empirical research - which is not 
mainstream behaviour in philosophical hermeneutics – for two reasons. One, I 
think empirical research needs philosophical hermeneutic rumenation. Two, I 
think a focus on empirical data prevents philosophical hermeneutics from 
becoming hermetic.  
Whereas the natural sciences demand a detached observer, in interpretation and 
hermeneutics the observer is a participator. Human sciences are “hermeneutic” 
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because their object, humans within society, makes sense within the horizon 
which encloses the scientist. This horizon yields meaning: humans and human 
societies acknowledge meanings to the extent that without meanings, we would 
not be able to make sense of what happens. By contrast, in the natural sciences, 
the meanings of the objects are peeled off and replaced by measurements, 
reductions, causations and mathematical models.  
Hermeneutics versus naturalism 
We needed an exploration of hermeneutics in order to evaluate an exclusive 
methodological naturalism. This naturalism has been defined before as the 
doctrine that the scientific knowledge of humans and human society is only 
yielded by the natural sciences and those sciences continuous with them. We can 
now see that hermeneutics is an counterexample to this doctrine. Its approach 
acknowledges the interpretational context, without which human behaviour 
cannot be identified, let alone understood. Naturalism is untenable if 
hermeneutics is indispensable for science about humans.  
This tension about naturalism becomes especially manifest in language research. 
In hermeneutics, understanding what language is and how it works in order to 
investigate language scientifically is not problematic; on the contrary, it is 
required. By contrast, naturalism would demand a distinction between the object 
language and the language of research. However, this distinction is problematic 
for two reasons. One, it leads to a regress. We might want to investigate the 
language of research: in that case, we would need to stipulate a second language 
of research in order to make the first language of research our object language; 
and so on. Two, one can doubt the reality of the distinction. Is the language of 
research really different from the object language? I suspect that the distinction 
leads to more problems than it solves.  
Moreover, if a theory depends upon participating in a field of meaning but the 
defender of that theory confesses to an exclusive methodological naturalism, he 
or she self-contradicts. This is the reason why the language evolution paradox 
would be a contradiction, if naturalism in this sense were presupposed. 
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Where does this leave Darwinism?  
If no theory based on naturalism is able to explain language evolution, then 
Darwinism is not impaired. Darwinism can easily incorporate, or cooperate with, 
hermeneutics. We only have to see it in the light of the broad definition, like many 
do. (cf. Flinn 1997; Levinson/Jaisson eds. 2006) 
In fact, Darwinism has a clear hermeneutical aspect even outside the domain of 
language evolution. Let me illustrate this perhaps astonishing claim by referring to 
three champions of Darwinism: Darwin, De Waal and Dawkins. Darwin used 
hermeneutics when it was necessary. He described certain phenomena in animal 
behaviour as the “expression of emotions”, he even devoted a whole book on this 
subject (Darwin 1872). This term means that he used his understanding of human 
expression of emotions to understand the behaviour of animals. An animal only 
expresses emotions in the view of observers who know emotional expressions 
themselves. Apparently, there was no other sensible way to frame the questions 
on this subject. A second example is De Waal’s study of “chimpanzee politics” 
(1982). To recognize “politics” in chimpanzee behaviour is to understand it in the 
light of our own experience with the term. Hermeneutically, the chimpanzees are 
pulled delicately within the “horizon” of human experience. It is not sensible to 
reframe his observations in terms that are estranged from human society, for that 
would weaken De Waal’s point, namely the evolutionary vicinity of chimps and 
humans. Why would we want to approach chimps hermeneutically and humans as 
genetically programmed actors? The final example is Dawkins (1976), whose 
theory of the reproduction of cultural units, “memes”, presupposes the 
hermeneutic ability to identify a meme. For example, if we want to identify the 
“God-meme”, the word “God” does not help us, for it is sometimes used by those 
who do not reproduce the God-meme. Moreover, other people who have clearly 
internalized this meme will only express it through certain behaviour, such as 
piety or charity, or through new words and so on. As both word-use and 
behaviour stand in need of interpretation, memeticism is hermeneutic. In 
Chapters II and IV, I will elaborate on these examples. 
I claim therefore that Darwinism is, and always has been, the practical refutation 
of an exclusive methodological naturalism, because Darwinism has, most of all 
through evolutionary anthropology and primatology, a hermeneutical aspect. 
Darwinian thinkers who tried to do without hermeneutics or proclaim themselves 
naturalistic, either failed to explain language evolution satisfactorily or included 
“closet” hermeneutic steps in their reasoning, as I will show in Chapter II. They 
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often apply the broad definition of Darwinism without pulling the (hermeneutic) 
consequences.  
Niche construction 
Apart from evolutionary anthropological theory, hermeneutics is indispensable in 
language evolution itself. This claim concerns content, not method. The human 
ability of interpretation is connected to the emergence of language in human 
evolution. In defence of this claim, I use an ascendant branch of Darwinism—
niche construction theory. 
A “niche” is a biological term for the functional space to which an animal or plant 
species is adapted. Animal species perceive the niche as the space in which 
threats can be fought against or fled from, and the space in which it finds food, 
and so on. Hence, one geographical area can contain multiple overlapping niches. 
Evolution is the process of change in a species in response to the demands of and 
threats in the niche. The environment to the demands of which the species 
“answers” (physiologically or behaviourally) is the niche (Skelton 1993, 326ff). 4  
In niche construction the roles are inversed (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). The species 
actively changes the environment to its needs and uses the changes for survival, 
reproduction and nutrition. The species adapts the environment. A small example 
is the bird nest, which concerns only reproduction and serves only a few birds of 
one species. A large example is the beaver dam, which concerns many 
generations of beavers and changes the circumstances of many other species as 
well. Niche construction behaviour must have evolved; moreover, the constructed 
niche is the environment that helps explain the evolution of the animal under 
discussion.  
Therefore, niche construction theory is an important discipline in Darwinism. At 
any rate, this theory is tremendously helpful in explaining human evolution. 
Humans have greatly adapted to human company and artefacts. Our reflexes and 
desires as well as our sensory and cognitive mechanisms are highly directed to 
social life, which has come to dominate our niche. According to Winnicott, “There 
is no such thing as a baby, there is a baby and someone” (cit. in Hrdy 2009, 111). 
This bond between baby and “mother and others” goes far beyond being fed and 
kept warm. It concerns our existential need to exist for other people. In the same 
                                                     
4
 “Habitat” is a more general term for a specific natural environment, like forest, desert or 
coast. There is no “habitat construction”. 
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vein our naked skin is adapted to a culture of clothing, our non-specialized teeth 
to a culture of cooking and our brains to complex symbolical communication. 
However, clothing, cooking and symbolic communication are not a part of the 
natural environment; they are constructed as niche-elements.  
A theory of human evolution needs niche construction theory. In this respect, 
humans are not unique, but on par with birds, bees and beavers. Nonetheless, the 
human niche is unique because of its hermeneutic character. The character of our 
constructed niche is culturally determined. Buildings and roads, artefacts and 
music, signs and clothes reveal their function in the eye of the beholder. Human 
niche elements are open to misunderstanding by conspecifics. Birds and beavers, 
by contrast, build species-determined nests and dams. There is no room for 
mistakes by conspecifics about what their constructed niche-elements mean – so 
perhaps they do not have any meaning, only a function. Nonhuman animals are 
instinctively able to perceive the niche elements that are important for them. 
They do not, in contrast to humans, execute an interpretative ability at that 
moment. Unlike linguistic expressions, the “signals” animals give, whether 
olfactory, visual, auditory, tactile or gustatory, are not open to interpretation. 
Instead, they cause a reaction in their conspecifics. Neither can animal signals be 
reformulated or expressed in a negative form. The blackbird’s alarmcall does not 
exist as a negation, like “no, there is no reason for panic, sorry for any distress”, 
“The cat is absent”, or as a reformulation, like “The meowing birdchaser that lives 
in human roofed nests is approaching”. 
Method and structure of the inquiry 
Methodologically, my inquiry is purely conceptual. I did not conduct an empirical 
investigation of skulls, cave art or infant language acquisition. Instead, I have read 
respected and often widely acclaimed studies on language and evolution in order 
to reflect on their assumptions and the power of their reasoning. A crucial 
element in my analysis is the language evolution paradox and its consequences 
for what we may expect of theories.  
I attempt to bridge the gap between two traditions: Darwinism and hermeneutics. 
As far as I know, until now the idea that Darwinism needs hermeneutics in its 
approach and in its theory of language evolution, through human niche 
construction, has not been defended before.- Studies from linguistics, biology, 
cultural anthropology, sociology, psychology and archaeology have helped me 
towards this goal. This is inevitable in a study about human language evolution; 
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indeed, these disciplines have been combined before (e.g., Donald 1991; Deacon 
1997). Its interdisciplinary character requires some interdiscipliniarity from the 
reader. My inquiry is structured as follows: 
Chapter I introduces the central concepts: evolution, Darwinism, natural sciences, 
naturalism and hermeneutics. Next, I describe the “language evolution paradox”. I 
show how language cannot be explained by the natural sciences. However, this 
refutation of methodological naturalism does not impair Darwinism. On the 
contrary, Darwinism does not need naturalism. This leads to the following claim:  
1. The indispensability of hermeneutics for a theory of language evolution 
makes Darwinism incompatible with, and a contradiction to, exclusive 
naturalism. 
In Chapter II, this abstract claim is confronted with the leading concrete theories 
on language evolution. First, we look at theories of evolution within languages, 
using an example of cultural evolution. The leading thinkers are Pagel, Atkinson 
and Dawkins (memeticism). We will see that their positions are of no interest to 
our inquiry. The next series of thinkers, who offer theories of the “mechanisms” 
responsible for language evolution, includes Millikan, Pinker, Chomsky, Hauser 
and Fitch. We will see that their theories are slightly disappointing, in the light of 
our paradox. In this respect, they differ from the last series of thinkers, Deacon, 
Donald and Bickerton, who are no less Darwinist but whose interest in the 
concrete evolutionary path has led them away from naturalism. Hence, the 
conclusions of Chapter II affirm claim 1. Naturalistic Darwinists cannot explain 
language evolution; sound theories of language evolution include hermeneutics. 
In Chapter III, I claim that 
2. Niche construction theory is the best Darwinist framework for human 
evolution. 
In combination with claim 1, this means that the theory of human niche 
construction does not presuppose naturalism. Chapter III explains why this is true. 
Our human niche is a niche of cooperation through language. Somewhere in our 
evolution, we started to do hermeneutics, that is, to interpret each other’s 
exclamations and gestures. Slowly, a sphere of intense cooperation unfolded, in 
which trust became essential. Hence, I make the accompanying claim: 
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3. The human niche is the hermeneutic niche. 
I lean on an argument about mindshaping and mindreading, developed by 
Zawidzki, for the idea that the hermeneutic niche preceded language and made it 
possible. This leads to the following claim: 
4. Language evolution presupposes the hermeneutic niche. 
Chapter IV shows how Darwinism incorporated hermeneutics from the beginning. 
We find the hermeneutic approach in the writings of Darwin and in several widely 
accepted primatological studies, such as those of Goodall and De Waal.  
Hermeneutics, in its philosophical variety, also incorporates Darwinism, in a 
dynamic similar to that concerning Freud and Marx. Once the “mechanisms” of 
human nature and society are revealed, they do not work in the same way as 
before their revelation. Our knowledge of them potentially transforms their 
effects. Science is mainly a project of Western culture, which we might loosely 
associate with the adjectives hi-tech, democratic, post-Judaeo-Christian and post-
Enlightenment. Regarding the Western niche, at least, I defend the following 
claim: Interpretation is an instrument for “civilizing” human nature, for 
emancipating individuality and strengthening the niche.  
5. Interpretation of Darwinian mechanisms further constructs our niche. 
This is the third meaning of my term “hermeneutic Darwinism”, apart from the 
two we saw above. The first was the natural place of quotidian interpretation in 
Darwinist ethology. The second meaning, and the main claim, was the 
hermeneutic character of the human niche. Its hermeneutic character influenced 
human evolution, made language evolution possible and is itself object of 
historical interpretation. After all, the natural sciences yield no vocabulary to 
define an interpretational process, let alone the methods to identify it.  
Put differently, I make two connected claims, a negative and a positive one. 
Chapter I and II contains the argument for the negative claim: a Darwinist theory 
on language evolution cannot be based on methodological naturalism. The 
positive claim is: Darwinism on language has a hermeneutic component, just as 
philosophical hermeneutics can make good use of Darwinism. It is argued for in 
Chapter I (language), Chapter III.2 (niche), and Chapter IV. 
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I. The paradox of language evolution 
The focus of this chapter is the language evolution paradox. Unintentional, non-
directed processes have produced beings that are able to act intentionally to direct 
their attention and their actions. “Blind” Darwinist processes have produced a 
species that understands these processes, “seeing” them, by awareness, reflection. 
Does this mean that our intentions and our directions are not what they seem? Is 
the reflection essentially the same as the processes from which it originates?  
My claim is that this paradox only becomes a genuine contradiction if we assume 
that scientific knowledge is yielded only by the methods of the natural sciences, 
that is, if we assume that evolutionary linguistics can (and should) do without 
hermeneutics. This assumption, “exclusive methodological naturalism” or 
naturalism for short (I will not speak about other forms of naturalism), is often 
blended with Darwinism. In my view, the language evolution paradox urges us to 
free Darwinism from naturalism (but obviously not from the natural sciences), 
which is the programmatic conclusion of this Chapter, in the third section. 
To appreciate the paradox of language evolution, we must first construct the 
concepts of evolution, development and Darwinism. This is the theme of the first 
section. We will explore some examples of evolution, the last of which being the 
origin of Homo sapiens. This section ends by emphasising the importance of 
obtaining a clear view of the origin of language, for language is an important 
feature of the human species.  
The second section connects language, interpretation and philosophical 
hermeneutics. First, it shows that in the science of language, many different, if not 
oppositional, approaches have been used. My claim is that hermeneutics is also a 
necessary ingredient in linguistics. Before studying language, one needs to know 
from one’s own experience what language is. This foreknowledge constitutes the 
research field of linguistics as well as of many other  sciences related to humans, 
like archaeology, medicine, and economics—and even of the natural sciences. This 
grounding of science in the life world is researched in philosophical hermeneutics. 
It shows how intensely language and hermeneutics are interwoven with each 
other and with our lives.  
It would be self-contradictory to exclude hermeneutics from science. If it is not the 
base of science in general, then at least it is a necessary element of the methods of 
the social sciences and the humanities.  
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1. Evolution and language 
In section 1.1, I explore the basic concepts of this dissertation: evolution, 
evolutionary theory, Darwinism and language evolution. Section 1.2 discusses 
some examples of these concepts. Section 1.3 provides the conclusion that 
language is an explanandum for evolutionary theory, but this explanation is still a 
desideratum. 
1.1 Evolution, evolutionary theory, Darwinism 
The term “evolution” denotes a historic process of gradual change. We say that 
certain habits within a family or a society evolve, or that a species or an 
environment evolves. In speaking of evolution, there must be a descent by 
tradition or generation. Because nothing in the universe is static, it is not 
surprising that we find change in every process of tradition and generation. It was 
news when an animal appeared not to have evolved during 3 million years (Heads 
2011). However, even this animal must have evolved in the preceding years. A 
non-evolving animal is an anomaly.  
Evolutionary theory is the discipline that tries to explain scientifically the fact of 
evolution and trace its path. Darwinism has become the orthodox view in 
evolutionary theory. It acknowledges three factors: heredity, variation and 
selection. These factors are normally called “Darwinian mechanisms”. 
I propose to distinguish a “narrow” definition of Darwinism from a “ broad” one. 
In the narrow definition, heredity is seen as genetic, or as similar to genetic in that 
(a) its process involves no interpretations, understanding and (b) information is 
given from generation to generation. “Learning” is seen as a kind of imprinting, 
without the subjects’ own involvement. In the broad definition, heredity includes 
learning through interpretation. Information is, in this definition, shared within 
generations, every day anew, and its modification is partly due to the conscious 
activity with which it is handled by the information bearers: us. Thus, the 
mechanism looses some of its “blindness”. – In the same vein, variation and 
selection in the broad definition are seen as processes that allow for conscious 
decisions.  
Darwinism is a general theory that promises answers to questions both great and 
small. I consider the “origin of species” a great question, and the origin of a single 
trait a small one. The first is also called cladogenesis, speciation, macro-evolution 
or branching evolution; the second is anagenesis or micro-evolution. Darwinism 
has this broad applicability because it views species as nothing but “a bundle of 
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traits”. Once you have explained the traits, you have explained the species. Huge 
questions are just bundles of small ones. 
In practice, a Darwinist study never starts in the Archaean era of unicellular life to 
explain a species or a trait. Explanation normally starts with the last common 
ancestor (LCA) that a species or variety shares with another, such as humans with 
chimpanzees, dogs with wolves or dolphins with killer whales. Theoretically, there 
is always an earlier LCA if we follow the way from the branches to the stem, until 
we arrive at the origin of life, the point before which there is no descent. This 
“point” is roughly dated at around 3.7 billion years ago (bya). The earth was then 
almost 1 billion years old. Multicellular life and sexuality only appeared around 
650 million years ago (mya) and mammals around 225 mya, after which they 
dispersed and inhabited the earth (after the extinction of dinosaurs around 65 
mya). If we compare cosmic history with the span of one year, mammals 
appeared on December 26, apes on Sylvester morning and humans less than two 
hours before midnight (the Big Bang happening on January the first; Sagan 1977). 
We sometimes say that a habit has “developed” instead of “evolved”. We might 
mean the same by both expressions, but there is a semantic difference. In 
development, the later forms are somehow present in the earlier, much like the 
adult is somehow present in the child—and vice versa. The process of 
development has an inner directedness towards a goal that is not yet fully 
realized. In development, the earlier form takes its raison d’être from the later; 
the later form realizes what inchoately lies in the earlier. One could say that 
development supposes a whole—a person, a country, a cultivated agrarian area. 
Where there is development, there is the possibility of retardation. In biology, 
development takes place in the life cycle of an individual. Organic development 
itself is a product of evolution.  
In contrast, evolution has no inner direction, and it makes no sense to say a 
species is retarded when it has cast off certain abilities that it apparently no 
longer needed. The amphibian does not lie in the palaeofish waiting to be 
realized, nor does the early reptile take its raison d’être from the bird who 
evolved from it. We do not call a kiwi retarded because it can no longer fly as its 
ancestors could.  
Regarding language, I can develop my understanding of English or my 
pronunciation of German because of the goal to which I direct my actions. 
Linguistic habits evolve over time without the conscious decision of any individual 
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or group to direct change in a specific way (e.g., “let’s erase the genitive from the 
German language”) and without a standard to identify language decadence, pace 
language purists who choose some arbitrary moment in evolution as the goal or 
the ideal and condemn themselves to discontent because the linguistic population 
never follows their rules.  
1.2 Examples of evolution  
I will now describe a few examples of evolution. Two are taken from the social 
sciences and two are from biology. These examples are meant as introduction, but 
they will be re-used later, in the context of niche construction theory.  
Egg discrimination  
Cuckoos never know their parents. They are brood parasites: cuckoo eggs are laid 
in the nests of other birds. Before laying her egg, the female cuckoo removes one 
and sometimes two eggs of the host. Her choice of host nest is not confined to 
one species. Regionally, the female cuckoo generally prefers the nests of the 
species in whose nest she herself was raised (Taborsky et al. 1998). However, she 
occasionally uses other nests as well. Across Europe, cuckoo eggs are found in the 
nests of more than 20 passerine birds (songbirds). The host species is always a 
bird whose adult size is much smaller than that of the cuckoo. We do not know 
whether the eggs deposited in some species’ nests have a greater chance of 
becoming adult cuckoos, compared to the nests of other species.  
The young cuckoo hatches earlier than the eggs of the host and then, only a few 
hours old, it starts to push these eggs from the nest. Darwin observed: 
I can see no special difficulty in its having gradually acquired, during 
successive generations, the blind desire, the strength and [physiological] 
structure necessary for the work of ejection; for those young cuckoos which 
had such habits and structure best developed would be the most securely 
reared. (1859, 192)  
One nest is sometimes visited by a few cuckoos in succession, so the first 
hatchling must not hesitate in pushing out its conspecific eggs. The host feeds its 
“adopted child” and continues to do so even when it has ostensibly outgrown its 
parents and has visible signs of belonging to another species. 
If this behaviour of cuckoos were 100% effective, the host species would vanish 
because its eggs would be increasingly pushed from its nests; but the cuckoo 
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would then soon vanish. Hence, we can expect an “evolutionary stable strategy” 
(ESS) (Dawkins 1976, 69), which is a dynamic relation that enables this situation to 
continue but is flexible enough to react to new circumstances. The contribution of 
the cuckoo to this ESS is that it uses the nests of more than one species. The 
contribution of some host species is the development of an ability to discriminate 
its own eggs from those of the parasite and take measures accordingly by pushing 
the latter out or deserting the nest altogether and building a new one somewhere 
else. 
The Darwinian mechanisms, variation, heredity and selection, make this ESS 
transparent. All offspring tend to vary slightly from their parents. The variation 
can be e.g. physical, physiological, and cognitive. Some birds must have developed 
the cognitive ability to discriminate their eggs from other eggs in their nest and 
react accordingly, but others did not. We focus on this variation. We presume that 
the variation must have occurred, because reptiles (which share a LCA with birds), 
for example, do not have this ability. The fact that this ability is not common in 
songbird species means that either the LCA of the songbirds had this ability and 
most songbirds lost it, or the LCA did not have the ability and some songbirds 
developed it. If some birds lost this ability, it means that there was no “pressure” 
to keep it; the variation of offspring that did not have the ability had as good a 
chance of producing offspring with its genetic material as the others did. If some 
birds acquired this ability, it must also be due to “pressure”; otherwise, it would 
have fallen prey to the brood parasites. The latter possibility is the case: “The fact 
that unsuitable species, with presumably no history of interaction with cuckoos, 
show largely no rejection of unlike eggs suggests that rejection evolves mainly in 
response to parasitism by cuckoos.” (Davies/Brooke 2006, 218) The hereditary 
line of those that did not develop this tendency has less chance of producing 
offspring.—Less chance, not no chance at all, because there are always more 
dangers than cuckoos, and cuckoos are not omnipresent. 
We pause to wonder at the spectacle: Songbirds, elegant beings that make lovely 
sounds, return from the south, finding their way back to the region in which they 
grew up. They build a nest industriously without having ever learned this skill. 
Enter the brood parasite, flying around, noticing where other species build their 
nests. It lays its eggs in April or May, so the offspring can acquire enough strength 
over one summer to fly thousands of kilometres when it is only a few months old. 
The cuckoo selects several nests that resemble the nest in which she was raised 
herself, approaching them in the early afternoon when the host takes a break. The 
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male sometimes lures the host away from its nest so that his female can approach 
it. The male “understands” which nest she intends (to which she, not he, is bound 
by imprinting). The female cuckoo removes an egg or two and produces an egg in 
a few seconds. This is repeated in approximately ten different nests. Each time 
she flies off, singing her odd name loudly although she never learned it from her 
parents. When the cuckoo hatchling is only a few hours old, it is determined to 
take everything that resembles an egg on its naked back, crouches at the edge 
and pushes it out, repeating this over a period of four days until it is alone. The 
host feeds the “adoptive child”, without hesitation, even if it saw the cuckoo 
approaching the nest. The host is apparently motivated by the wide-open reddish 
beak which always wants more, more. 
Now what ESS did the cuckoo develop against the egg-discrimination ability of 
hosts? This is the greatest miracle of the whole story. Its eggs have started to 
mimic the shade and colour of the host eggs. One female cuckoo only lays one 
type of egg, and if this is not the usual grey, unspecified cuckoo egg, then it 
mimics the egg in the host nest in which she herself hatched. Cuckoos in different 
regions specialize in certain eggs. This is a case of coevolution, for the type of egg 
was first developed by the host, possibly as an adaptation to brood parasites, and 
the cuckoo evolved in the same direction. We can consider it a response to 
discrimination pressure because experiments have shown that cuckoo females do 
not adapt to the eggs of birds who do not discriminate, such as dunnocks. 
According to Davies and Brooke (2006, 208), “Coevolution between brood 
parasites and host is expected to lead to ever more intricate adaptations and 
counter-adaptations.” Some suitable birds display a strong rejection of cuckoo 
eggs, such as the blackbird and the song thrush, raising “the intriguing possibility 
that suitable species now rarely used were former victims which evolved strong 
rejection and so forced the cuckoo to turn to new hosts” (219). 
Discriminatory abilities are always directed towards eggs and not chicks, although 
the latter would seem the easier task, for there is less chance of failure given the 
huge differences between cuckoo chicks and that of reed warblers, for example. 
This fact shows that the evolutionary process is not logical but chronological. It is 
a process of trial and error, one step at a time, to a relatively optimal situation, 
disregarding a higher optimality if it was “two steps away”. Evolutionary theory 
therefore is essentially an historical theory, in which even sparse evidence about 
past occurrences must be structured according to scientific logic. The resulting 
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theories have more degrees of incertitude than exist in other natural sciences like 
chemistry or physics.  
Time structures 
Our next example of evolution is taken from the social sciences. Many sociologists 
have noted that a gradual change took place in the lives of people in the Western 
world around 1750, which was characterised by an “acceleration” of three fields: 
first, transport, information and communication technology; second, the tempo at 
which the data of our social world counted as “old school”; third, the personal 
drive to have as many and as diverse experiences as possible and share them with 
as many people as possible. The acceleration of each of these fields was the force 
behind the acceleration of the others (Rosa 2005, 251, 309). 
Acceleration precedes modernity. Only after 1750 did this evolution became intra-
generational instead of inter-generational (Rosa 2005, 178). People began to 
notice it. “It is bad enough that nothing we learn nowadays lasts for our life. To 
our ancestors, the education they received in their youth was enough for their 
life; we however must learn every five years anew (umlernen) or we get out-
dated.” This quote (in Rosa, 176) is from Goethe’s 1809 novel Die Wahlverwandt-
schaften. Those of us who have conscious memories of the pre-PC (let alone pre-
smartphone) era are in a position to observe a later episode of the same process 
of acceleration. The “knowledge” Goethe referred to was specific professional 
knowledge, whereas today, it is knowledge about our life-world. Indeed, no 
knowledge seems immune to this acceleration. We change partners, energy 
providers, health insurance companies, professions, employers, religions, 
addresses and even sexual identities. Moreover, we must keep track of similar 
shifts in our social environment.  
Four habits have evolved as an answer to this pressure, which can be empirically 
shown to be new. First, we accelerate tempo (speed reading, power naps, fast 
food, speed dating, drive-through funerals). Second, we skip breaks so that we 
have “more time”. Third, we “multitask” in order to accomplish more things in the 
same amount of time. Fourth, we “save time” by buying a service that promises 
the same effect in less time; for example hiking through woods and meadows 
becomes visiting the fitness club or watching a BBC nature documentary, and 
cooking a meal becomes ordering a pizza (Rosa 2005, 199).  
I. The paradox of language evolution 
30 
 
Acceleration leads to the paradoxical result of stagnation. We have traffic jams on 
the highway and a full email box, we complain about having “no time” for the 
essential aspects of our profession. Consequently, many develop a depression, as 
a “pathology of time”, because they have less time to digest their experiences 
(Rosa 2005, 356). 
The subtitle of Rosa’s excellent book on acceleration, “On the change of time 
structures in modernity” could have been “On the evolution of time structures” 
for two reasons. First, it is about heredity, through generation and tradition. The 
change is not intended by those participating in it. Individual rationality has a 
contrary effect on the social level. In order to have more time, we start to hasten 
but thereby narrow the “time environment” for those around us. Someone who 
answers an email in the time mode of a postal letter would receive a huge amount 
of social pressure to adapt to the expected tempo of electronic response. - 
Second, the change takes place on the level of a population. Time is a social 
construct, so any change in its structure both transcends the level of the 
individual, affecting it nonetheless. 
Nepalese marriage habits  
A second example from the social sciences concerns marriage habits in Nepal, 
which have evolved in recent decades. The starting point was that “young age at 
marriage, arranged marriage, and polygamy have been common practice, and 
inter-caste marriage and divorce have been virtually non-existent” (De Jong et al. 
2006). The following changes were noted: 
- The preferred age at marriage has risen (towards an age after 23; there 
is more support for an age after the first menstruation) 
- Inter-caste marriage is tolerated 
- The rate of divorce has increased (and more than half of the 
respondents were tolerant of it, if the couples are characterized as 
“arguing”) 
- More than 90% of the respondents found a marriage based on consent a 
normal thing. 
This evolution of marriage practices in Nepal may be explained by the influence of 
the Western idea of progress and what it entails. This however was the premise of 
the foregoing research (De Jong et al. 2006); the findings of change count as a 
proof of this influence. Thus, theoretically, first a strong environmental influence 
was identified (Western civilization), and then it was predicted that populations 
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would display certain effects of this influence, such as increasing freedom and 
equality. Nepal is an especially interesting case to measure the force of this 
influence because the country had been cut off from Western influence until the 
1950s. The researchers emphasized that these changes do not mean that old 
habits had disappeared. According to De Jong et al. (2006, 1), “We do not find 
complete acceptance of so-called modern family attitudes”; instead, there is more 
diversity in the “continuously evolving models of family life in Nepal” [my italics].  
Homo sapiens 
My second example of biological evolution is the origin of modern humans (Homo 
sapiens). We have to determine the LCA it shares with other hominine species 
(i.e., species belonging to the genus Homo). This ancestor was endowed with key 
hominine characteristics of neoteny, terrestriality, bipedalism, encephalization 
and civilization. (Foley/Lewin 2004 [hereafter FL], 19, 39) It is possible that these 
features evolved more than once (Wood 2002, 134), making it harder—and 
perhaps less important—to pin them to one ancestor. Hence, whatever the origin 
of these features, here we presuppose them.  
It is nonetheless important to see how these five hominine characteristics work 
together. Bipedalism makes sense only in a terrestrial mammal. Civilization offers 
an excellent environment for further encephalization, just as encephalization 
allows for complex communication, which is needed in a complex culture. 
Neoteny (developmental retardation) extends the juvenile period (cf. Somel et al. 
2009; Kipp 1980) and thus enhances the influence of culture. Tension arises 
between bipedalism and encephalization. Bipedalism needs a strong and dense 
pelvis, but encephalization implies a greater space for the birth canal in the 
female pelvis. The “evolutionary solution” of humans, that is, the adaptation that 
the skull of the infant unfolds after birth, shows that both encephalization and 
bipedalism remained essential (Aiello 1996).  
The fossil evidence shows that several hominine species precede sapiens:  
* Homo ergaster in Africa, who lived simultaneously with  
* Homo erectus in Asia, and his descendants;  
* Homo neanderthalensis in Europe (FL 332) and  
* Homo denisovan in Asia (Pennisi 2013)  
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Earlier hominine species, such as Australopithecines (e.g., the skeleton “Lucy”) or 
Homo habilis (“Turkana boy”), were extinct long before sapiens appeared, so we 
will neglect them here. 
To find the ancestor of sapiens, we first look at the chronology. From its 
appearance around 160 kya, sapiens lived simultaneously with neanderthalensis 
and denisovan until the extinction of neanderthalensis around 30 kya. (We are not 
sure when denisovan disappeared; the species was only recently discovered.) This 
eliminates neanderthalensis and denisovan as ancestors of sapiens.  
Next, we look at geography. There are two extreme models of the dispersion of 
sapiens. One is the multiregional model defended by Wolpoff. In several regions, 
hominine species evolved to sapiens and interbred. The other is the "Out-of-
Africa" model defended by Leakey, who placed the origin of sapiens in Africa, so 
with ergaster, and explained its dispersion as the effect of migration out of that 
vast continent, around 80 kya.5 Until now, the fossil evidence has affirmed 
Leakey’s view. The oldest remains of sapiens in Africa date to 160 kya (White et al. 
2003), while those in Asia date to 60 kya and those in Europe date to 40 kya. In 
the Middle East (Israel), a middle date was found in Qafzeh near the Lake of 
Galilee, around 100 kya. Thus, these dates suggest Leakey was correct in his 
pattern of origin in Africa and dispersal from there through the Middle East 
towards Asia and Europe, where sapiens must have coexisted (and mated) with 
neanderthalensis and denisovan. Perhaps they also encountered late individuals 
of erectus. It is possible that neanderthalensis lived in Europe in colder periods of 
the Pleistocene, whereas the warm-adapted sapiens only came there during the 
warmer periods (FL 383). However, the most recent neanderthalensis remains do 
not display any signs of an evolution towards sapiens, which would have 
supported Wolpoff’s multiple region model. Until now, the latter theory has 
lacked strong evidence. (FL 377-89)  
Genetic (mitochondrial) material supports the Out-of-Africa theory (FL 407f).  
The behavioural evidence, as researched by archaeology, also supports the Out-
of-Africa theory (so ergaster as predecessor of sapiens). However, it contradicts 
the anatomical view of where in Africa sapiens originated. The anatomical 
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 This is the Out-of-Africa II hypothesis, concerning sapiens, which is not to be confused 
with the Out-of-Africa I hypothesis concerning ergaster/erectus, relating to migration 
around 1.5 mya. Cf. Mellars (2006) 
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evidence places the cradle of sapiens in the north, in Ethiopia, whereas the 
behavioural evidence points to southern Africa. The tools connected with sapiens 
have diverse forms that show growing precision, training and instruction. The 
earliest evidence was found in southern Africa (FL 424; 431), which includes 
decorative objects and art forms (i.e., traces of symbolic thinking) from around 77 
kya.  
  
Engraved ochre stone, 7 cm, 
found in Blombos Cave, South 
Africa. Around 77 kya. 
Bifacial points, Blombos Cave.  
Photos: Haarland. Source: Wikipedia 
Figure 1 
 
 
Chauvet Cave, Ardeche France. 
Around 32 kya 
Female figurine, Hohe Fels, Germany, 
mammoth ivory. 
Around 35 kya. 
Figure 2 
Apparently, the speciation of sapiens around 160 kya did not immediately involve 
symbolic behaviour. It seems that only around 77 kya did its most southern 
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population set its first steps in this direction. By then, sapiens had dispersed, 
around 80 kya, to Europe and Asia. These migrators seem to have acquired 
symbolic thinking only around 35 kya, but took it to a new level in the Upper 
Palaeolithic, teaching Africa the “law of the handicap of a head start” (Wet van de 
remmende voorsprong), a phrase coined by the Dutch historian Romein. 
This symbolic explosion took place not only in Europe, but also, as recently 
discovered, in Asia (Aubert et al. 2014). New findings will no doubt astonish us 
further. 
We will now focus on the moment language appeared in human evolution.  
1.3 Language as an explanandum for evolutionary theory 
Evidence of complex and diverse stone tools and symbolic behaviour points to 
cognitive abilities that we usually associate with communication and symbolic 
thinking: in other words, with language. Language enables instruction; a symbol is 
close to a word. Would we have experienced a Blombos Cave inhabitant as one of 
ourselves? Did he or she speak? Or did modern humanity only appear later, after 
a critical biological change that enabled an entire range of complex behaviours, 
including language? Theories diverge on this point. 
The divergence is partly determined by the fact that language is crucial for 
humanness. There is no report of a human population without language, whereas 
no living population of our nearest relatives, such as the gibbon, chimpanzee, 
gorilla and orang-utan, has it.6 The fact that all humans share this trait suggests 
that it depends on the species genotype. In such cases, Dobzhansky’s sweeping 
statement, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”, must 
be our guide.  
Darwinist logic requires sketching the evolutionary path of linguistic abilities step-
by-step from ergaster to sapiens. Although every step must lead to a relative 
optimum within reach, it must be a small one. Therefore, there must have been 
many steps, which implies a process of long duration. Thus, it seems natural to 
look for the beginnings of linguistic abilities in ergaster, the older hominine. 
However, the linguistic competences of prehistoric humans are as undetermined 
as they are interesting. Palaeoanthropologists and archaeologists have to deal 
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 However, it is teachable to a certain extent and in certain circumstances to bonobos, as 
in the example of Kanzi (Segerdahl et al. 2005). 
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with the fact that language does not fossilize. It leaves only indirect and 
ambiguous evidence of brains, speech production, complex behaviour and genetic 
material. How can these four areas help us in the task of dating the origin of 
language?  
The brain might tell us about language, in that we know that the damage of 
certain brain areas (Broca’s, Wernicke’s) hampers linguistic abilities. There are 
however three problems. First, there is no specific language part in the brain that 
is absent in non-linguistic species (Deacon 1997, 286). Instead of a “language 
area”, we must think of language as a brain function in which many areas work 
together. Second, we do not know whether the pronounced development of 
these areas was caused by linguistic behaviour, including sign language (Corballis 
1999), or presupposes it. Third, brains do not fossilize, so the indirect evidence 
has to come from endocasts, or remains of the upper skull. This line of research 
therefore remains speculative, providing only “tantalizing hints” (FL 466). 
The organs of speech production perform only slightly better as evidence for 
dating the origin of language. The human vocal tract is unique in the animal world 
because of the low position of the larynx. Because the soft tissue of the larynx 
does not fossilize, indirect evidence is needed from the basicranium, the skull 
base. It seems that the lowering of the larynx began with ergaster/erectus (FL 
467). This might have had to do with selection pressure. The Darwinist reasoning 
is as follows: Those who are less able to express themselves, have fewer 
possibilities to mate, so their genetic material has fewer chances to influence the 
future population. However, having greater possibilities of speech does not imply 
the beginning of language. It is possible that earlier species at that early stage had 
non-vocal, gestural languages (Donald 1991), and that the later dominance of 
sapiens is explained by their vocal language, freeing the hands to improve 
technology (Corballis 1999). It is also possible that ergaster used the larynx for 
purposes other than language. Thus, this line of evidence is also inconclusive. 
The third kind of evidence for the presence of language is complex behaviour, 
such as cooperation or symbolic expression. However, behaviour does not 
fossilize; it can only be traced through indirect evidence, such as tools or objects 
of art. Concerning tool use and tool fabrication, this evidence leads only to 
speculation as long as there is no clear idea about the amount of complexity 
required for a minimal language. Objects of art are very similar to language. A 
depiction of a horse or a fish can be seen as a “word”, denoting a specific object 
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or kind of object because of the process of abstraction. Hence, language and art 
might have come about by a similar and simultaneous process. Because objects of 
art started to emerge only after 77 kya (Blombos Cave) and only fully after 40 kya 
(the “Palaeolithic revolution”; e.g., the paintings in Chauvet Cave or those recently 
discovered at Sulawesi, Aubert et al. 2014), language is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and possibly the finishing touch of sapiens. However, the evidence 
does not exclude an older origin. The control of fire perhaps was the threshold of 
complex behaviour, for it produced a severe selection pressure on cognition (i.e., 
do something wrong and your genes will not be reproduced), on the one hand, 
and a strong advantage over other inhabitants in your environment, on the other 
hand (Goudsblom 1992). Evidence of fire control is uncontroversial from 400 kya 
onward. Controversial sites date back to possibly 1.7 mya (James 1989). 
Unfortunately, although fire control must have stimulated cognitive evolution, it is 
not directly linked with language—except for the possibility that a fire hearth 
invites storytelling (Wiessner 2014). 
Genetic evidence is somewhat more precise but no less controversial. The FOXP2 
gene seems to regulate neural plasticity. Sapiens, neanderthalensis and possibly 
denisovan share the same version of this gene, whereas other mammals and 
vertebrates have different versions. In humans, mutations of this gene cause 
severe language disorders as well as problems with orofacial movements, such as 
those needed for pronunciation. FOXP2 is not “the language gene”, but it seems 
particularly connected to spoken language. Its mutational history opens a dating 
window around 200 kya, shortly before we project the arrival of sapiens (Enard et 
al. 2002, 871). Controversial however is the question whether the gene itself 
proves the presence of language. Any gene has many functions, and the moment 
at which it became involved in language is hard to determine. 
Hence, palaeoanthropological, archaeological and genetic evidence “help” us by 
tentatively selecting a period between 1.7 mya, or 200 kya, and 40 kya as the 
period in which language evolved.  
How did it evolve? To answer this question, we again use the Darwinian 
mechanisms of heredity, variation and selection. The genotype of hominins varied 
to the extent that it allowed certain individuals within a certain population to 
cooperate, communicate and cognize better than others. These possibilities made 
them more successful in producing offspring, either because they were able to 
provide more food or better shelter (natural selection) or because it gave them 
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more opportunities to mate (sexual selection). However, it required enough 
protein-containing food so that the development of the brain could be sustained 
(the brain needs a disproportionate amount of energy). This tentative 
development, dictated by environmental pressures, might have reached a point at 
which internal group pressure predominated.  
Any heritable trait which increases the ability of an individual to outwit his 
fellows will soon spread through the gene pool. And in these circumstances, 
there is no going back: an evolutionary ‘ratchet’ has been set up, acting like 
a self-winding watch to increase the general intellectual standing of the 
species. (Humphrey 1976, 311)  
This is logical inference, not concrete evidence. It does not answer questions such 
as when did it start, was speech or gesture the first medium, was it primarily for 
cooperation or communication or cognition? Moreover, the evolutionary picture 
must explain language not only as the concrete competence of its users, but also 
as a system containing grammar and lexicons. We will offer further theories 
concerning language evolution in Chapter II.  
Until now, we have focused on Darwinism and found our way to language. In the 
next section, we focus on linguistics. In the third section, we return to Darwinism 
and sketch the “paradox of language evolution”. 
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2. Linguistics and hermeneutics 
In section 2.1, I show how hermeneutics is an essential part of the study of 
language.  
Section 2.2 offers cases of interpretation in science about humans, or human 
societies. The overview does not need to be exhaustive in order to make the 
following point. Science about humans and societies is unthinkable without 
hermeneutics.  
Finally, section 2.3 follows the argument from philosophical hermeneutics that 
hermeneutics is deeply connected with our life experience, as is language. To have 
language is to live hermeneutically. 
2.1 Science and language 
Science can be described as a communal project to obtain general knowledge in a 
methodically justified way. The “scientific community” is the group of scientists 
living presently, communicating through publications and meetings. This 
community originated in ancient Greece, with Aristotle and Archimedes. Among 
its 19th century members were Wilhelm von Humboldt and Charles Darwin. 
Historically, the project branched into the natural sciences, the social sciences and 
the humanities.  
Natural sciences, such as physics, chemistry and biology, explain phenomena with 
the help of the deep physical structures and laws governing their changes. For 
example, the characteristics of materials are caused by the chemical structures of 
their components; the acceleration of a falling object is described by the law of 
gravity.  
The social sciences, such as psychology or sociology, explain social phenomena 
with the help of the deep psychological, neurological and chemical structures that 
influence them. Child trauma induces through hormonal mechanisms (Hüther 
2006) low self-esteem, which negatively affects school performance and 
heightens the chances of addiction to drugs or alcohol, causing reduced 
intelligence, and so on. Since the 1950s, the social sciences have absorbed as 
much mathematics and experimental methodology as possible in order to 
strengthen their scientific character, wooing the natural sciences with their status 
of “hard science” and giving the humanities the cold shoulder. 
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The humanities describe and explain typical human phenomena, such as art, 
folklore and history. They cannot take recourse in “laws” or “deeper structures”, 
but instead have to take phenomena at face value. The Battle of Waterloo cannot 
be explained by the neurological events in its participants, nor can the paintings of 
Matisse be explained with the help of a psychological analysis of his early years or 
a chemical account of his nourishment. Statistics plays a minor role in the 
humanities, although one could count the soldiers in the participating armies at 
Waterloo or the fire power of their armaments. By the same token, one could 
count the different shades of green in the paintings of Matisse and compare them 
with those in the paintings of Van Dongen. Experiments in history are mostly 
thought experiments: How strong was the force against which a certain far-
reaching decision was made? What chances had the different view to become 
accepted (Kershaw 2007)? The humanities use explanations and explanatory 
mechanisms when necessary, as the French “trauma” of 1870-1 which lead to a 
revanchism without which the First World War is hardly thinkable. 
The foregoing provides a negative account of the humanities. A positive 
description of the methods used in the humanities would include well-chosen 
juxtapositions in time, by historical narration (art history is the usual way to learn 
to understand art) and in place, by comparison (e.g., Matisse with Van Dongen, 
Mozart with Haydn). This method is so convincing that we also find historical 
narration in the natural sciences, such as in evolutionary theory. We will see 
below that the craft of “choosing well” rests on hermeneutics. 
As scientific objects, humans are not reserved to one of these branches. 
Anthropology is a part of biology, sociology is a social science and history belongs 
to the humanities. The fact that reality does not respect the distinction of the 
three branches of science invites interdisciplinary research. Psychology without 
neurology and neurochemistry makes no sense.  
Similarly, although linguistics primarily belongs to the humanities, it needs the 
natural sciences. For example, speech requires physical requirements, and 
language is a feature of our species. Neither can linguistics ignore the social 
sciences, for language is heavily influenced by social processes. The enormous 
language differences between adjacent tribes in New Guinea can be explained by 
the intention to be different.   
To illustrate the multiple sides of linguistics, we will briefly look at the difference 
between syntax, semantics, pragmatics and phonetics. The approach of Chomsky, 
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which dominated linguistics for many decades from 1960 on, favoured abstracting 
from concrete linguistic behaviour and concrete utterances (signs or sounds). Its 
object was the linguistic competence of the individual. At first, Chomsky thought 
that this competence consisted of a set of syntactic rules. (Syntax is grammar in so 
far as it accounts for how words form meaningful sentences; grammar is also 
about how words are composed and spelled.) This structuralist approach focuses 
on the underlying structures of possible sentences. It explicates these as implicit 
knowledge of every language speaker: a finite set of rules with which an infinite 
set of sentences can be generated (the theory is therefore called “generative 
grammar”). The “place” of this knowledge is in the ideal speaker and ideal hearer. 
Later, Chomsky thought that instead of innate rules, an innate set of switches is 
manipulated by the linguistic environment in which a child is raised. This is the 
“principles and parameters” approach. Only after a half century of linguistic work, 
in 2002, did Chomsky declare that implicit syntactical competence should have a 
place in evolutionary theory. His theory will be described in Chapter II. 
Whereas syntax concerns the structure of sentences, phonetics is the sound of 
morphemes (e.g., the sound “structure” has two morphemes: strac and tiur, but 
the sign has three). In between lies semantics, which concerns the meaning of 
words and sentences. We need semantics to explain phenomena. The following 
pairs of deductions have a similar syntactical form but a different logical value 
(Katz 1971, xxf).  
1. There is a fire in the kitchen. The kitchen is in my house. Hence, there is a fire in 
my house. 
2. There is a pain in my foot. My foot is in my shoe. Hence, there is a pain in my 
shoe. 
Or  
3. Every part of the toy is oily. Hence, the toy is oily. 
4. Every part of the toy is little. Hence, the toy is little.  
The difference between 1 and 2 and between 3 and 4 is explainable using the 
semantic categories of “fire” and “pain”, and of “oily” and “tiny”. “Pain” is a 
feature of sentient beings; shoes are non-sentient beings. “Fire” is a process that 
can happen in all places where there is inflammable matter and oxygen, which are 
normally in kitchens and houses. “Oily” is a material feature; what is said of the 
parts therefore counts for the whole. “Little” is a comparative feature, and as such 
it is not transitive from part to whole. The same applies to the category of 
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abstract form. If all parts of the toy are square, the toy itself can be a cube. When 
these categories are explained, the reasons that sentences 1 and 3 are logically 
valid (and 2 and 4 are not) are clarified. As Chomsky explored syntax, Katz’s 
semantic theory (1971) proposes exploring the deep structure of meaning. 
Semantics abstracts from the context in which language is used. Human language 
allows this abstraction, contrary to animal communication, because it is “domain 
independent”. Pragmatics studies the contribution of context to meaning. We 
assume what the hearer knows, and we often only say what is necessary to make 
him or her understand. “Next!” “Just one please” “Well done!” Such utterances 
can be enough in a certain context. If we ask the hearer what he or she had 
understood, the latter might say “The doctor asked for the next patient to come 
inside” “She only wanted one loaf of bread on her plate” or “He scorned me for 
what I have done”. This knowledge was available in the context. The last example 
shows that the context can even turn the semantic meaning into the opposite 
meaning. Context is needed to understand the meaning of the utterance but only 
because the sentence itself has a literal meaning. Semantic meaning is 
constitutive of pragmatic meaning. We must have something before we can turn 
it upside down. 
Syntax, semantics and pragmatics rely on the linguistic experience of scientist as a 
participator in a linguistic community. He or she knows intimately what a 
language is and how it is used. This is presupposed for recognizing linguistic 
behaviour as such. And only after having observed linguistic behaviour can the 
scientist conclude e.g. which brain parts contribute to certain aspects of language, 
or what structure the syntax has. In philosophical terms, this understanding 
constitutes the field of research. Without prior understanding, there is no 
linguistics. The results in turn add to, or correct, this understanding.  
This interdependence of prior understanding and experience has been called the 
“hermeneutic circle”. We see an utterance as language only because of our 
experience with language in daily life. The indispensability to linguistics of prior 
participatory knowledge means a hermeneutic moment in linguistics. 
The hermeneutic circle can be understood in contrast to the empirical cycle. In the 
empirical cycle, a question leads to certain observations. The observations must 
necessarily be made without previous knowledge constituting the field. This 
requirement is met by using unequivocal definitions (of warmth, movement etc. 
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as the basic elements of a theory), quantification, measuring instruments. 
Furthermore, experiments require settings in which unwanted influences are 
blocked in order to measure only what one wants to measure. The subsequent 
observations lead to quantifiable results that have a meaning within the theory, 
which leads to new questions, and so on.  
In the hermeneutic circle too, questions engender movement. In this case, 
however, observations require previous knowledge, that is, the scientist’s 
understanding, expectations, questions, sensitivities and knowledge. The quality 
of his or her “mental reception room” is decisive for the quality of the research 
results. In interpretation, what is observed is always described in terms exceeding 
the purely observable. A line drawn in a work of art has an empirically quantifiable 
curve; an interpreter could speak of it abstractly as having “tension”.  
A science has a hermeneutical moment when prior knowledge of the scientist as a 
person is methodologically applied.  
I said above that the humanities often work using the method of “well-chosen 
juxtapositions”: choosing well means omitting as much as possible. This mirrors 
the experimental setting, except that the “blocking out” of unwanted elements is 
not a spatial operation prior to the experiment but a mental, interpretative 
operation during and after the inquiry. For example, every history is written by 
omitting many facts and choosing a few. A good historical work, as distinguished 
from a mediocre one, offers facts that shed light on each other and make what 
happened understandable (Huizinga 1952, 2). The art of “choosing and omitting” 
requires the pre-concept of both the context and the personal aspects involved.  
In the next section, I want to show that other sciences than linguistics also have a 
hermeneutical moment (aspect, element, component).  
2.2 Hermeneutical elements in science 
Hermeneutical elements can be found in all sciences about humans and societies. 
I want to enumerate a few, in order to illustrate what I mean with “hermeneutical 
moment”.  
Archaeology has hermeneutic components (Hodder 2007). The objects in the 
Blombos Cave and the paintings in the Chauvet Cave (see figures 1 and 2) are 
recognized as art. In themselves, they are only pieces of marked stone or coloured 
parts of a cave’s interior. It takes human experience to recognize them as 
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intentional lines that were drawn to convey a meaning. The dimension of meaning 
that is opened by such objects cannot be measured by instruments. It can only be 
“heard” by humans, in the sense of “being spoken to”. This is not contradicted by 
the fact that we need the natural sciences to date the findings or to rule out the 
possibility that the engravings were not caused by something natural.  
In medicine, tests for a new medication for depression or headaches can only be 
carried out if the researcher knows what to ask and the test-persons know what 
to answer. How would one, for questionnaire purposes, define “depression” or 
“headache” in a natural way, without using terms from one’s own understanding 
of life and behaviour, that is, without hermeneutics? The results of a 
questionnaire only prove that people answered it in a certain way, not that 
something really changed on a physiological level.  
A sociological example was given in section 1.1, regarding the research on the 
evolution of time structures and Nepalese marriage habits. Both are framed in 
terms that were taken from prior experience in personal life. A description of 
behaviour exceeds a description of perceptions: to understand certain 
perceptions as “behaviour” and subsequently categorise “types of behaviour” 
presupposes a primary understanding of what behaviour is. The research itself 
drew upon knowledge, about e.g., what questions do we need to pose in order to 
know whether marriage habits in Nepal evolve in the direction of those of 
Western societies?  
In psychology, research on how the mind and brain work and how hormones drive 
our mental functions is framed in terms taken from understanding human life. 
The medication for headache is tested statistically only if the members of the test 
groups understand “head ache”, which is not definable in neurological terms. In 
modern times, we have learned to interpret human phenomena in scientific 
terms. For example, I might say “My melatonin level rises” instead of “I get tired” 
or “he was full of adrenaline” instead of “he was mad”, without having measured 
those hormones. It has even been argued that the social sciences (mainly 
sociology and psychology) are hermeneutic in a twofold way. First, their task is to 
interpret the actions of the humans they study. Second, they order their findings 
so that ordinary people can make sense of them (Giddens, cit. in Delanty/Strydom 
2003, 402). 
In economics, it is clear that one should first learn to ask the right questions 
before conducting research. However, this hermeneutic moment is not explicated 
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when the economic counsellors of governments offer expert advise on how to 
handle the economy by keeping inflation low, capitalising the banks, allowing free 
trade and so on. This apparent scientificity all too often cloaks ideology.  
Peasant and noble, worker and factory owner, waiter and banker: each has 
his or her own unique vantage point and sees important aspects of how 
other people live and what relations of power and domination exist 
between social groups, and these observations shape each person’s 
judgement of what is and is not just. Hence there will always be a 
fundamentally subjective and psychological dimension to inequality, which 
inevitably gives rise to political conflict that no purportedly scientific 
analysis can alleviate. Democracy will never be supplanted by a republic of 
experts – and that is a very good thing. (Piketty 2014, 2; cf. Habermas 
1968a, 137).  
The “subjective” and “political” dimension of economics must be kept in view, or 
economics as a science is isolated from the real questions.  
To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its 
childhood passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often 
highly ideological speculation, at the expense of historical research and 
collaboration with other social sciences... This obsession with mathematics 
is an easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity without having to 
answer the far more complex questions posed by the world we live in [my 
italics]. (Piketty 2014, 32) 
So much for the overview of hermeneutics in the human social sciences. However, 
one could counter that hermeneutics remains a non-scientific element in science 
and that its role must be diminished. After all, hermeneutics allows for opposing 
judgments, without a clear way of deciding which has more validity or even truth, 
in the sense in which an experiment might be decisive in the natural sciences. 
However, there are three arguments against the judgment that hermeneutics is 
an unwanted element in science. 
First, just because the methods of the natural sciences have been successful in 
their field does not mean that they are as useful in other fields. This assumption 
would imply a methodological absolutism as irrational as the absolutism criticized 
in the Enlightenment. The fact that science historically developed the three 
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branches sketched above indicates the need of scientists to adapt to the specific 
qualities of their object.  
Second, the fact that interpretation cannot start without foreknowledge or 
prejudice still allows for rationality. In order to be rational, the interpretation 
must start with an acceptance and certain explication of one’s point of departure. 
This point is part of the “hermeneutic circle”, and as such it enables certain 
questions about the things we perceive from there. No doubt, we can hardly 
explicate our prejudices to the extent to which a medieval reader would have 
understood us, or a tribal member of the BaMbuti pygmies would understand us 
(Turnbull 1961). Much of our understanding is too implicit to notice. However, the 
method is rational in the sense that it includes the willingness to enter dialogue 
and debate the justification of our starting point. We are capable of starting a 
meta-conversation in natural language about the rules and the world. This critical 
meta-conversation is an integral part of hermeneutics (Habermas 1973; Apel 
1971, 1980). It hinges on what Apel called “the transcendental language-game of 
the unlimited communication community” (1978, 159).7 The scientist needs to 
justify his or her choices not only to the present members of the scientific 
community but also to future members. Many aspects of science may have 
changed by then, but what will remain are meta-rules, such as “rules and facts 
should be respected”, “argue coherently” and “communicate truthfully”. Science 
anticipates an ideal: we reconstruct our community “both empirically and 
normatively critically in the light of the ideal of the unlimited communication 
community that is to be realized in society” (Apel 1978, 140). 
Third, even the natural sciences rest on hermeneutical ground. Although this 
seems an outrageous statement, the argument for it has been with us since its 
formulation by Husserl. It is a philosophical hermeneutical claim and it runs as 
follows: Historically, everyday life experience in the world led to measurements of 
objects, surfaces, movements and so on. This concrete measuring then gave rise 
to further idealisation and abstraction in mathematics. Since Galilei, mathematics 
structures and physics have been used to explain the world. Its objective results, 
however, are only a travesty of the world as we experience it. Not only historically 
but also structurally does the “life-world” (Ströker 1979) remain the ground of 
science and “the essential meaning of the given world as horizon of all inductions 
that make sense” (Husserl 1935, 54). Recently, it has been shown that our 
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understanding of scientific concepts depends on our bodily experience, that is, 
our knowledge as embodied beings in the world. According to Lakoff (1987, xv; cf. 
Abram 1996), “Reason is made possible by the body”. Scientific understanding of 
the world also depends on emotional self-control. Only after humans were able to 
control the expression of spontaneous emotions were they able to develop the 
view of a mechanic movement of the planets (Elias 1997, 62). Not to remember 
this origin of science is “naive” (Husserl 1935, 56).  
One could counter by saying “Yes, but the concrete table is less real, or less true, 
than the table as explained by physics. After all, it is with physics that we build 
bridges and computer networks, so it works and therefore it’s true.” However, 
this argument underlines Husserl’s view, for it seeks the justification of physics in 
the life-world of home, traffic and communication. Even the mathematical 
experience of an outcome as “evident” is an experience in the life-world.  
The same goes for the logical-positivist project (Carnap 1932). Carnap proposed 
the design of a logically correct language, in which empty formulae, such as 
“Caesar is a prime” or “Das Nichts nichtet” (Heidegger), could be ruled out as 
nonsense. Only those sentences would remain that could be grounded in protocol 
sentences, such as propositions that expressed simple perceptual truths. 
However, Carnap encountered a twofold problem. First, no sound definition of 
“protocol sentence” could be agreed upon. Second, the language in which the 
logically correct language would be agreed upon is itself a natural language, that 
is, the language of the life world. The experience with the life-world, however, is 
the field of meanings, the field of hermeneutics. To study it, one needs a 
hermeneutic philosophy or a philosophical hermeneutics, as rational research into 
the grounds of scientific activity. 
Philosophical hermeneutics has two main themes. One is the importance of the 
life-world for our thinking, as revealed by Husserl. The other theme, the 
constitutive role of language, is the subject of the next subsection.  
2.3 Philosophical hermeneutics and language 
At first sight, language is a trait, appearing recently in the evolution of one 
species, like the trait of brood-parasitical behaviour appeared in a few species. 
However, language is more than just an explainable trait. Twentieth-century 
philosophy, especially through philosophical hermeneutics, has driven home the 
point that language is the medium through which we know any object, including 
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ourselves. This is why language is, as asserted in the Introduction, a precious gift 
bestowed on every human infant. 
To Wittgenstein, language is the prototype of those phenomena that cannot be 
justified, only joined. To Gadamer, language opens the horizon against which we 
understand and interpret; its contribution to our understanding cannot be 
objectified. To Taylor, language is connected to the first-person view. Language 
has a transformative power, but only if we understand it from the point of view of 
participants, like we are. These three approaches all make the same point, viz. 
that language is more than an object – and that the scientific study of language 
needs to reflect this. 
2.3.1 Wittgenstein: from logic to forms of life 
Wittgenstein was fascinated by the constitutive power of language, asserting that 
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (1921, 5.6).8  
Wittgenstein first described language as the expression of facts, and facts as 
realized logical possibilities: “The facts in logical space are the world” (1921, 1.13). 
The contribution of logic and language to the world cannot be observed from an 
external viewpoint. “My fundamental thought is that [ . . . ] the logic of the facts 
cannot be represented.” (Wittgenstein 1921, 3.0312) However, not all language is 
meant to be a picture of facts. Indeed, “What does not get expressed in the sign is 
shown by its application.” (Wittgenstein 1921, 3.262) This seems to me the kernel 
of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the mark of the continuity in his 
development that Hutto (2003) described in an admirable synthesis of clarity and 
depth.  
About the “application” of signs, we need to remember the following. We often 
use language for means other than to make a proposition. We express, inquire, 
tell stories and joke, to name a few uses of language that are not propositional. 
One may ask the transcendental question, “What must be true, given this 
variety?” Wittgenstein’s later answer was no longer the logic of language, but the 
logic of “language games” or “forms of life” (Wittgenstein 1953), to which he 
reckoned not only linguistic usages but also intelligible forms of life, such as 
playing a game, driving a car, cooking dinner, building a house and so on. Thus, in 
a way, “language” is the paradigm of an intelligible activity in the world and 
therefore constitutes our view on the world, other humans and ourselves. We 
                                                     
8
 References to Wittgenstein 1921 and 1953 are to the propositions, not the pages. 
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know forms of life as participants, in an implicit understanding. According to 
Wittgenstein, “We may say: it only makes sense for someone to ask what 
something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name” (1953, 31).  
What connects all language games is not “language in general”, about which 
philosophy could make theories, but them being members of the family of 
languages, sharing some characteristics with these members and other 
characteristics with others. The notion of “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein 
1953, 67) protects the multi-faceted phenomenon of language from remarks that 
would be too general, and therefore unreal. Although “it may come to look as if 
there were something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a 
single completely analysed form of every expression” (91), this is not the case. 
There is no such essence; language use is never completely lucid to us. 
Wittgenstein proposes reaching clarity by putting philosophical doubts to rest and 
opening our eyes to the concrete (moral) context in which we are placed. 
“‘Language (or thinking) is something unique’—this proves to be a superstition 
(not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions” (110).  
‘But you talk as if I weren’t really expecting, hoping, now, - when I thought I 
was.’ ... What is happening now has significance – in these surroundings. 
The surroundings give it its importance. And the word ‘hope’ refers to a 
phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face.) 
(583) 
Linguistic meaning is not a scientific object for the natural sciences: “Our problem 
is not a causal but a conceptual one”. (1953, II: 183)  
We saw that language games are the mother of meaning and that we only know 
them as participants. The philosophical hermeneutic point is that these language-
games do not stand in need of justification. They are the suppositions of 
justification. That is why Wittgenstein rejects a neurological explanation or 
justification of language games.  
‘Just now I looked at the shape rather than at the colour’. Do not let such 
turns of phrase confuse you. Above all, don’t wonder ‘what might be going 
on in the eyes or brains here?’ *my italics+ (1953, II: 243)  
‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is 
false?’ – What is true or false is what humans say; and it is in their language 
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that humans agree. This is agreement not in opinions but in forms of life. 
(1953, 241) 
The everyday language-game is to be accepted, and false accounts of it 
characterized as false. The primitive language-game which children are 
instructed in needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be 
rejected. (1953, II: 161)  
What people accept as a justification shows how they think and live. (1953, 
325) 
2.3.2 Gadamer: language as horizon and as a means of transportation 
Humans live as linguistic beings, and their efforts to understand something are 
explicated in language. Every experience tends to be formulated in words 
(Gadamer 1960, 421; 436). Words have an explicatory power that is transparent 
and expressive or descriptive. This linguisticity of understanding led Gadamer to 
call the hermeneutic circle a “hermeneutic conversation” (391) with the person or 
object (tool, text) that we try to understand.  
Language offers humans a shared world. World (Welt) is not the same as 
environment (Umwelt, Gadamer 1960, 447). World is linguistically articulated; it is 
how human language transforms the human environment. The unity of our world 
is given by its horizon. Reading an ancient text, interpreting a cave painting, and 
even finding ancient footprints (Ashton et al. 2014; Raichlen et al. 2010), we feel a 
connection that presupposes a shared horizon.  
The meaning we perceive is not past but present (Gadamer 1960, 396). What 
connects humans is a horizon, the background against which we understand, 
behind which we cannot (and need not) see. Our dialogue partners themselves 
also have/had a horizon. Hermeneutics is the task of melding these horizons (401, 
cf. 467). 
The horizon (as the scene of the hermeneutic dialogue) is an image implying that 
“hermeneutics does not know the problem of origin” (Gadamer 1960, 476). Just 
as the horizon does not begin somewhere, our understanding always starts in the 
middle and reaches as far back and forth as it needs. Of both language and 
horizon, we normally do not notice their contribution to what we see. Conversely, 
language without the context in which it is used is a poor phenomenon: 
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The language that lives in speaking, and that embraces all understanding, 
including that of text interpreters, is involved in thinking and interpretation 
to the extent that too little is left when we decide not to use the contents 
languages gives us, and only see language as a form. (Gadamer 1960, 409)  
This does not imply that language is a prison. It offers, like an horizon, a 
productive constraint, it enables instead of imprisons. It allows for the “infinite 
dialogue” (1967, 139) with others by which I can learn. Metaphorically speaking, 
language is the means of transportation within the horizon.  
2.3.3 Taylor: the transformative power of language 
Taylor distinguished two aspects of linguistic meaning: designative meaning and 
expressive meaning. The first, designative meaning, points to something in the 
world. The second does not point as such, but directs my attention to the 
subjective state of the speaker, to his or her perception, thought, anxiety and so 
on (Taylor 1985, 218).  
Designative meaning is primal for philosophers who see meaning and language as 
unproblematical. It is “just about the world”; it helps us to communicate 
efficiently about our surroundings and our planned action in it. This kind of 
meaning “offers the promise of a theory of language which can fit into the canons 
of modern natural science” (Taylor 1985, 221). By contrast, expressive meaning is 
unthinkable without the subject, without taking into account his or her specific 
point of view, which is an hermeneutic enterprise.  
Taylor speaks of a “metaphysical” (1985, 220) difference between views giving 
primacy to either designative or expressive meaning. By contrast, I would like to 
stress the methodological difference. We are well advised if we abstain from 
metaphysics as the inquiry into the ultimate nature of reality. It used to be called 
“first philosophy” because of its importance to the ancients. However, I propose 
to make it the last philosophy. Let us leave metaphysics aside until we have 
settled all other questions. Only then can we hope to answer questions about the 
nature of reality.  
According to Taylor, language transforms things. Take feelings as an example. 
Animals and humans express their feelings. A linguistic expression of feelings is 
distinctive because it gives the feelings “a reflective dimension which transforms 
them . . .  Man completes himself in expression“ (Taylor 1985, 233).  
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For expressed anger differs from unexpressed anger, and persons who express 
themselves potentially transform themselves by such expression. Man and 
expression are in a kind of dialectical relation. My expression has become a fact, 
connected to me, and I am aware of its connection with me, so now it influences 
both me and my future expressions. Taylor ascribed this insight to thinkers of the 
Romantic period, such as Humboldt. He maintained that we could not be human 
without language. Being human is not just something determined by birth; it is 
also an assignment, a calling, and we cannot hear this calling, nor can we follow it 
as best as we can, without the mastery of language.  
In order to be able to recognize a word as something meaningful, we have to have 
a “reflective awareness”: 
[S]peaking is not only the expression of this capacity but also its realization . 
. . . The expressive dimension is fundamental to language because it is only 
in expression that language comes to be. (1985, 229)  
There are no purely designative sentences: every linguistic utterance, even “the 
cat is on the mat”, expresses our reflective awareness.  
If we take the expressive aspect of language as something important, then the so-
called truth-conditional theories of language, which rely on language as primarily 
designating (e.g. the theory of Millikan, Chapter II, 2.1), can never be sufficient. To 
say that linguistic meaning is derived from objects or facts is to deny an important 
aspect of language, impoverishing it to a mere depictive medium (Taylor 1985, 
252f). 
The creative aspect of language (in addition to the purely designative aspect) is 
not only attached to this transformative power through expression. It also creates 
a public space, a shared realm of meanings in which things, the bearers of those 
meanings, exist as well as the community of those communicating them (Taylor 
1985, 259). Language is not just communication between subjects about objects; 
it opens a world in which we are together. We are in a kind of dialectical relation 
with this linguistic world. It forms us in order that we form it. Without the concept 
of public space, one cannot understand how modern society works (cf. Habermas 
1962). 
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3. The paradox of language evolution 
Section 3.1 explains that two elements of our paradox, intendedness and 
unintendedness, cannot be easily combined; moreover, one cannot be reduced to 
the other.  
Section 3.2 shows that paradox only becomes a genuine contradiction if we 
assume that an exclusive methodological naturalism is right. Because 
contradictions are to be avoided, I argue against choosing exclusive naturalism as 
a methodological position.  
Finally, in section 3.3, I will sketch what the paradox should mean for the 
enterprise of theorizing about language evolution. Based on the paradox, two 
pairs of desiderata for an evolutionary theory of language are formulated. In 
Chapter II, these desiderata will help us to evaluate leading Darwinist theories on 
language evolution. In that chapter, we will study empirically what in this first 
chapter is argued for theoretically. The desiderata will then guide us to a Darwinist 
theory on language evolution that is not based on naturalism, as discussed in 
Chapter III.  
3.1 Blindness and sight: contradiction or combination 
As we saw in section 1, Darwinian evolutionary theory explains evolution with the 
help of three “mechanisms” heredity, variation and selection, which operate 
without intentions and inner directness, hence “blindly”.  
- Heredity means generally that the genome is copied. This copying is a 
natural process to which we cannot ascribe any consciousness or 
awareness. As far as cultural heredity is concerned, Darwinian literature 
tends to describe this as mindless “copying” (Dawkins 1976) as well.  
- Variation can happen in two ways. First, the genomic copying can be 
faulty. Second, under the influence of epigenetic processes, variation is 
possible in the “expression” of the genes in the phenotype. Both 
variation-causing processes are fully physicochemical and without 
intention.  
- Selection is the outcome of the living of phenotypes in an environment. 
Some variations might be better suited to live, mate, reproduce and raise 
offspring than others are. However, on the part of the environment, there 
is no sight, no conscious choosing of one variety instead of another. On 
the part of the species, there is no choosing to be a certain variation, only 
the urge to survive and to reproduce. 
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The unintentionality of the evolutionary process towards language in this 
Darwinian view is in contrast with the intentional awareness of the linguistically 
explicated Darwinian view. This is the language in evolutionary theory. The 
Darwinian scientist asks about phenomena, judges the evidence before him or 
her, designs a theory suiting the evidence best, chooses arguments, picks his 
battle (Kronfeldner 2010). He or she knows what he is doing and why.  
A Darwinist might maintain that he does not know what he is doing, that his 
scientific activity is just as mindless as the genome copying of which he is the 
result. Such a position equates science with religion, opinion, illness, digestion, 
and eventually the blowing of the wind. However, most scientists will maintain 
that their theories are superior to religion or opinion. Thus, the self-understanding 
of the scientist as mindless might be coherent with his interpretation of 
Darwinism, but is incoherent with the character and claims of science as such. 
On the one hand, we have mindless contingent processes that are not directed by 
a consciousness and not constrained by an “essence”. The results of these 
processes are often unpredictable, but they can usually be explained with help of 
the mechanisms. On the other hand, we have cognitive processes that are 
directed by questions and problems, and constrained by concepts and ideas. It is 
not easy to bring these two kinds of processes together in one view, as they 
require a different perspective.   
The complexity of the task caused some thinkers to try move both processes 
under one umbrella. However, the proposition “all cognition necessarily has no 
intentionality” makes no sense. We would be at a loss to interpret such a 
proposition. The more one insists on the mindlessness of cognition, the more one 
advocates the mind perspective, which is to commit a practical self-contradiction, 
as I argued above. The contrary proposition, “all natural processes are of an 
intentional nature” would relieve us from the burden of combining blindness and 
sight by eliminating blindness. However, it would lead us from the frying pan into 
the fire, for what on earth does it mean to say that all natural processes are 
intentional? Whose intentionality, what intentionality, and how do we know it? 
Such pan-psychic views are too odd to be acceptable in contemporary science, so 
I will not take them into consideration.  
We have established the necessity of the task of developing a view that combines 
the two. We now ask the question, if we must reserve some space in nature for 
conscious decisions, understanding and justifications, how wide should that space 
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be? Too narrow a space would not do. For example, reserving the space to only 
the inner circle of scientists, as the elite who are the sole persons with insight, 
would lead to two problems. First, nobody outside the circle would be able to 
understand the happy few. This contrasts especially with the fact that no scientific 
theory is exported to the public domain to the extent that Darwinism is.9 Two, it 
would not relieve us of the burden of explaining its emergence in principle. Hence, 
let us assume that all humans have the ability to make conscious decisions and to 
justify their behaviour. It belongs to our present species. The Darwinian question 
then must be how has this ability evolved in our species, and what is its relation 
with unconscious physiological processes?  
Darwinian evolutionary theory suggests that the evolution of language resembles 
a gradual opening of one’s eyes. First, one sees nothing, then there is a dim light, 
and so on. The peculiarity of this suggestion is that it plays the film backwards. 
The film starts with us and our present knowledge and lets it diminish until it is 
not there. Once we have reached that endpoint, we call it a “starting point”, and 
then it is easy to imagine how we developed - because we were there all along. As 
a scientific suggestion, it starts as a hermeneutic circle, which is not problematic in 
itself, but then it jumps out of the circle, which is incoherent. It is like pointing at 
the neurological underpinnings of language games. Borrowing an image of 
William James, it is like “seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to 
turn up the gas quickly enough to see the darkness” (James 1892, 160). 
Why would one want to jump out of the circle, and deny the hermeneutic 
moment in one’s reasoning? I suggest that one assumption, held by many but not 
often explicitly argued for, explains this tendency. This assumption is naturalism.  
 
                                                     
9
 Recently, some scientists measured the popular belief in evolutionary theory. An article 
in Science (Miller/ Scott et al. 2006) about the results caused some frowns because of the 
poor number of true believers. However, what should have caused the frowning was the 
category mistake. Science is a project of scientists, and its theories are not intended to 
gain popularity or acceptance among lay people. The article suggests that evolutionary 
theory is an exception to this rule. Apart from the question of whether this is in the 
interest of science, the fact that this categorical mistake remained unnoticed is puzzling. 
Compare this with the ideological reception of Darwinism during its first decades (Bayertz 
1983). 
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3.2 Methodological naturalism 
In the present context, “naturalism” does not mean the literary style of Emile Zola 
and John Steinbeck, which was influenced by Darwinism. Neither do we mean it in 
the way that Darwin was viewed as a naturalist at the time. This naturalism is 
virtually synonymous with what we now call biology. Instead, we mean naturalism 
as a philosophical position. It arose in American thought as a “slightly disguised 
name” for materialism because the latter was the official metaphysics of the 
Soviet Union (Walsh 1963, 48). As such, it is a broad term and in need of 
specification. We will focus here on methodological naturalism, and ignore the 
other versions (ontological and epistemological) (cf. Katz 1998, xii).  
Methodological naturalism, which I will refer to as “naturalism” for the sake of 
brevity, claims that the methods of science of humans are continuous or will be 
eventually unified with the methods of the natural sciences. These methods 
correspond to the objects they study. The natural sciences study “natural 
objects”, but these are not easy to define as modern physics digs deeper and 
deeper in the nature of substance (Crane/Mellor 1990). For my purposes, it 
suffices to say that a natural object has three features:  
- It is located in time and space; 
- It is a part of the causal web, i.e., it causes and is caused;  
- As such, it can be studied and described objectively by a detached 
observer. 
 
Thus, a magnetic field is as much a natural object as a wave or an elephant 
population is. Naturalism declares that everything that seems something other 
than a natural object (e.g., a number or a mountain ghost) will turn out to be 
either a natural object, a property of it or an illusion. Now this is close to 
uncontroversial. Chomsky dubbed the dreadful alternative “methodological 
dualism”, “the view that we must abandon scientific rationality when we study 
humans ‘above the neck’ (metaphorically speaking), becoming mystics in this 
unique domain, imposing arbitrary stipulations . . . .” (Chomsky 2000, 76).  
However, I claim that not mysticism but hermeneutics is the candidate for the 
opposite position. To assess the power of hermeneutics as the opposite of 
Chomsky’s “methodological monism”, we must first distinguish between two 
kinds of knowledge: life-world knowledge and expert knowledge. (Instead of 
“knowledge” we can also say “meaning”.) Life-world knowledge is the core of the 
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three fields of hermeneutics we distinguished earlier: quotidian and historical 
interpretation and philosophical hermeneutics. It consists of the things we know 
about the world in order to live our life as the person we are in our community. 
We know that the earth is a planet in space, that each morning the sun rises and 
that there is a tree in front of our house. We know that the car moves forward 
only when we have performed certain actions, that our colleagues will recognize 
us when we return to work, that we have to eat when we feel hungry and so on. 
In contrast, expert knowledge digs behind the user-friendly surface of these 
things. It is obtained by using specific methods. Because the perceptions formed 
during methodical research are not those of ordinary life (e.g., spectroscopy or 
microscopy), the terms receive a precise definition or operationalization. These 
terms allow for measurement (e.g., in the natural sciences) and formalization 
(e.g., in logic or algebra). In expert knowledge, terms such as “mass”, “velocity”, 
“digestion”, “DNA” and “oxygen” have meanings other than those in the life-
world. Corresponding with this distinction is Sellars’ description of the “manifest 
image of man” as opposed to the “scientific image of man” (Sellars 1962).  
The relation between these kinds of knowledge, or meaning, is complex (cf. 
Bennett et al. 2007). Knowledge of the life-world is with us from the beginning, 
that is, from the start of prehistory. Expert knowledge only entered the scene 
from the scientific revolution onwards, with Galilei, Newton and Boyle. Not only 
historically but also psychologically does expert knowledge follow life-world 
knowledge. Its beginnings are explained to us in life-world terms. Although expert 
knowledge “purports” to be “complete” (Sellars 1962, 20), that is, without the 
need for life-world (Sellars: “manifest”) knowledge, it is not clear how it could 
eclipse life-world knowledge. Because no one can become an expert in all fields of 
knowledge, if the knowledge is important to others as well as the experts, it has to 
be translated into life-world knowledge-terms to convey life-world meanings.  
The translation process often starts earlier. Because the problems for which 
science searches solutions are often problems in the life-world, the first 
translation is that from the life-world problem into the terms of expert 
knowledge. Suppose I tell my doctor about a persisting headache. He translates 
this into what he knows of human nervous system, blood pressure and so on. He 
measures several things (please excuse my vagueness; I am not an expert in these 
things). He then prescribes a medicine, a massage treatment or a few days off 
work. However, the doctor can never measure whether the headache has 
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persisted or not. He has to ask me, the non-expert. Even if I do not want it to, the 
headache remains a part of the life-world. 
This example can be generalized. Concepts with a life-world meaning cannot be 
operationalized to expert knowledge without changing their meaning. The 
operationalization of life-world concepts to measurable expert knowledge 
alienates us from the phenomenon (which does not mean that it should not be 
done; on the contrary, it produces important knowledge). For example, if my 
doctor told me “I have measured that your head-ache is over”, it would be 
alienating; “anxiety” is not the same as having a certain level of adrenaline in the 
blood; “emotion” is not the same as a certain configuration of facial muscles; and 
our topic, “language”, is not the same as a “communication system” that could 
also apply to the communication between cells; we do not say that the cells 
“speak” to each other. Other examples of typical life-world concepts are 
“politics”, “rational”, “meaning”, “community”, “friendship”, “individuality”, 
“authenticity”, “honesty”, “science” and “art”.  
I do not want to suggest that life-world knowledge is for lay people and expert 
knowledge for scientists. In this, I differ from Sellars’ famous distinction between 
the “manifest” and “scientific” images of man (Sellars 1962). Instead, I claim that 
many sciences combine the two kinds of knowledge. In other words, in many 
sciences, life-world knowledge is an essential part of the research. This is not the 
case in the natural sciences, such as physics, chemistry, astronomy and geology 
(although they have – as we saw- a hermeneutical base), but it is the case in the 
social sciences and the humanities. The reader will remember the “hermeneutic 
moment” in these sciences, as described in the previous section. This is no 
coincidence. Life-world knowledge is with us from the beginning, and it allows us 
to make sense of our world. We know what art is and we know what language is, 
as well as politics, friendship and emotions. Such concepts are not translatable in 
sub-human terms without a loss. Their meaning resides in the language of “the 
community intentions which provide the ambience of principles and standards 
(above all, those which make meaningful discourse and rationality itself possible) 
within which we live our own individual lives” (Sellars 1962, 40), that is, the life-
world.  
After this discussion of expert and life-world knowledge, we are in a position to 
assess Chomsky’s concept of methodological monism. Let us define this position: 
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Methodological naturalism is the view that humans and human 
phenomena must be explained exclusively through the methods of the 
natural sciences.   
This methodological monism means that eventually, the life-world meanings 
would succumb to the expert meanings of the natural sciences and the sciences 
continuous with them. To paraphrase Dilthey, “The enormous power of this 
naturalism is that it resists to be fooled. Its limitation is that it mutilates the 
meaningful by pressing it into the frame of an external reality” (cit. in De Boer 
1988, 29). We saw that Chomsky offered “mysticism” to those who were not 
satisfied with methodological naturalism. I suggested that “science with a 
hermeneutic moment”, or “hermeneutic science” for short, would be a better 
candidate. An operationalization of hermeneutic science is as follows:  
A science is hermeneutic if it uses life-world concepts to refer to topics of 
research and proposed explanations. 
The chief example of such a life world concept is “meaning”. A science in which it 
is important to know whether something meant something to somebody, is 
hermeneutic. Above, I distinguished between “meaning” and “cause”. Contrary to 
a cause, a meaning can be misunderstood. Contrary to a cause, a meaning 
depends on a pre-understanding of the context, i.e., on other meanings, in a 
symbolic system which is an element of our language definition.  
Operationalization can happen within and between domains. When they are 
operationalized in the natural sciences, hermeneutic concepts change their 
meaning. The same is true for the reverse movement: medical terms, such as 
“ADHD”, “DNA” and “autism” are widely used (operationalized) by lay people in 
the life-world, which is the hermeneutic domain, but these terms have lost their 
precise meaning, as in “I like computer programming; it’s in my DNA”. Hence, we 
can safely operationalize “hermeneutics” if we stay within the hermeneutic 
domain, as I have done above. 
These definitions of naturalism and hermeneutics allow for the free use of 
hermeneutics in natural scientific methods, just as they confront a methodological 
naturalism that anathematizes such cooperation. In section 2, I argued that 
excluding hermeneutics would lethally damage science. Hermeneutics will never 
fade into the methods of the natural sciences. Hermeneutics needs an attitude 
other than that required by the natural sciences. It asks for participation in a 
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context which gives meaning to objects. In contrast to participation in the 
hermeneutic circle, the empirical cycle in the perception-hypothesis-test-theory 
needs a detached observer. 
Knowledge of the natural sciences is applied in building bridges and aeroplanes. 
Sciences with a hermeneutic element also can be applied, e.g., in policy making 
(e.g., Helliwell/Layard/Sachs 2012) and pedagogy (Hüther 2006). 
The argumentative position of naturalism has two characteristics. First, naturalism 
cannot be justified by the natural sciences it values so much. Naturalism is about 
science; it is itself neither a testable theory, a hypothesis, a method nor a result. It 
is a belief and a conviction whose only legitimate role in science is heuristic. Its 
claim that the methods of natural science are the exclusive source of knowledge is 
not scientifically refutable, because it is not a scientific claim. Although naturalism 
is, like philosophical hermeneutics, a claim about science, it is weaker than the 
latter with respect to self-reflexivity. To the methods it propagates, it does not 
exist, for there is no natural science of ideas, or naturalism (if so, it would be 
hermeneutic), whereas a philosophical hermeneutical approach to philosophical 
hermeneutics is possible. 
The second feature of the argumentative position of this exclusive naturalism is 
that it is logically vulnerable. It can be refuted by one simple natural phenomenon 
escaping the natural sciences. The pivotal idea of this dissertation is that language 
is this phenomenon. First, language is natural. It is the human version of 
communication, and communicative behaviour is part of the subject field of 
ethology. Second, it needs hermeneutics in order to be studied. However, 
naturalism excludes hermeneutics (see the operational definition provided 
above). Hence, naturalism as a methodological position that excludes 
hermeneutics is refuted by the phenomenon of language. In the following 
chapters, I will illustrate this using examples of Darwinist theories of language 
evolution, and I will then ask what the refutation of this exclusive naturalism 
means for Darwinism. 
3.3 Accepting the paradox of language evolution 
Darwinian mechanisms have brought about natural diversity, including humans. 
When language and mind started to influence each other, a new kind of 
environment —culture—became a selective factor. Humans adapt to culture and 
influence it simultaneously.  
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Human culture became the “niche” in which human evolution went its own way, 
rewarding certain adaptations. The concept of niche is described in Chapter III. 
The niche does not evolve only on the biological, but also and primarily on the 
cultural level. As a cultural process, it demands hermeneutic scientific vocabulary 
and methods. In the first section of this Chapter, I sketched two of these 
evolutionary processes: time structures and Nepalese marriage habits. In my view, 
they can be seen as continuous with the Darwinist view through the concept of 
niche. Niche is not only an effect of evolution but also a cause in itself. What 
happens in a niche might eventually influence biological evolution. Language 
evolution is perhaps the main example. We are physiologically prepared to join 
this cultural phenomenon. 
The essence of our niche is its light: the light of thinking, of community, of 
language, of knowledge, and in the case of Western society, of science. The 
human niche is the ground and the product of hermeneutics. The light of language 
brought us knowledge of the blindness in and around us. Pointing at the blindness 
can only be done by those that see. The paradox of blind processes bringing sight 
into effect and seeing blindness everywhere is the core of what we are. Every 
attempt to explain it away weakens our understanding of ourselves. We had 
better accept it, like e.g. Habermas does. He calls his position “weak *ontological+ 
naturalism”: culture is a continuation of nature by other means, so irreducible 
(1998, 37-39). His use of the term “naturalism” differs from mine. His use is meant 
to stress the evolutionary continuity between humans and their animal 
predecessors. That becomes clear when he states that methodological naturalism 
is not able to understand the human perspective (1998, 34). 
Hermeneutics itself “does not know the problem of origin” (Gadamer 1960, 476). 
That is, the culture in which we find ourselves gives meaning to our world but we 
cannot study its influence on those meanings in the same way. The meaningful 
realm is presupposed in our questioning; it is not an “object”. In Chapter IV, I will 
sketch the outlines of a hermeneutic Darwinism.  
It is one thing to argue a priori that naturalist theories of language do not work. It 
is another thing to illustrate this by close consideration of such theories. In the 
Chapter II, I propose to do the latter. I will discuss several Darwinist theories on 
language, among which are naturalist ones. The theories will be evaluated in the 
light of two desiderata. These desiderata follow from the discussions in Chapter I. 
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1. Mechanism and interpretation. The explanation must use natural regularities 
that are grounded in aspects of the organism, such as genes or hormones, or in 
aspects of the trade-off between organism and environment, such as natural 
selection. It must however also explain the interpretative abilities needed for 
language use. This means that it must embrace the paradox. 
2. Gradualism and context. The explanation must describe development by 
juxtaposing phases or stadia. This must however also account for context: both 
the social context, in which an utterance has meaning, and the semantic context, 
that is the lexicon and syntax of a language, which make it a Saussurean system. 
These are supposed by every theory, as it takes its place in a context of 
justification, as distinguished from a context of stimulation or causation. 
We expect the leading Darwinist theories discussed in Chapter II to emphasize 
mechanism and gradualism. We will have to assess their strength in reaching a 
sufficient, satisfying explanation of interpretation and context.  
I claim that the smaller the distance between a theory on language evolution and 
our paradox, the better the theory. Inversely, less understanding of the 
paradoxical character of one’s undertaking weakens the theory. The paradox is 
the symbol of self-awareness. Self-awareness and science can strengthen each 
other dialectically; the lack of self-awareness undermines science. Perhaps 
philosophy, as the discipline of rational self awareness, functions as the 
conscience of science. 
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II. Darwinist views on the evolution of language 
This chapter introduces leading Darwinist approaches to the evolution of 
language. The theories will be evaluated in the light of the desiderata explained in 
the last section of the previous chapter: mechanism and interpretation, 
gradualism and context. Through these desiderata, we can determine how the 
theory relates to our paradox of language evolution. My choice of thinkers 
represents the main trends in the field.  
 
The first section gathers examples of approaches that study the evolution of, or 
within, concrete languages. They investigate phenomena of “cultural evolution” 
and the evolution of cultural phenomena (languages and words) with the help of 
Darwinian principles of heredity, variation and selection.  
 
The second section features theories that stress the “mechanisms” behind the 
evolution of humans towards the mastery of language. I have chosen Millikan’s 
theory because her “biosemantics” has been influential. She sees language as a 
biological object and approaches it using a naturalist supposition. The second 
thinker is Pinker, who speaks of a “language instinct”. Pinker is an influential 
thinker and writer on language and cognitive science and highly able to popularise 
theories, as well as to polemicize them. The third theory comes from Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch. They combined their knowledge of evolution and linguistics in 
the thesis that the Darwinist approach of language should primarily be interested 
in homologies.  
 
In the third section, we focus on three theories that sketch the path of human 
language evolution, those of Deacon, a biologist with neurological training, 
Donald, a cognitive psychologist and Bickerton, a linguist, all of whom offer views 
reflecting their expertise. Deacon sketches the “coevolution of language and the 
brain”. Donald distinguishes three stages in the evolution of memory within 
human cognition. Bickerton tries to identify the origin of protolanguage in the 
human ontogeny. We will note certain convergences between these three, 
including the awareness of the conceptual difficulty of the project. This trio is 
clearly aware of the paradox.  
 
Bickerton’s inclusion of niche construction theory is the bridge to Chapter III, which 
is about the construction of what I propose to call the “hermeneutic niche”.  
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1. Cultural evolution 
“Language evolution” in this dissertation means the coming into being of 
language as a phenomenon within the behaviour of a certain species. However, 
this subsection will expore its other meaning, as in: the evolution of a given 
language, such as Middle English, from an ancestor, such as Old English. The latter 
meaning belongs to the discipline of cultural evolution. Although these theories 
take “language evolution” in a different way, it is of interest to our inquiry because 
it is a good example of naturalism. Section 1.1 demonstrates that Pagel and 
Atkinson are interested in the units of words or languages as a whole. In section 
1.2, we see that Dawkins and Blackmore take a more general approach, seeing the 
units as “memes” or cultural replicators, such as tunes, clothing styles and words.  
1.1 Pagel, Atkinson and others: evolution within language 
If we take words as the units of cultural evolution, we might compare languages 
that are accepted as having a common origin in the Indo-European family. We 
notice that they have related forms for several words, such as “two”, “who” and 
“I”. Other words, such as “bird”, “tail” and “sand” have synonyms in other 
languages that are not at all similar (Pagel 2009, 410). Seen from an evolutionary 
perspective, the word “two” is homologous; it has accompanied relatively 
unchanged many evolutionary lines from the LCA. For example, the lungs of 
mammals are homologous, but their voices are not. Words like “sand” are less 
homologous and less stable. In technical terms, the words for the cognate “sand” 
differ more than those for the cognate “two”. 
The “slow rates *of change in words for cognates like ‘two’+ demonstrate that 
humans are capable of producing a culturally transmitted replicator [like a word] 
that, perhaps because of the purifying force of spoken word frequency, can have a 
replication accuracy as high as that of some genes” (Pagel/Atkinson/Meade 2007, 
718)—so much for heredity. Regarding variability, a statistical approach showed a 
correlation between frequency of word use and its variations. The more often a 
word is used, the more plausible it is that its form or meaning will not change. In 
other words, within a few hundred years, this word or a similar one will play a 
similar role. The same applies to new words; the higher the frequency, the more 
plausible its accurate proliferation. 
The Darwinian explanation for this apparent fact is not immediately clear. 
Regional or cultural factors cannot be responsible because the phenomenon can 
be found in many different societies and cultures. The authors propose two 
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compatible explanations: 1) the slower modifying categories of words are more 
important in conveying meaning than the ones that modify more quickly; 2) the 
“power law of learning”, that is, the more a word is used, the easier it is to 
pronounce, recall and perceive and the greater the social resistance against taking 
over modified forms (Pagel/Atkinson/Meade 2007, 719; cf. Pagel 2009). These 
factors concern the third Darwinian mechanism, selection. 
This hypothesis might help to determine how long ago the split between two 
daughter-languages from their ancestor language occurred. The more changes in 
words that are frequently used and/or are more important, the longer ago the 
moment of separation will have taken place. According to Pagel/Atkinson/Meade 
(2007, 719) “Within English . . . words spoken at a higher frequency are more 
likely to be of Old English origin”. 
So far, we have looked at evolution on the level of words. Another evolutionary 
unit is an entire language. One could ask whether the evolution is a gradual 
process, or, as has been proposed for biological species (Gould/Eldredge 1972), 
whether it happens in punctuational bursts. Evidence of either possibility can only 
be indirect. It has been found that the more a language showed signs of change, 
the more splitting events it had endured. This correlation suggests that the 
splitting events might have caused the change, thereby strengthening the idea of 
punctuational bursts (Atkinson et al. 2008). 
How could this be explained evolutionarily? Part of the explanation again has a 
parallel in biology. If the new language is spoken only by a small group, 
evolutionary processes are less constrained (in biological terms, the gene-pool is 
smaller) and diversification can occur rapidly. However, that cannot be true in all 
cases, for one or both groups are often large. Hence, the stronger explanation is 
the tendency in newly formed groups to promote group cohesion and group 
identity through language. An example is Webster’s dictionary of 1789, which 
created differences between British English and American English, or the language 
of the former German Democratic Republic, where a “socialistic” German 
appeared (Lerchner 1974). Social coherence is the means for a group to 
strengthen its chances of survival. Tribes in New Guinea display an astonishing 
diversity of languages. More than 800 languages are spoken on this island alone 
(Gordon 2005) even when they live near each other and are not separated by 
mountains or water. Plausibly, these differences were not just the by-product of a 
long period of non-contact. This means that language phylogenies “provide the 
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logical backbone on which to test these [questions about the splitting of 
populations and languages+ and many other anthropological questions” (Pagel 
2009, 414).  
I make two remarks to evaluate this approach. The theories of Pagel and Atkinson 
concerning linguistic processes stress similarity of genealogical descent with 
linguistic tradition, without mentioning a profound dissimilarity. Language is much 
more open to new influences than any genealogical line is. Language changes with 
use; it is a reticulated system (Lewens 2013). 
Moreover, it is not clear what these theories mean for human evolution. The 
theories suggest that slower evolution is a feature of cognates whose importance 
for humans is more or less stable for centuries. Does it mean that cognates whose 
words evolve more quickly are less important? One might as well say that they are 
more important to their speaker because they clearly had the desire for a word 
for this cognate. President George W. Bush must have had this in mind in 2002 
when he said, perhaps apocryphally, to Tony Blair, “The problem with the French 
is that they do not even have a word for entrepreneur”. 
1.2 Dawkins/Blackmore: the language meme as meme vehicle 
A more general approach to cultural evolution defines its units as memes. A 
meme is a cultural unit that can be replicated, such as an action, a musical theme, 
a word, a sentence, an image, a style of clothing or speech. We can look at culture 
from the point of view of meme: space in mind/brains is limited, so to get copied 
is to continue to live. Memes that are attractive and easy to replicate will be 
copied. Because memes need humans to survive, we are their natural 
environment. 
Meme replication is not the same as learning. Learning is the application of innate 
behaviour to new situations, such as bottle-opening by birds, and the animal 
creates the behaviour anew (Blackmore 2000, 50). In learning, we are the actors, 
whereas in meme replication, the memes themselves act with the help of our 
great ability to imitate. We are interesting for memes because we are hardly 
constrained in imitation ability. The natural language itself is not innate and is in 
fact a huge meme, for memes are identified by their replication and language are 
replicated. It is also vehicle for smaller memes, in another meme vehicle—the 
brain. 
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The theory is undecided about whether we should take memes as fundamental 
for our minds or accidental. They sometimes seem fundamental because memes, 
according to Blackmore (2000, 22), “are the very stuff of our minds. Our memes is 
who we are”, by which she probably means that I am the sum of the memes that 
have taken refuge in my mind, including ideas about identity, self and so on.  
At other times, it seems accidental because of two arguments. First, Blackmore 
presents a “consistency principle”:  
Memes do not exist in isolation. All memes, at least at some phases of their 
lives, are stored in human brains, and humans are complicated creatures 
who strive to maintain some kind of consistency to their ideas. This 
‘consistency principle’ is crucial in understanding a lot of human thought 
and action. (Blackmore 2000, 165)  
We may ask, is consistency, whether as a principle or as an urge, itself a meme? If 
so, then it must be a super meme capable of regimenting the others. However, 
this should have been explained coherently in memeticism. Fortunately, it does 
not have to be a meme: “Not all thoughts are memes, but in practice, most of our 
thinking is coloured by them” (Blackmore 2000, 15). Again, this prompts 
questions: What is this colouring and how can I decide whether a thought is a 
meme or not? On what grounds does Blackmore concede that “not all thoughts 
are memes”? In fact, if that is true, then the “consistency principle” urges me to 
deny the earlier statement that “our memes is who we are”.  
Second, Dawkins suggests that we have gained a potential autonomy, despite and 
thanks to the memes that first determined us:  
We are built as gene replicators and cultured as meme machines, but we 
have the power to turn against our creators. We, alone on earth, can rebel 
against the tyranny of the selfish replicators. (Dawkins 1976, 201)  
“Despite”, for we “turn against” our replicators. “Thanks to”, for it was the memes 
who “cultured” us to this point. However, this dynamic has to be explained in 
much greater detail before we can evaluate it. In fact, this idea contradicts the 
tendency of memeticism to explain humans by the use of sub-human elements. 
What I called undecidedness seems dangerously close to incoherence. This is my 
first critical remark. 
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My second point of criticism is that the replicator analogy does not work. The fact 
that humans imitate does not mean any causal relation between imitated and 
imitating behaviour. There is no “copying”: imitation is something different 
(Lewens 2013). 
A third point of criticism is that it is unclear what memeticism claims to explain. 
Does it want to explain why some ideas, styles and tunes spread and others do 
not? Or that part of our cognition runs more or less automatically?  
A fourth point of criticism concerns the ontological status of memes. Are they 
abstract or concrete objects? How did they get an urge to live forever?  
In sum, memeticism shall have to wait on the shelves of libraries until someone 
expresses it in a more coherent way. In a Darwinian theory of human culture, 
memeticism might be a sub-discipline. However, it should renounce claims as “we 
are our memes”, and instead claim something much less sensational, such as 
“part of our mental life is more or less automated, and the forms it takes are 
often imitated”. It should distinguish the mental realm of memes from the mental 
realm of memeticism. This distinction might have been discovered and clearly 
formulated if Dawkins had reflected on our potency of rebellion. As far as we do 
not let our mental life drift off into automation, we care too much about reality to 
waste time on memes. 
1.3 Cultural evolution and the paradox  
So, contrary to what one would expect, these theories on cultural evolution take 
Darwinism in the narrow definition. Heredity is described without a learning that 
may use interpretation. There is a great deal of mechanism in memeticism as well 
as in the power law of learning, in which words are conserved by frequent use. 
Dawkins observed that we can “rebel against the tyranny of the selfish 
replicators”. If he had spelled out what he meant by this, he would have reflected 
on the paradox. Why would not such a rebellion be just another meme? It would 
have made him explain the role of interpretation as distinct from being 
stimulated.  
The Darwinian focus on blind processes seems to cause a blind spot regarding 
processes that are not blind but that interact with the blind processes. The 
interaction between blindness and sight need not be rebellious: education, self-
control, concentration are beautiful assets of most cultures and help to form 
personality and shape culture (Elias 1997). Culture moulds the blind processes 
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that carry our origin. The fact that nature has culture “on a leash” (Buskes 1998, 
55) pales in the light of another fact: human culture has created a “second 
nature” (McDowell 1994), that is, “culture is our updated biology” (Segerdahl et 
al. 2005, 195). 
Gradualism has a strong presence because the evolution of words, languages and 
memes can be traced through slightly differing forms. However, the context is the 
uninvited guest in these views. Why we use the words we do is partly determined 
by the social context, as well as the semantic and phonological context. A theory 
that does not reflect this context offers a view on an interesting correlation (use–
evolution) in a small corner of the field. One would almost forget that it is a 
theory about words, about our language! Questions, such as “Why are some 
words used more frequently than others?” and “In what culture/language/epoch 
are certain words used more frequently?” would pull this dimension to centre 
stage. 
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2. Language mechanisms 
The theories included in this section describe the evolution of language regarding 
the human capacity for language. A second characteristic of the theories in this 
section is their naturalism. Millikan (section 2.1) is explicit in her allegiance to 
naturalism, whereas the naturalism of the theories of Pinker (section 2.2) and the 
trio of Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (section 2.3) is implicit. 
2.1 Millikan: evolved language devices 
Ruth Millikan offers an uncompromising, and therefore refreshing, naturalist 
theory of meaning. She proposes categories of evolutionary function that 
encompass both biology and linguistics, so a claw or an eye can be explained by 
the same set of principles as a word or a sentence. According to her, language is a 
biological phenomenon. Instead of referring to a conscious speaker, we refer to 
the speaker’s utterance and the hearer’s response as workings of “mechanisms” 
or programmes.  
We expect a naturalist approach to be muscular with respect to mechanism and 
gradualism. Both aspects appear in the catchy opening passage of Varieties of 
Meaning (2004): 
Imagine that the eye doctor is trying to put drops in your eye but you keep 
blinking. You insist that you don’t mean to blink but that no matter how 
hard you try, when the eyedropper comes too close, your eye just closes. 
Perhaps unconsciously you don’t want that medicine in your eye? What 
could your underlying motive be? The Freudian move is a joke, of course. 
But there does seem to be a sense in which that medicine is not wanted in 
your eye. ... The difficulty is that you and your eye, or you and your eye-
blink reflex, are at cross-purposes. You are trying to let the drops in but the 
reflex’s purpose is to keep them out. Maybe you will object that only one of 
these crossing purposes is a real purpose. ... The real purpose is the 
conscious human intention not to blink. Only the intention not to blink is a 
purpose of the whole person, rather than merely a ‘subpersonal’ purpose. 
... I will try to persuade you that no interesting theoretical line can be 
drawn between these two kinds of purposes. Purposes of the whole person 
are made up out of intertwined purposes at ‘lower’ or more ‘biological’ 
levels. (Millikan 2004, 3)10 
                                                     
10
 The involuntarily closing of the eyelids was an example used by Darwin (1872, 38). 
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Millikan’s gradualism is expressed in the remark, “no interesting theoretical line 
can be drawn . . .”. The passage is about a mechanism—blinking—whose kind, 
according to the last sentences, reigns the “whole person” by intertwining.  
My sketch of her theory is structured with help of the mechanisms and machinery 
Millikan uses in her explanation: language devices, natural selection and semantic 
mapping. 
2.1.1 Language devices for linguistic items 
Humans possess, through their genetic make-up, organs for producing linguistic 
utterances, such as brain structures, larynxes and the cognitive mechanisms for 
interpreting them. These “devices” are adapted to a specific, concrete linguistic 
environment, such as Russian or Swahili. The interpreting mechanisms are at an 
intermediate level between the concrete communication (this utterance, this 
beehive dance, this skin colour change) and the general physical base of the 
mechanism that is identical throughout the species.  
To these devices belongs a controlling device that is built into animals and 
humans and is responsible for the adaptive programmes of learning and knowing. 
This basic thing has a proper function, whereas its adapted product has a derived 
proper function. Empirical research will show how this works physiologically. 
Because  
however flexible the human nervous system is, containing systems that are 
instructed or programmed by other systems that are instructed or 
programmed by still other systems, still there must come an end to 
flexibility... [These systems] must be inherent in the basic brain – the 
original product of evolutionary design. (1984, 48)  
One might think that if our brains are part of a “device”, to use them means 
understanding. However, this is not necessarily so. Reproduction is the base of 
not only  language devices but also linguistic items, such as words, syntactic 
forms, intonation. These are reproduced (copied, more or less perfectly) but not 
because we understand them. If “Nature” could invent something as purposeful 
as organisms without our having the need to refer to an intention to do so, then 
why should it not also invent something as purposeful as language without our 
need to refer to the intentions of speakers or hearers? Using this approach, 
Millikan draws the linguistic consequences of the current anti-Cartesianism.  
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Descartes famously took certainty as the core feature of science: if it is 
knowledge, then it is undoubtable because it is inferred with clarity from 
undoubtable principles. Twentieth-century philosophy has rejected this 
“foundationalism”, if only because it leads to an infinite regress. Pace “cogito ergo 
sum”, no principle is a priori above all doubt and simultaneously the foundation of 
all knowledge. Millikan points out that if we cannot base our knowledge on any 
sensory given, then why should we be sure of what is mentally “given”? 
We cannot know a priori that we mean. Nor can we know a priori or with 
Cartesian certainty what it is that we are thinking or talking about. Further, 
we cannot tell just by armchair reflection whether or not two terms in our 
idiolect are synonymous, whether a single term is ambiguous, or whether a 
particular state of affairs is or is not ‘logically possible’ in any interesting or 
useful use of the term. (Millikan 1984, 10)  
We sometimes use language without intentions, like when we talk in our sleep. At 
other times, we might have a small intention and just follow convention (how do 
you do?), or we might have a full blown intention, such as “By saying p I want him 
to understand that I understand that he understands q”. Because the strength of 
these intentions varies from zero to hundred, they cannot be essential to 
language. This opens the door to seeing linguistic utterances as a special kind of, 
or at least continuous with, natural signs. Examples of natural signs are smoke 
(signing fire), a dark cloud (rain) and certain tracks in the wood (quail). Now these 
signs do not necessarily mean what they normally do. They have meaning, in 
normal circumstances, only for the interpreters who tracked the semantic 
mapping function between the tracks on the one hand and the presence of quail 
nearby on the other hand. However, the sign elements do not mean by 
themselves in the same way that the complete sign is composed of its elements. 
According to Millikan (2004, 50-1), “Rather, the meanings of the various 
significant parts or aspects of signs are abstracted from the prior meanings of 
complete signs occurring within complete signs systems”. This tracking of the 
semantic mapping function does not have to be intentional, conscious or based 
on explicit understanding. I might hear something behind me and react to it 
before I consciously understand that someone is approaching me.  
Is this a model with which we can also approach language? An argument against 
the uncoupling of language and understanding (intentionality) is that a linguistic 
expression can be misunderstood, whereas a cause can never be misunderstood. 
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In other words, for a sentence to have influence on someone, the person must 
somehow cooperate with it by understanding it. A tree in the sunlight does not 
have to cooperate with the rays of sunlight in order to get warm and my eardrums 
do not have to cooperate in order to vibrate according to sound waves. However, 
Millikan has a reply against this argument. She allows for the notion of 
misunderstanding without giving entrance to the notion of it as an essential 
aspect of language. Just as our limbs can be used to write on, and screw drivers 
can be used to open a can, our interpreting ability can be used to produce a false 
belief in a sentence as well as in a stimulus like a sunray; let us say that we feel 
the sunray but think that it is caused by a heater. What we call 
“misunderstanding” might only be a variance in function.  
2.1.2 Natural selection 
Millikan proposes that linguistic items, such as words and syntactic forms, do not 
depend on conscious intentions, but on their causal function. They exist thanks to 
their evolutionary value for the bodies that have evolved to use them. In this 
respect, linguistic items belong to a biological category because they either help 
or block the survival of their users. They influence the verdict that natural 
selection imposes on every organism.  
Although not every individual linguistic utterance contributes to survival, the 
general use of language does, and it is plausible that our capacity for language 
somehow enhances our survival as a species. Millikan’s “suggestion is that when it 
is in part because A’s have caused B’s in the past that a positive correlation has 
existed between A’s and B’s, and the fact that this correlation has existed figures 
in an explanation of the proliferation of A’s, then it does make sense to say that 
A’s exist in part because A’s caused B’s” (Millikan 1984, 26). The function, in fact, 
is only found at the end of a long chain of causations within a whole web of 
interconnections. This applies to language as well as the ability of the chameleon 
to take the colour of its environment. 
In line with the evolutionary function of language, Millikan compares language 
with a toolkit that is full of “linguistic devices”, such as words, surface syntactic 
forms and tonal inflections. An utterance is a new token on a string of preceding 
similar tokens, and thus a member of at least one “reproductively established 
family”. Most “language devices” (e.g., words, surface syntactic forms, 
punctuations, tonal inflections etc.) are part of such families. Sentences are 
“always members of a number of different reproductively established families at 
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once, one for each significant aspect of the sentence”, “the overall syntax coming 
from one large family” (Millikan 1984, 23; 53).  
This loosely abstract formulation is improved upon in Millikan’s later work, where 
she develops a functional grading of representations. The natural reactions of 
animals to perceptions (i.e., “pushmi-pullyus”) are the first step. The next step is 
that some animals are able to segment a representation into parts that can be 
recombined, such as creating solutions for problems with food (Millikan 2004, 
168). A further step is the representation of one’s own goals. Most instinctive 
behaviour of animals shows that apparently intelligent behaviour nevertheless 
lacks a representation of its goal. “Although the greylag goose apparently reacts 
intelligently to an egg that has rolled out of the nest by bringing the bill behind 
the egg and rolling it back into the nest, if the egg slips away sideways out of 
control of the bill, this movement may still be carefully completed, ‘as if it were a 
vacuum activity’ . . .“ (169). The last step is the representation of pure fact with 
only theoretical interest (181). 
Millikan introduces the “reproductively established family” when phenomena are 
reproduced in accordance with the biological laws of natural science. The 
reproduced device has “ancestors” to which it is connected through a kind of 
copying; furthermore, these ancestors are known to serve a certain function, 
which is a ground for the reproduction, in other words, for the existence of the 
“family”. Screwdrivers, kidneys, and traditions like shaking hands as a form of 
greeting, all serve a function and are reproduced because of this function. Millikan 
speaks of their “proper” function, which is roughly their usual (“Normal”) 
involvement in the survival of its user. Thus having a proper function presupposes 
being part of a reproductively established family, and not vice versa. The cause of 
the stability of character during endless reproduction is the fact that words and 
syntactic forms are used by so many that the “normal use” is a strong “field of 
gravity”.  
This “gravity” is obtained through the stabilizing function of our language device. 
If linguistic meaning relies on descent with modification, and if one utterance 
descends from many families, as is usual for a sentence, then we need some 
ability to mix all these lineages and to find out which meaning prevails. According 
to Millikan (1984, 77), “Only because language devices have stabilizing functions is 
it possible to distinguish what such a device itself means from what a speaker 
means by it.” Stabilizing accounts for syntax as well as lexicon. It accounts even for 
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truth and falsity because a message in an idiolect cannot be true or false. Thus, its 
result is a language.  
A language, in Millikan’s view, is a system that differentiates between an animal 
signal and a sentence. The discrete parts of the sentence (words) can be used in 
other ways with other parts of the lexicon-system or in another syntax (provided 
it is allowed by the syntactical system). For example, every sentence can be 
transformed to a negation, such as “There is no leopard” or “Do not jump 
immediately to the hole”, but a vervet monkey’s call or a rabbit’s jump cannot 
(Millikan 2004, 93; 221).  
Language, to Millikan, is a contingent whole of the stabilized linguistic habits of a 
certain group. It is not an abstract object (pace Katz 1981, 1990). Rejecting 
language as an abstract object makes the naturalist case stronger, for one does 
not have to explain the existence of objects that transcend the natural order. For 
example, Katz (1990, 50) remarked, “evolutionary and developmental processes 
[phylogeny and ontogeny] do not bring languages into existence. They only 
produce competence in them on the part of communities and individuals.” 
Millikan would counter: These competences are adaptations to linguistic social 
phenomena, which we sometimes lump together as “language X”, but every 
delineation of a language is a contingent choice of a linguist, just as borders 
between countries are nothing but conventions. 
According to Millikan, neither is language an I-language (pace Chomsky 2000). 
Rejecting the view that language should be studied as an Individual, Internal and 
partly Innate phenomenon (“I-language”) makes the evolutionary case stronger. It 
allows for the gradual evolution of the linguistic adaptations of humans in the 
context of an environmental property, that is, a linguistic community. Given such 
an environment, the only thing human infants have to evolve is a device to keep 
track of this social phenomenon.  
2.1.3 Semantic mapping 
Why are linguistic devices so effective in enhancing the survival of humans? They 
are able to picture the world and “semantically map” it. A linguistic device is able 
to cause an interpreter to have “intentional icons” (a certain understanding of the 
environment). The devices are caused by the “intentional icons” of speakers when 
they are under the influence of the idea that they should share their 
understanding of the world with someone else, such as by giving an order or by 
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asking a question. We map with the help of syntax, which is adapted to the 
content (Millikan 1984, 42). As such, our language is similar to the beehive dance. 
According to Millikan (1984, 40), the beehive dance is ultimately adapted to the 
place of the flowers: this location is its “adaptor”. This means, it has its proper 
function “as adapted to a given context”. The utterance is an expression of an 
intentional icon by the producing device, and it is translated into an intentional 
icon that is interpreted by the hearer. This interpretation appears to others 
through behaviour (101). The intentional icons “map” some aspect of the 
environment. This “real value” is a condition for its proper function. It maps 
something now (descriptive utterance) or in the future (imperative utterance).  
However, human intentional icons are different. They are much stronger, because 
they allow (as we saw) for negation transformation, segmentation and their own 
representation. Millikan explains this with two factors (2004, 224). The first is life 
practice: The things that we distinguish in practice are also good objects of 
thought. The second factor is public language: In language, the information is 
abstracted from the direct situation in which the perceiver stands in a relation 
with what is perceived. Millikan suggests that the representation of time, 
historical time, is among the primary achievements of language. “An 
understanding of historical time . . . implies the capacity to think of an individual 
object as having a property at one particular time but not necessarily at any 
other” (227). This is helped by hearing about the perceptions of others, through 
language. It also allows us, in turn, to plan a future.  
2.1.4 Evaluation 
Millikan’s language philosophy is full of mechanisms, such as devices, selection, 
stabilization functions, sematic mapping functions, and even an “automatic 
mechanism [my italics]” (Millikan 1984, 69). Moreover, interpretation is explained 
by language. Mechanisms and interpretation are phenomena in a continuum 
without an “interesting theoretical line”. If that were true, the paradox would turn 
into a practical self-contradiction. It would mean that Millikan’s theory does not 
need to be understood in a context of justification and only needed explanation.  
An example of an “interesting theoretical line” drawn in the wide area between 
automated linguistic behaviour and higher order intentional linguistic behaviour is 
given by Deacon.  
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One way we learn about new meanings [of linguistic items] is to figure out 
what the right contexts are *in which to ‘reproduce’ them+; but knowing 
five or ten more contexts in which the same phrase works does not really 
change the superficial nature of the reference *the ‘mapping’+. Learning 
more and more appropriate contexts does not in itself constitute 
understanding the meaning or significance. Yet, when we know what the 
phrase means, the problem of remembering all the applicable contexts 
becomes irrelevant, and innumerable novel contexts can be immediately 
recognized as appropriate. In between these alternatives there is not just a 
quantitative increase, but a radical change in cognitive strategy [my italics]. 
(Deacon 1997, 67)  
Millikan said that she did not want to “speculate much on mechanisms” (2004, 
208) affording such higher levels of cognition. Why then does she (or what 
mechanism makes her) speak of mechanisms in the first place? After all, she 
wrote, “if necessary, one can rise above the automatic mechanism” (1984, 69). Is 
this not crossing a most “interesting theoretical line”, that between blindness and 
sight? Her reply that misunderstanding is nothing but a variance in function does 
not do justice to the nature of misunderstanding. A misunderstanding is 
constrained by the context – and to reflect on the context would mean to enter 
the hermeneutic realm. 
Instead of gradualism, we saw continuity between representations that we share 
with animals and the higher order representations that improved our chances of 
survival until the representation of pure fact. Continuity is a synchronic biological 
phenomenon, whereas gradualism is evolutionary theory (diachronic). Continuity 
suggests possible gradual evolutionary steps, which might be enough for a 
philosopher. However, the continuity in this case is in need of a context. 
The context of language as a system is addressed in the idea of reproductively 
established families. Meaning is partly created by earlier use: that is a respectable 
thought. However, the identification conditions are unclear. We may ask when it 
is allowed to say that x is a reproduction of y and z. How do we know that it is not 
a reproduction of w? Keep in mind that reproduction is the source of lexicon and 
syntax. There must be something in common between the reproduction and the 
reproduced. It cannot be the form (visual or auditive) of the token, for this differs 
all the time. No pronunciation is the same, and the mode may change (from 
written to spoken to sign language, translation and so on). It has to be something 
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that is “not ‘given’ in perception” and belongs to the same group of “theoretical 
entities”, such as forces and genes (Millikan 1984, 77). Linguistic types are 
introduced with a similar causal force as are physical forces and biochemical 
forces, for which we have laws, models, experiments and so on, which we do not 
have for linguistic types. There are theories of linguistic types (Katz 1990; Wetzel 
2009). However, these are from another reproductively established family of 
philosophies, of Cartesian and Fregean stock rather than Millikan’s, and are close 
to being her philosophical enemies. Hence, if Millikan wants to uphold the 
similarity between linguistic types and genes and forces, she must come up with a 
supportive argument.  
The final mechanism, or machinery, is the social context. In Millikan’s theory, 
language is so full of devices and mechanisms that persons do not seem to 
matter. Nonetheless, as a person, the speaker is an essential element of the 
environment in which the utterance takes on meaning. This is what makes the 
difference between an icon and an utterance. A language is not just a set of icons; 
it is a set of compositional icons used by persons. To leave out the speaker’s 
intentions leads to absurd consequences. The word “coffee” uttered by a parrot 
has a function because it is part of a reproductively established family with a 
direct proper function. If the utterance normally is done when the parrot smells or 
sees coffee, then it also has a derived proper function. There is, in Millikan’s view, 
nothing to distinguish it from a human saying “coffee” (1984, 52). She must call 
the parrot a speaker and his utterance a word, which is an absurd conclusion.  
Millikan tried to avoid this absurdity by introducing the idea of a “cooperative 
intentional sign . . . produced by systems designed to make natural signs for use 
by cooperating interpreting systems” (Millikan 2004, 73). The attentive reader 
notices that a cooperating sign-interpreting system is a synonym for . . . another 
human being! The heap of devices, systems and signs at this point topples over, 
and reveals behind it a hitherto implicit hermeneutic circle. Therefore, I suggest 
that Millikan is a closet hermeneuticist (as is Dawkins). Eventually, she explains 
language by the existence of linguistically able humans. However, Millikan’s 
intuition is right: the cooperating capacity of the system proves that learning to 
master a language is no isolated phenomenon. 
Millikan explained human cognition with practice (the things we live with are 
good objects to think about as well) and with public language. Where did 
language come from? The social context requires a high level of cognition, and it is 
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enabled by it. This level is characterized by symbolic thinking and the recognition 
of the context of justification. I can at any time be held accountable for what I say 
and how I say it; I know this so I anticipate it. My speaking is not caused but 
intended to a certain degree, which is determined by the “justification pressure” 
that I anticipate. The interpreter presupposes that I can be held accountable and 
knows that I anticipate it. He or she understands this context, this dimension, of 
which he or she is also a part. The context of justification is the human context; it 
is the hermeneutic realm. 
2.2 Pinker: the language instinct 
Pinker sought a solution for a stalemate. Chomsky’s linguistics described a 
grammar that is universal to all humans because no human tribe without 
language has been found. Simultaneously, Chomsky disregarded (until 2002, see 
the next section, 2.3) any evolutionary reasoning explaining our innate linguistic 
knowledge. Pinker boldly went where Chomsky did not go, by claiming that we 
have evolved a “language instinct”. Obviously, two related facts seem to speak 
against the idea of a language instinct that is common to all humans by birth. First, 
languages differ from each other, and second, culture, not nature, determines 
which language a child learns. However, Pinker learned from Chomsky that there 
is something specifically universal to all languages—universal grammar—and asks 
rhetorically: How could we explain such a universal human trait without it being 
innate and how could it be innate without having been evolved by natural 
selection? These two questions shall structure my review of his theory. In the last 
subsection, I evaluate the theory. 
2.2.1 What aspects of language are innate? 
In answering the first question, Pinker uses Chomsky against what he calls the 
“standard social science model”. Social scientists look for cultural differences and 
neglect crosscultural universals. Chomsky maintains that language has a universal 
structure that is primarily syntactical. Syntax is part of grammar and consists of 
the set of rules for combining words in sentences.  
Pinker learned from Chomsky that a “pre-schooler’s tacit knowledge of grammar 
is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art 
computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings . . .” 
(Pinker 1994, 19). This knowledge cannot have been taught to him, not even by 
imitation, for every sentence he hears is new. This is called the “poverty of input” 
argument. The pre-schooler builds sentences he or she has never heard before, 
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using deep rules of which even the adults that surround him are unaware. 
Examples of applied innate knowledge are “don’t giggle me” and “we holded the 
rabbit”. Apart from that, “the concept of imitation is suspect to begin with (if 
children are general imitators, why don’t they imitate their parent’s habit of 
sitting quietly in airplanes?)” (45)  
An example is the ability to form a question out of a proposition. A unicorn is in 
the garden: Is a unicorn in the garden? This is done by moving the first “is” to the 
first position. Now consider the sentence, “A unicorn that is eating a flower is in 
the garden”. If I want to make a question from this sentence, it does not work to 
replace the first “is”. The proposition consists of a sentence *a unicorn that is 
eating a flower] in another sentence “a unicorn is in the garden”, and the question 
is made with the second sentence, that is, the second “is”. How do young children 
know this without it having been taught? Another example is the suffix –s in “he 
walks”. To learn how this is used, the child has to keep track of four details in 
every sentence: is the subject in the third person, is it singular, is the verb in the 
present tense, is it habitual? By the age of three and a half or earlier, children use 
it “in more than ninety percent of the sentences that require it, and virtually 
never use it in the sentences that forbid it” (Chomsky 1994, 44). 
What applies to syntax also applies to idioms. We put words together using 
certain rules, like the –s in the plural dogs, the suffix –able in learnable, the 
combination tooth + brush = toothbrush, or the fact that plural of Walkman is not 
Walkmen. The rules open up an infinite set of possible new words. Although the 
rules differ between languages, the fact that children pick up the pattern so 
quickly and build up their idioms so that by age 16 they know an average of 
60,000 words means that we must have an innate bias to guessing only certain 
things. These guesses are biased by our “mentalese”, which distinguishes 
between things, persons, animals, actions and properties (perhaps something like 
Aristotle’s categories), allowing more words to mean the same thing and 
attributing more meanings to one word.  
What applies to idiom and syntax also applies to speech and hearing. We put 
innate knowledge to use from the start. We hear much more than the sounds we 
perceive; we hear abstract patterns. “Phonetic perception is like a sixth sense” 
(Pinker 1994, 159), for speech sounds are very fast: “If we can hear forty-five 
phonemes per second, the phonemes cannot possibly be consecutive bits of 
sound; each moment of sound must have several phonemes packed into it, which 
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our brains somehow unpack” and even unpack to the level that we seem to hear 
intervals between words, although not always the right ones: “The good can 
decay many ways” can be heard as “The good candy came anyways”. The sound-
bits (phonemes) connect to words but not to meaning, so our linguistic 
understanding relies on a “duality of patterning” (163) However, even on the 
phoneme level, every language has certain unconscious rules that a child 
nevertheless picks up. For example, in English, one can combine certain 
consonants at the beginning of a word: “flit”, “thrive” and “string”, but not “sring” 
or “vlit”. In Japanese, the starting consonant can only be one: “strawberry” 
becomes “sutoroberri”. One immediately recognizes that “thale” and “flutch” are 
not English words but could have been, whereas “rtut” and “nyip” could not. 
“Speakers must have tacit knowledge about how phonemes are strung together in 
their language” (173).  
If language is an instinct, it must be seated somewhere in the body. The left 
hemisphere of the brain is the most likely candidate for the seat of the language 
unit, specifically the Broca and Wernicke areas. This differs from animal 
communication and the emotional utterances of humans, which stem from 
subcortical regions of the brain (Pinker 1994, 334). Impairment of the language 
unit is correlated to impairment of language competence, not of intelligence in 
general (53) and not thought, for language and thought are different areas. We 
know when our words do not quite express what we think. There are stories of 
people such as Helen Keller who learn language later in life but then tell about 
their earlier, non-linguistic experiences (68).  
We do not think in language because language is ambiguous and thoughts are 
not. “Knowing a language is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of 
words and vice versa” (Pinker 1994, 82). “Every act of sloppiness on the part of 
the speaker demands a compensating measure of mental effort on the part of the 
conversational partner” (180), so there must be a system of pronunciation, even 
when it changes to seemingly more lazy forms. This system is constrained by the 
system the hearer uses to compensate for what is not heard. It seems that human 
speech perception works top down, forming expectations about what the other 
means and even suggesting that he or she is actually saying it. These expectations 
are not psychological. They express a deep knowledge of phonology, syntax and 
vocabulary (186). 
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2.2.2 Language and natural selection 
Pinker’s second question is: how could we explain this instinct other than by 
natural selection? In other words, how did language get into the genetic material? 
Language must have started as a behaviour. The key argument for its entering the 
genetic material is a general evolutionary one. Evolutionary theory predicts a  
selective pressure for learned abilities to become increasingly innate. That 
is because if an ability is innate, it can be deployed earlier in the lifespan of 
the creature, and there is less of a chance that an unlucky creature will miss 
out on the experiences that would have been necessary to teach it. (Pinker 
1994, 242)  
In other words, the parts of language that can be abstracted from individual 
languages, such as its universal structure, can become innate. This might even be 
something that did not evolve in language, but later proved useful, as an 
exaptation. However, it would be dangerous for a whole language to become 
innate, for then a child would not be able to survive in another tribe.  
In this respect, Pinker follows Darwin and not Chomsky. The latter maintains that 
universal grammar somehow appeared in the brain as the effect of an unknown 
physical change. Pinker sees universal grammar as too complex to have arisen out 
of one mutation and as too advantageous to neglect the empowering stimulus of 
selection. For example, language helps build communities, so any mutation 
strengthening the ability to communicate more precisely and more effectively will 
have enhanced the chances of the reproduction of its bearer’s genetic material. 
Although this evolutionary reasoning only proves possibilities, Pinker feels free to 
speculate about a “gradual fade-in” (Pinker 1994, 346) and that the first traces of 
language could have appeared as early as Australopithecus afarensis (e.g., the 
woman whose skeleton is known as “Lucy”) or perhaps even earlier.  
Whom did the first speaker speak to? Perhaps she or he spoke to neighbours who 
“could have partly understood what the mutant was saying even if they lacked the 
new-fangled circuitry, just using overall intelligence” (Pinker 1994, 365). 
Subsequently, “evolution often produces spectacular abilities when adversaries 
get locked into an ‘arms race’, like the struggle between cheetahs and gazelles. 
Some anthropologists believe that human brain evolution was propelled more by 
a cognitive arms race among social competitors . . .” (368), which could have 
propelled a linguistic one. What could the beginning language have looked like? It 
would have been a proto-language. 
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The languages of children, pidgin speakers, immigrants, tourists, aphasics, 
telegrams and headlines show that there is a vast continuum of viable 
language systems varying in efficiency and expressive power, exactly what 
the theory of natural selection requires. (365ff) 
2.2.3 Evaluation 
Could universal grammar be the product of the mechanism of natural selection? A 
strong case for a negative answer is made by Deacon. Stimulus associations (i.e., 
the appearance of a language) affect the brain. For them to have an effect on 
evolution, they must be highly invariant and persisting. However, “the most 
universal attributes of language structure (e.g., operator-operand and subject-
predicate structure) are by nature the most variable in surface representation, 
and they are poorly localizable within the brain between individuals or even 
within an individual”. Therefore “no innate rules, no innate general principles, no 
innate symbolic categories can be built in by evolution” (Deacon 1997, 333ff). 
There are better candidates for being “universal to language” (for a list, see 
Tomasello 1995, 136), and these need not be the same as the traits needed for 
language that have evolved through natural selection.  
Is the mechanism of instinct a suitable concept when it comes to language? No 
one would deny that humans are biologically prepared for language. This 
“universal preparedness” can be studied empirically: physiologically (brain, vocal-
auditory structures) and functionally (cognitive psychology). What other instinct 
allows for such diversity across the world? What instinct only unfolds after years 
of imitation, correction and training? Here, the choice for the concept ‘instinct’ 
proves unfortunate because it has many meanings (Bateson 2000). Furthermore, 
Pinker’s position is criticized for its use of neurological evidence. Indeed, language 
relies on the brain. However, no part of the brain is exclusively used for language, 
and every complex action of the individual relies on more than one part of the 
brain. The evidence does not prove a linguistic innate module. Thus, this episode 
of mechanicism is flawed, even if it does not claim anything specific about the 
difference between interpretation and causation. If Pinker is a Chomskyan in this 
respect, then perhaps he feels, like Chomsky, that in the end, the natural sciences 
will explain human cognition (Chomsky 2000).  
Gradualism is only briefly mentioned, but for a good reason. The uniqueness of 
human language is a result of the extinction of many other species, including 
ancestral species of hominins. The now living species do not display homologies, 
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which makes a sketch of its gradual evolution difficult; only the principle is clear. 
“For all we know, language could have had a gradual fade-in, even if no extant 
species, not even our closest living relatives the chimpanzees, have it. There were 
plenty of organisms with intermediate language abilities, but they are all dead” 
(Pinker 1994, 346). Such a broad sweep needs an explication of the context.  
The social context is that of other persons with an I-language or at least with the 
innate equipment to develop it. Their language capacity is partly innate and partly 
developed through experience with others. Pinker offers a few conjectures about 
the origin of language in early hominins and rightly uses the social context as an 
important factor.  
The context of language as a system is seen as an I-language that is internal to the 
individual. This system can be studied as the idealized “competence of the ideal 
speaker”. Linguists study it by looking at linguistic utterances. However, the 
Chomskyan claim that I-language is the only language open for scientific research 
is hardly convincing. Language is a public phenomenon that is never fully present, 
neither in time nor in space. This is true for the individual as well. This means that 
everything one says about language is about an idealized object. Once this is 
conceded, it is descriptively more honest to account for the public character of 
language. This does not need to result in the ontological commitments of Katz, 
who saw the abstract character of language as an argument against naturalism in 
general, but set off on the wrong foot by mistaking Wittgenstein for a naturalist 
(1990, 4).  
2.3 Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch: language as animal communication system 
For several decades, Chomsky refused to take an evolutionary stance towards 
language. Even as late as 2000, he published articles that included remarks, such 
as “speculations about natural selection *explaining the fact that our individual 
linguistic capacities are tuned to one another], which are found throughout the 
literature, seem completely beside the point” (2000, 33; cf. 73, 83, 110). This 
changed in 2002, when he published an article in Science, in collaboration with 
two evolutionary thinkers, Hauser and Fitch. It bore an intriguing title that 
suggested on the one hand that a whole area of research had just been 
discovered and on the other hand that definitive answers had eventually been 
found: “The faculty of language: what is it, who has it and how did it evolve?”. My 
report in this section is confined to these three questions and refers to the 
authors as “HCF”. 
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2.3.1 What is the faculty of language? 
HCF assume that the primary interest for scientists is the internal, intensional, 
biologically grounded language capacity of the individual, called “I-language”, as 
opposed to language as a culturally specific system in so far as it is external to the 
individual, “E-language”. This however is still too broad, so they distinguish 
between the narrow and broad (I-) language faculty. The broad language faculty 
includes the capacity of humans “(and not, for example, chimpanzees) to readily 
master any human language without explicit instruction.” (HCF 2002, 1571) The 
narrow faculty is the computational system underlying I-language use, which is 
especially needed for our capacity to “recombine meaningful units into an 
unlimited variety of larger structures, each differing systematically in meaning” 
(1576), which are normally captured by the technical notions of discrete infinity 
and recursion. The narrow language faculty “takes a finite set of elements and 
yields a potentially infinite array of discrete expressions” (1571). HCF see the 
narrow faculty on the one hand as “independent”, and on the other as interacting 
with the sensory and cognitive systems, for example. To understand this faculty is 
left by HCF for further empirical research. However, HCF provide no clue about 
how a conceptual decision about what is narrow or broad can ever be corrected 
by empirical research.  
HCF suggest that a linguistic expression is generated first and is then mapped in 
the sensory-motoric system by a phonological interface (yielding speech or script) 
and in the cognitive system by a semantic interface. Perhaps the computational 
system once existed independent of language and was used for “numbers, social 
relationships, navigation”, before it was exapted, that is, put to a new use.  
2.3.2 Who has the language faculty? 
HCF observe that the narrow language faculty is common to all humans and 
“currently appears to lack any analogue in animal communication and possibly 
other domains as well” (HCF 2002, 1571). This applies to the phonology and 
semantic “interfaces” between the narrow language faculty and the cognitive and 
sensory-motor system. It also applies to the phenomenon word: “key aspects of 
words may also be distinctively human. There are, first of all, qualitative 
differences in scale and mode of acquisition, suggesting that quite different 
mechanisms are involved”, like the rate in which children build the lexicon. There 
is also the fact that most words “can be linked to virtually any concept that 
humans can entertain” (1576). Animals “lack the capacity to create open-ended 
generative systems” (1577). 
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On the other hand, a broad language faculty is shared by many animals. One of 
the authors, Hauser, has published a magnificent monography on animal 
communication systems (Hauser 1996). HCF however allow for the possibility that 
future research will clarify that the conceptual-cognitive part of the broad 
language faculty is also uniquely human.  
2.3.3 How did the language faculty evolve?  
HCF claim that this question can only be solved when distinguishing between 
narrow and broad language faculties. These two levels might have evolved 
independently and later combined, which constrained their further evolution as a 
human faculty. One can ask the following questions of both levels: First, was the 
evolutionary path gradual or saltational? Second, was the evolution exaptational 
or adaptational in kind? Third, using the comparative approach HCF propagate, 
what of these two can be found in the LCA of apes and hominins, or further back, 
in the LCA of all mammals? What environmental pressures and genetic structures 
constrained its evolution? 
HCF offer the hypothesis that the broad faculty is an homologous trait that is 
adapted to the environment and evolved from forms that existed in LCAs. The 
broad faculty of language “has an ancient evolutionary history, long predating the 
emergence of language, and a comparative analysis is necessary to understand 
this complex system”; in this respect, humans are only quantitatively different 
from other animals (HCF 2002, 1573). This applies to speech perception, speech 
production,  imitation (although our nearest relatives, apes and monkeys, do not 
have this trait, we do find it in dolphins and songbirds), conceptual recognition 
and communication. 
The narrow faculty is uniquely human. It must have appeared at some time during 
human evolution, but it need not be seen as an adaptation to a selection 
pressure. Instead, it might have been the exaptation of certain neurological 
structures that suddenly proved to be the near-optimal solution for certain 
problems concerning communication.  
HCF accept that these hypotheses about adaptation or exaptation can only be 
tested by “empirical data, much of which is currently unavailable”. The “important 
issue for [all hypotheses about language evolution] is whether a series of gradual 
modifications could lead eventually to the capacity for infinite generativity” (HCF 
2002, 1574). This diplomatic sentence veils an agreement to disagree. Chomsky 
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thinks it could never have led to this capacity, whereas Hauser thinks that it 
obviously did. 
2.3.4 Evaluation 
HCF view language as reliant on mechanisms. In human word learning, “quite 
different mechanisms are involved”, compared to animals. This however leads to 
our paradox, for if word learning depends on mechanisms, what role does 
understanding play and how do concepts and cognition fit? If only mechanisms 
are involved, what should we make of the theory itself?  
Interpretation is targeted by the remark that most words “can be linked to 
virtually any concept that humans can entertain”, whereas animals “lack the 
capacity to create open-ended generative systems” (HCF 2002, 1576f). Is this 
capacity a mechanism? If it is not, why is word learning a mechanism? The 
paradox remains unresolved and unaccepted.  
An important mechanism in the narrow language is recursion. However, Bickerton 
(2009, 243) has pointed out that Chomsky’s linguistic theories no longer support 
recursion, only “merge”. This development in Chomsky’s theory took place before 
the article of 2002. That means that it needs special argumentation to revive its 
use in the evolutionary context. 
HCF wrote that gradualism is an “important issue” when it comes to language. 
However, their article does not refer to gradual modification. We may suspect 
that this has to do with a major disagreement about the gradual evolution of the 
narrow language faculty. An article about language, bearing the question “how 
did it evolve?” in its title, entitles the reader to expect more than the assertion 
that the narrow faculty might be an exaptation of certain neural structures. 
Because gradualism is absent, it does not surprise that the social context plays the 
role of deliverer of input to the universal grammar module. Its role is similar to 
that of a computer programmer. However, as an analogy, this is too narrow to 
have explanatory power. My linguistic behaviour depends largely on what I 
perceive as the social context. Whether I say something, what I say and how I say 
it depends on what I think is necessary in this context. From a certain moment in 
ontogenetic (and perhaps phylogenetic) development, the context is not just a 
programme, but a meaningful background that the language user tries to assess in 
order to produce and interpret linguistic utterances. This moment might have 
been early in linguistic development. It made humans not only passive receivers 
of linguistic input but also active contributors to the linguistic community. It 
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therefore needs an evolutionary explanation. What happened? How did the first 
humans evolve to this stage?  
Regarding the context of language as a system, this is what is studied as I-
language and which is partly innate. The uniquely human aspect of language 
preexisted, but not in the form in which it would become important, and then it 
just took on that form and became very important! The tone of the article is such 
that the reader should accept this as a small step.  
2.4 Language mechanisms and the paradox 
Millikan’s and Pinker’s approaches are opposites in the space they give to history. 
Millikan’s linguistic “devices” have evolved, similar to Pinker’s universal grammar 
module. However, the former is empty, and must be filled with words and 
syntactic forms that owe their power to their respective “reproductively 
established families”. The latter is an innate richness, making up for the poverty of 
stimulus.  
Millikan’s weakness is that her naturalism makes our language evolution paradox 
a contradiction. Eventually, she introduces language as an explanans for cognition, 
instead of an explanandum, thus revealing a “closet hermeneuticism”. Pinker’s 
weakness is different. One problem of his theory is the jump from an accepted but 
vague “biological preparedness for language” to something as debatable as 
universal grammar. The other problem is that universal grammar is the least likely 
aspect of language to become innate.  
HCF’s proposal to see language as linguistic competence and distinguish several 
partial competences within it enables comparative research and helps 
evolutionary thinking. They fail to offer arguments for the definition of the narrow 
language faculty as uniquely human and uniquely for language. They rule out the 
possibility that a specific non-linguistic human ability (e.g., joint attention) 
transformed broad language abilities into something uniquely human. Thus, it 
seems that in this respect HCF jumped the gun. They would not have done so had 
they tried to sketch the evolutionary (gradualistic) story instead of a static picture. 
HCF do not notice the paradox because they speak of mechanisms, on the one 
hand, and interpretation, on the other, without mediating the two.  
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3. The path of language evolution 
The last three authors of this chapter have gone a distance in describing the path 
of human language evolution. They contributed tremendously to the field by 
offering original, bald theories. 
Terrence Deacon (section 3.1) is a biological anthropologist which is why his 
theory is a suitable bridge from the previous section on language and mechanism 
to this section. His central concept is co-evolution, that is, language and the brain 
coevolved. Merlin Donald (section 3.2) is a cognitive psychologist. His designed 
functional cognitive levels between gestures and full-blown language, which he 
proposed to connect with archaeological finds. The linguist Derek Bickerton 
(section 3.3) is an expert on the origin of languages, particularly how a new idiom 
and syntax arise. 
3.1 Deacon: crossing the symbolic threshold 
Deacon is a Darwinian thinker who delights in taking on theoretical controversies. 
In this case, he starts by recognizing “the singular discontinuity between human 
and non-human minds” without denying “the unbroken continuity between 
human and non-human brains”. These have to be reconciled.  
Though we share the same earth with millions of kinds of living creatures, 
we also live in a world that no other species has access to [a shared virtual 
world]. Biologically, we are just another ape. Mentally, we are a new 
phylum of organisms. (1997, 21;23)  
3.1.1 Animal communication and language 
Animal communication is continuous with human non-linguistic communication, 
an ability we still possess. Language is something entirely different. It does not 
have a place in this “grading” because it is a class on its own. Facial expressions, 
vocalizations and gestures are an “irreplaceable component of human social 
communication. Yet this is not analogous to being bilingual”. “Of no other natural 
form of communication is it legitimate to say that ‘language is a more complicated 
version of that’” (Deacon 1997, 33).  
Language acquisition takes place in an environment to which non-linguistic 
communication also belongs. Although language has an evolutionary origin, there 
is nothing else like it. The originality of Deacon’s position is that it uses the tension 
between these two thoughts, without accepting the one and denying the other, 
which indicates that Deacon is not afraid of accepting paradoxes. 
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Gradualism is an essential pillar of any evolutionary theory. No complex 
anatomical and behavioural feature appeared immediately functioning the way it 
would do later. Every feature appeared as a small mutation that was rewarded or 
treated neutrally by the environment and chanced to re-appear in future 
generations and mutate further. Essential to language is abstractness and its 
ability to refer. This function must be explained gradualistically. “Somehow, 
despite their cognitive limitations, our ancestors found a way to create and 
reproduce a simple system of symbols, and once available, these symbolic tools 
quickly became indispensable.” A symbolic threshold was crossed, as I will explain 
below. A new way of transmission, apart from genetics, separated humans from 
other animals. This transmission created a fierce evolutionary pressure on every 
new-born member of the tribe. It said, join or die. “The human brain should 
reflect language in its architecture the way birds reflect the aerodynamics of flight 
in the shape and movements of their wings” (Deacon 1997, 45). This dynamic is 
known as the Baldwin effect. We will return to it in Chapter III, when we discuss 
niche construction theory. 
In addition to the evolution of symbolic communication, there is the evolution of 
speech. Humans must have discovered that speech lends itself to symbolic 
communication. Speech is obviously continuous with the sounds made by 
animals. The human vocal tract, and the use of tongue, lips and teeth to 
manipulate the exhaling breath is unique, but it differed gradually from the 
production of animal sounds.  
3.1.2 Gradually crossing the threshold: icon, index, symbol 
To understand the crossing of the symbolic threshold, Deacon chose to be led by 
Peirce’s model of the levels of reference (or meaning), which holds that icon, 
index and symbol refer to relations of similarity, correlation and social convention 
(Deacon 1997, 70ff). The same thing can be icon, index, symbol or nothing of 
these, depending on the way we interpret it. For example, the roof of my house is  
- an icon of the roof of my neighbour’s house, because of the similarity; 
- an index of the weather when I look to see whether it is wet, or covered 
with hoarfrost; 
- a symbol of the ability of humans to create their own environment.  
The archaeologist who finds an inscription on a clay tablet in a script he does not 
recognize cannot interpret it symbolically. If he says that these are symbols 
because they resemble other symbols, he uses the iconic level. If he concludes 
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that these would-be symbols make the existence of a high culture probable, he 
moves to the indexical level.  
The three levels are functionally hierarchical (and will turn out to be gradual 
stages in cognitive development). On the iconic level, I must be able to 
concentrate on resemblance instead of the majority of differences. The eyes of 
the beholder are crucial for any similarity and any iconicity. I recognize that this is 
like that, in a certain way. On this level, one of two things must not be physically 
present, but it can be virtually represented. Inferential powers are needed for 
iconic reference. 
An indexical relationship relies on many iconic relations: yesterday the roof was 
wet, just like now; last Saturday, it was wet as well, just like now; yesterday, it 
rained; last Saturday, it rained as well. We reach the indexical level when we think 
that the two (a wet roof and rain) are correlated, that is, one is an index of the 
other: the roof is wet again, so it probably rained again, or it is raining again, so 
the roof will probably be wet. 
Symbolic relationships rely on each other, that is, on the symbolic system, more 
than on the indexical level. The roof still symbolizes human culture, even if we 
find more and more cultures where house building is absent. The roof is 
connected with other criteria for human culture, such as tools, art and funeral 
gifts. When we interconnect indexical criteria with each other, thereby making 
them less dependent on the learned correlation, we furnish the symbolic level.11 
The interconnection of symbols comprises their sense, their relation with objects 
and their reference. The “relationship of a lexigram *sign+ to an object is a 
function of the relationship it has to other lexigrams” (Deacon 1997, 86). A 
metaphor, then, is a symbol read as an icon. 
Symbolic thinking allows for the “offloading” of our working memory of 
redundant details. Every pupil discovers sooner or later that by understanding 
something, it is not necessary to invest much effort in remembering it – and vice 
versa: if you cannot understand it, you have to invest much more time in learning 
by heart all the details. How does one reach the symbolic level? Symbols, after all, 
are not acquired one by one, as we acquire associations, unless there is a symbol 
                                                     
11
 Millikan was close to this solution: “What makes a basic representation be a 
representation is how it interacts with other representations”, but she does not 
differentiate between icon and symbol (2004, 68) 
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system in place and children are introduced to it. Even then, symbolic thinking 
requires a jump to a higher level, a letting go. “What we call a symbolic insight 
takes place the moment we let go of one associative strategy and grab hold of 
another higher-order one to guide our memory searches” (Deacon 1997, 93).  
The ability to recode symbolic indexical relationships is “discovered or perceived, 
in some sense”. Recoding “essentially takes no time”. However, what is 
assimilated genetically is the crossing of the mnemonic and attentional threshold 
(Deacon 1997, 335). Something like language must have been the developmental 
pressure on an Australopithecine that, seduced by symbols and stone tools, 
crossed the threshold to Homo (348ff). Hence, if we want to speak, as Pinker 
does, of an instinct, it is one for symbolic meaning. Language was the medium 
through which this instinct became part of our nature.  
Thus, language is both the explanans and the explanandum. In this co-
evolutionary process, the different factors rely on each other. Early hominins 
somehow approached the symbolic threshold, supported by the starting growth 
of the prefrontal cortex. Their social practices grew to rely on indexical and then 
symbolic abilities, eventually crossing the symbolic threshold. Gestures, sounds, 
instruction and symbolic acts, all worked together to strengthen social relations 
and the cognitive grip on the natural environment. This social environment was a 
strong selection mechanism for evolving more language and more symbolic 
abilities.  
Language could only evolve in so far as it fitted our cognitive biases. Therefore, to 
Deacon, our symbolic bias, which depends on the prefrontal cortex, is the main 
explanans for language. Early hominins must have “discovered or perceived” the 
symbolic level and experienced its possibilities (Deacon 1997, 449ff). Animal 
communication functions at the index-level regardless of whether it is learned or 
spontaneous (innate) behaviour. Only a few animals have been trained on the 
symbolic level, of which bonobo Kanzi is the most astonishing example (Segerdahl 
et al. 2005). There is much we do not know about animals, but if they had a 
symbolic level of communication, they would have been looking for other species 
that communicate on the symbolic level, just as we do. None of the species we 
have met so far seems to try to communicate on the symbolic level. Hence, it is 
plausible that of all known species, only humans have fully developed the ability 
to communicate at the symbolic level—until now, at least. We are “the symbolic 
species”. 
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Deacon enriches Darwinism with a ”kind of tangled hierarchic network of nodes 
and connections that defines a vast and constantly changing semantic space”, in 
which the connections restrain the use of symbols. The network-idea is essential 
because symbolic reference is “inherently systemic”. This system presupposes 
certain conditions in the lower, iconic and indexical levels. The three levels are 
related both hierarchically and componentially. “We live most of our concrete 
lives in the subjective realm that is also shared with other species, but our 
experience of this world is embedded in the vastly more extensive symbolic 
world” (Deacon 1997, 450). The fact that symbolic reference distances from us 
personal experiences confers a representational freedom to thought processes 
that allows for a new self-experience: me as a speaker/thinker and not just me as 
the one who yesterday did so and so (452). 
If the levels are hierarchically organized, we can communicate at lower levels with 
other species. An American anthropologist reported the following encounter in 
Java:  
I found myself looking into the face of one of the rare and beautiful bison 
that exist only on that island. Our eyes locked. When it snorted, I snorted 
back; when it shifted its shoulders, I shifted my stance; when I tossed my 
head, it tossed its head in reply. I found myself caught in a nonverbal 
conversation with this Other, a gestural duet with which my conscious 
awareness had very little to do. It was as if my body in its actions was 
suddenly being motivated by a wisdom older than my thinking mind, as 
though it was held and moved by a logos, deeper than words, spoken by the 
Other’s body, the trees, the stony ground on which we stood [my italics]. 
(Abram 1996, 21)  
This anecdote underlines our continuity with our evolutionary kin, and it 
simultaneously expresses the symbolic abilities of humans. After all, Abram—not 
the bison—reflected on the encounter and reported it. 
The symbolic realm evolves through humans and vice versa. It has, within the 
theory, a sui generis status; it is autonomous and not reducible to something 
neural or even biochemical. This entire realm of ideas forms us as we form it. In 
Chapter III, I will propose seeing this realm as a construction element of the 
human niche.  
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3.1.4 Evaluation 
Deacon’s mechanisms are mainly physiological processes that responsible for the 
developmental features of the brain, and of course, natural selection. The 
selective role he reserves for the symbolic realm is entirely compatible with niche 
construction theory (see the next section and Chapter III). By putting so much 
emphasis on the symbolic level, interpretation receives, for the first time in this 
chapter, its due place. Deacon is also the first in this chapter to express the 
paradoxical character of the undertaking. 
We encountered gradualism connected with the cognitive distinction of icon, 
index and symbol, which he projected on human evolution. His main ideas about 
brain evolution will be described in Chapter III; obviously, there is a gradual brain 
growth from Australopithecus to ergaster/erectus to sapiens. This anthropological 
evolution is explained by the symbolic context, for every symbol presupposes a 
symbolic system.  
The ambiguity of the origin of this system is however problematic. Is it perceived 
(discovered) or constructed? Deacon does not resolve this ambiguity. An example 
is the image of symbolic “threshold”: did it exist before humans approached it? A 
strong interpretation would imply a kind of Platonism, in which the symbolic 
realm is the world of eternal ideas, or Frege’s third world (Frege 1919). I do not 
think that Deacon is prepared to argue for that (nor am I). A milder interpretation 
is possible. The symbolic realm is not responsible for the existence of the world; it 
is only given and explored in human cognition. It need not be eternal nor 
unchanging, but it must have a certain stability, which could be socially induced. 
Our knowledge of its existence depends on our being a member of a human 
community.  
Why not say that the symbolic realm resides in the brain? This assertion would 
lead to circularity: our brain has adapted to itself. Hence, we must presuppose the 
symbolic realm, without being able to locate it somewhere in the world. It is a 
presupposition of our knowledge of the world. It is part of the hermeneutic realm, 
which we can never leave once we enter it (except for good, like in dementia). In 
other words, we can never observe it from the outside. We have reached our 
paradox again.  
The social context is in Deacon’s theory less explicit than the cognitive context, 
but it is there, as in the description of the “self” induced by the symbolic realm: 
“This self is indeed not bounded within a mind or a body, and derives its existence 
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from outside – from other minds and other times” (Deacon 1997, 452). The 
symbolic acts and gestures of the early hominine communities are described as 
the selection force responsible for a relative growth of the prefrontal cortex.  
3.2 Donald: from gesture to mythical sentences 
Language plays a crucial role in Donald’s theory of the evolution of the modern 
mind. He envisaged the functional stages that the passive “episodic memory” of 
most animals should have gone through in order to reach the modern cognitive 
stage of theoretical culture. He suggested that the major changes took place first 
on the cognitive level, and the changes in anatomy and culture followed.  
He proposed three transitions from one stage to the next. Given the 
undirectedness of evolution, each subsequent stage should be within reach when 
the right selection pressure appears. Although Donald thought of the transition as 
punctuated events because of the archaeological evidence, he did not rule out a 
slower, more gradual change (Donald 1993, 737). Any proposed selection 
pressure should be confirmed by palaeoanthropology before it plays a role in 
theory. Continuity is preserved because the earlier cognitive stages survive as 
layers within our present cognitive system. 
Donald intended to ground the stages in palaeoanthropological and 
archaeological evidence (which I will abbreviate to PAE). Obviously, this intention 
makes the theory vulnerable. Not only does the material allow for many 
interpretations, but also it is constantly increasing, so every interpretation is made 
dubitable or even refuted by new material. On the other hand, this kind of 
vulnerability to evidence is precisely what science should seek (Popper 1963). The 
task of the scientist is to find out whether a falsification by PAE concerns either a 
minor element of the theory or the theory as a whole. – A small remark on 
palaeoanthropological terminology. Donald mentions erectus as the successor of 
habilis and the species which left Africa, whereas nowadays, this is said of 
ergaster, and erectus is ergaster’s Asian brother. I have changed this accordingly 
in the following section. 
3.2.1 The transition to mimetic culture 
Australopithecines, apes and perhaps other mammals possess the ability to 
perceive certain happenings as events and episodes, as well as remember them 
passively in “episodic” memory. It enables them to recognize that certain events 
are similar to previous ones. However, they cannot recall these memories at will 
(actively). In other words, their thinking is cued instead of detached, that is, online 
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instead of offline. This kind of memory enables them to learn the use of human 
signs. Given the signs (on paper or on press buttons) and given a stimulus 
(banana), an ape remembers the combination of signs that will reward him. This 
memory stage is apparently a proto-human mental ability. We share it with many 
animals (e.g., birds, apes and whales), so it is plausible that the LCA of all of them 
contained it.   
Although we should be cautious in presupposing that animals lack certain 
cognitive abilities, we may say that the distinct step away from episodic memory 
towards mimetic culture has not yet been found in animals. Mimetic culture is an 
“archaic but distinctly human culture that mediated the transition from ape to 
human”. Donald projects it on homo ergaster/erectus, roughly from 1.9 mya 
onward. 
Mimetic skill is representational: x is imitated because it is recognized as a 
representation of x. One should think of gesture, such as pantomime, ritual 
dancing and using the body and its sounds to convey a message. This skill is also 
used in rhythm, which humans can apprehend in every muscle group in many 
combinations. Thus, it is the Gestalt that is performed (Donald 1993, 741) and, 
accordingly, cognitively perceived.  
Mimetic skill should be distinguished from two abilities that many animals have: 
mimicry (e.g., the eggs of the cuckoo mimicking those of the host) and imitation 
(e.g., the plover hen imitates a hen with a broken wing to fool a predator into 
moving away from the nest, and when he comes after her, she suddenly flies 
away). These abilities are performed in one way, and they are not representations 
whereas mimetic skill adds a representational element to imitation and can be 
performed in many ways. In other words, it is used to mean something and it can 
mean in more than one way. This means that actors are self-conscious within the 
social setting and of the representation they try to convey. They exercise 
“intentionality, generativity, communicativity, reference, autocueing and the 
ability to model an unlimited number of species” (Donald 1991, 171). 
Ontogenetically, intentional pointing is observed in children from 12 months 
onwards, preceded by joint attention moments in which children as young as two 
months can participate. 
Donald’s theory lets the public realm of meaning unfold slowly with mimetic 
culture. A public realm of meaning opens the possibility that a gesture not only 
expresses emotion but also describes something. Compared to animal 
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communication, this is new. Even our nearest relatives, chimpanzees, cannot 
produce a sound in the absence of the appropriate emotional state (Goodall 1986, 
125).  
The PAE shows a growth of brain size and the appearance of stone tools (Oldowan 
and early Acheulean) from 2 mya, before the start of mimetic culture. These 
changes might be seen as preparing the ground for mimetic culture. Next, the PAE 
documents the transition with widespread and systematic Acheulean tool 
manufacturing, seasonal hunting, migrating over long distances, using fire and 
cooking food. The brain grows to 80% of the modern human brain. These 
activities and corresponding brain growth prove the development of motor skills, 
which, when combined with the cognitive aspect of mimetic skills, could in the 
next transition give rise to speech, and a protolanguage. Apes cannot articulate 
words because their motor skills do not enable them to do so (Donald 1993, 740).  
Mimetic culture shaped the social environment in which language could flourish. 
It shaped a kind of representation that language could serve even better, and it 
created the motor skills necessary for speech. Plausibly, the first words were used 
as a “very simple shared symbolic environment” (Donald 1993, 741). This is why 
the stage of mimetic culture has a “logical” place between apes and modern 
humans.  
3.2.2 The transition to language in mythic culture 
The second transition, that to mythic culture, produced language. Mythic culture 
is a kind of urbanization of the social environment that was created by mimetics. 
It did not result from environmental selection pressures, such as geographical or 
climactic conditions. The pressure was caused by other hominins, even in the 
same species and in the same ecological niche.  
The first pressure was to minimize ambiguity, which must have been immense 
when mimetic communication became more complex. It is paradoxical that in this 
stage, language here seems necessary to minimize ambiguity in messages—
ambiguity will take revenge and return to the semantic linguistic level! If we do 
not accept this pressure, we might place the invention of words in an earlier stage 
and explain that grammar was needed to minimize the ambiguity of words. With 
speech came certain physical adaptations, such as respiration control, the position 
of the larynx, memory and the development of cortical zones for autocuing. 
The second pressure came from our need to tell stories and perpetuate myths. 
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Thus, although language was first and foremost a social device, its initial 
utility was not so much in enabling a new level of collective technology or 
social organization, which it eventually did, or in transmitting skill, or in 
achieving larger political organizations, which it eventually did. Initially, it 
was used to construct conceptual models of the universe. Its function was 
evidently tied to the development of integrative thought. ... The myth is the 
prototypal, fundamental, integrative mind tool. (Donald 1991, 215) 
Cultural tools depend upon adaptations, and the adaptation that most likely 
explains the rapid spreading of homo sapiens—and the rapid disappearance of 
ergaster/erectus—is that of speech. Hence, mythic culture and the use of spoken 
language are connected.  
Language is used mostly for mythic purposes. In ancient communities, where 
technology was poorly developed, language was rich. Grammar, substantives, 
verbs and so on were developed for this higher cognitive goal. Mythic culture then 
depends upon the cognitive ability to invent mind-tools, that is, symbols as well as 
the rules to use them. Hence, language develops “on the linguistic battlefield” 
where inventive speakers propose their inventions, and the “users of a language 
vote for each new invention by adoption” (Donald 1991, 236).  
Notwithstanding this perpetual change, the initial developers of each language 
must have been super-inventors! Ancient languages are syntactically more 
complex and richer in their vocabulary than their descendants are, beyond any 
practical need, as the 17th century philosopher Francis Bacon observed (Arens 
1974, 83). Even the invention of a poor vocabulary is a magnificent performance, 
for words are special things. They express symbols as well as emotions, refer to 
(classes of) objects and relations, and in transcending mimetics, they allow for 
syntax. I am not sure whether we can say there was a first word, but the first 
words certainly speeded up the hominization process. 
Donald is undecided regarding whether his main motor of evolution, cognition, is 
individual rather than cultural. Costal and Thompson see a (perhaps implicit) 
plaidoyer for the mind as socially scaffolded. Plotkin perceives his theory as 
essentially about psychology and individual cognition (in Donald 1993, 755; 769f). 
3.2.3 From language to science 
The third transition was enacted by modern humans, or Homo sapiens sapiens. 
This stage of theoretical culture was characterized by visual symbolic invention 
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(e.g., cave paintings), external memory (script, e.g., for a calendar) and the 
thinking that engenders theories.  
Donald approaches the transition as a social scientist would. In his view the 
oppositions as group and individual, not blindness and sight. Just as mythic culture 
formed large groups, the new culture seems to stimulate individuation.  
Paradoxically . . . the individuation of humans has increased with the 
growth of the external symbol storage, perhaps because it holds a much 
larger reservoir of alternatives for individuals to choose from and because it 
challenges the tradition-bound mythic elements of society to find 
significance in individual life rather than in the group. (1991, 356)  
Donald accepts this opposition as the paradox of our life. There is no trace of the 
idea that one of the two is more real than the other is. 
3.2.4 Evaluation 
Natural selection is the important mechanism in Donald’s theory. When mimetic 
culture appears, selection has a partly cultural character. Although it seems 
obvious that language is a communication tool, Donald suggested that it was first 
a storytelling tool. However, this is nothing more than an educated guess 
(Halverson, in Donald 1993, 762). Because Donald approaches evolution from a 
cognitive point of view, interpretation is given from the outset. It is no wonder 
that he has a clear eye for the paradox.  
The theory is obviously highly gradualistic. The cognitive stages are retraced as 
evolutionary stages, the lower stages contained functionally in the higher ones. 
However, the localization of mimetic culture as “between apes and modern 
humans” drew criticism from both camps. One camp pointed out that instead of 
being ape-like, totemic dances can be highly informative (Brace, in Donald 1993, 
751). Donald did not deny this. In fact, his position is that mimetic culture is still 
with us in Western culture (e.g., slapstick, opera and sports), so his statements do 
not condescend to aboriginal culture. Scholars from the other camp argue that 
apes have mimetic culture (Mitchell/Miles, in Donald 1993, 768). Others argue 
that apes are not able to imitate (Tomasello, in Donald 1993, 771). Tomasello 
suspects that if Donald had known that apes do not imitate, he would not have 
unnecessarily diminished their other cognitive skills, such as communicating with 
representational content. However, this criticism does not affect the structure of 
the argument. Whether humans are unique in their mimetic skills or even in their 
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imitation skills or not, the transition to mythic culture is crucial because it involves 
language. 
Donald accounts for the context of language as a system in his idea that it was 
invented as lexicon and as syntax in a social context. He seems to suggest that the 
early words of the mimetic stage were not yet the phase of lexical invention, 
which came much later and combined with the origin of grammar. His argument 
against the idea that words preceded grammar (defended by Bickerton among 
others) is that this creates the burden of explaining why grammar followed so 
much later (Donald 1993, 744). This debate is mirrored in the debate about 
Brother John, a monk whose epileptic seizures made him linguistically disabled. 
However, during these periods, he was still able to operate the radio and the 
elevator, to communicate with gestures and to recall later his experiences in 
language. What does this example prove? That language is not necessary for the 
things John was still able to do (Donald) or that his mind had been so formed by 
language that the actions could to a certain extent be performed on their own 
(Bickerton)? The latter interpretation is more plausible, given the fact that Brother 
John normally was linguistically able and given the fact that language forms our 
cognitive abilities (Vygotzky 1960). It does not mean that Donald underestimates 
the influence of protolanguage on human cognition or that mimetic skills were 
merely a spin-off from language. Things could have been much more deeply 
intertwined from the outset. For example, Donald defended his position by 
pointing out that in order to invent words, two elements should be in place: social 
meanings and autocuable motor skills. Both elements are explained by the 
condition of a mimetic stage.  
Here I provide a brief remark about other criticisms of Donald’s theory. The first 
transition, from episodic to mimetic culture, has been criticized by archaeologists, 
who held that the PAE is not at all clear, without saying that PAE refutes the 
theory (Wynn, in Donald 1993, 774). Moreover, if the culture of Oldowan and 
early Acheulean tools is used to explain the rise of mimetic culture, their own 
appearance should also be explained. The third transition, which was to 
theoretical culture, was criticized because of its Eurocentrism. Evidence for the 
transition outside Europe is dated much later than the Chauvet Cave although 
homo sapiens existed there during the same period (Chase, in Donald 1993, 752). 
Again, this does not refute the theory as a whole. 
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3.3 Bickerton: scavenger’s protolanguage creates a niche 
Bickerton’s Adam’s Tongue (2009) is subtitled “How humans made language, how 
language made humans”. This alludes to the concept of coevolution. According to 
this concept, language and humans react to each other’s evolution with a further 
evolutionary step. Where Deacon, the biological anthropologist, used modern 
brain research, Bickerton the linguist found another ground for the Darwinian 
approach: niche construction theory.  
3.3.1 Animal communication and language 
The Darwinian approach to language suggests looking for homologies of language 
in the animal communication systems (ACS) of species with which we share a 
recent evolutionary path; in other words, a LCA. Here a problem awaits. All ACSs 
are “modifications or stylizations or amplifications of things animals would do 
anyway, things that when they started out may have had little or nothing to do 
with language”, but gradually became associated with “certain situations and 
hence with certain messages appropriate to those situations” (2009, 17-18). This 
is why the flash of the firefly has “meaning” for another firefly, and the same 
applies to dolphin sonar, wolf howling, bee dance, birdsong, ant chemical signals 
and so on. This however cannot be something out of which human language has 
arisen. Furthermore, ACS have only three topics: survival, mating and social 
signals, which are always in the “present tense” in the attempt to manipulate the 
other. Language, on the other hand, has an infinite amount of topics, including 
language itself, and it allows for abstracting from the present situation: the 
weather in general, the rain tomorrow, the crop last year. It is primarily 
informative and only secondarily manipulative. 
If language did not emerge from an ACS, how did it start? Perhaps it began as a 
few combinable spoken sounds and words. In no ACS do sounds combine such 
that one sound modifies the other, such as making it plural, a possibility, a joke, or 
two alternatives between which a choice must be made. All signals have the 
character of a whole sentence. On the other hand, words, whether in pidgin or in 
fully grown languages, combine in whole sentences, which endows them with 
meaning (Bickerton 2009, 46). 
Bickerton agrees with Deacon that a threshold was crossed when humans started 
to think symbolically, that is, to think with words, but not necessarily syntactically 
(Bickerton 2009, 50). Perhaps the iconic and indexical stages are more important 
in hominization than Deacon suggested. Words as icons break open the prison of 
II. Darwinist views on the evolution of language 
102 
 
here and now, such as expressing that there is food at some other place 
(indexical). The word, then, is central, because once it was there, it allowed for 
the indexical and symbolic stage to emerge.   
It has been proposed that these first words were extracted out of the holistic 
phrases of an ACS, such as the word for “danger” in the different alarm calls of the 
Vervet monkey: one for the leopard and a different on for the eagle. However, 
these calls do not have an equivalent in another language. The Vervet monkey’s 
call when an eagle is spotted could mean “Eating bird”, “Danger from above”, 
“Run to the trunk of the tree”, “I perceive an eagle; please draw your own 
conclusions”, or many other possibilities. This makes the extraction of one sound 
that it shares with the leopard call, which could mean “danger”, impossible. The 
sound bite could also come to mean “Lo, watch this”, “I as an observer see the 
following”, “Run!” and so on. “ACS units aren’t designed to refer; they’re designed 
to get other animals to do things” (Bickerton 2009, 68). 
3.3.2 Niche construction and selection pressure 
Bickerton expresses amazement at the fact that even bonobos, who have a social 
life in which language could be useful, and are able to learn signs and even to 
make short sentences with them, do not use these signs between themselves. It is 
as if they do not appreciate this gift of language.  
To us, [language] is the ultimate adaptation, the core of what we are. We 
can’t imagine a species that wouldn’t be delighted to have it – that once it 
got it, wouldn’t cling to it and exploit it as thoroughly as it could. (2009, 91)  
This observation leads to the question of what selection pressure could have 
promoted linguistic abilities. The paradoxical answer is language itself! Bickerton 
used the new discipline of niche construction theory to explain language 
evolution.  
A niche is an environment (in a habitat such as a rainforest, a deep sea or a 
meadow) in which an animal lives and to which it is adapted, in order to find its 
nourishment and to protect itself. An evolutionary process can be influenced by a 
change in the behaviour of an animal in a concrete environment. Let us say that a 
dog starts to forage in water, first for rats and then for fish as well. This makes 
some behaviours and some phenotypical traits (e.g., slow-drying fur) less 
advantageous and other behaviours and traits advantageous. Genetic variations 
are selected by this behaviour. So far, this is Darwinism as usual. When a 
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population of dogs hunts that way in a specific environment, the effect might be 
that certain rats or fish disappear from the environment, which would make it 
easier for other animals or plants to live there, going along their own evolutionary 
path. The dogs have unknowingly and unintentionally constructed a niche for 
them and destructed the niche for rats. This is an example of niche construction. 
Niche construction means that the animal builds or destroys (part of) the habitat 
to which it, or another animal, is adapted. Famous examples are the beaver dam 
and the bird nest, which are non-human illustrations of what Aristotle called the 
final cause (Metaphysics Book V) of the building behaviour of these animals. 
Moreover, the animals benefit from their activity because they are adapted to the 
environment that they build. Hence, it is “not just the species that makes the 
niche: it’s the niche that makes the species” (Bickerton 2009, 103). This principle 
holds for both humans and other animal species. Culture is our niche, and we 
became entangled in a complex web of evolution and adaptation that was far 
more complex than that of any other species.  
Bonobos are peaceful and chimps are aggressive; chimps often move in all-male 
groups and bonobos almost always move in mixed groups. Chimps use tools, but 
bonobos do not. Bickerton sums up these differences to make two points. First, 
these differences correlate with their niches (Bickerton 2009, 111). Second, 
humans differ from both, in their creation of a series of niches: 
What makes us different from our closest relatives, the bonobos and 
chimps..., is the series of niches our ancestors developed...: a terrestrial 
omnivore niche, a low-end scavenging niche, a high-end scavenging niche, a 
hunting-gathering niche, a herding niche and an agricultural niche. You 
could add an urban-industrial niche, if you like, to make seven. (Bickerton 
2009, 109) 
What could human evolution have been like, seen from the perspective of niche 
construction theory? The Australopithecines (e.g., the Taung Child and “Lucy”) 
were more prey than predator (e.g., the Vervet monkeys today, with their alarm 
cries), so they had to build on each other’s watchfulness. The other member of 
my tribe is not the one who has to be outwitted; he is someone I need to watch 
my back, a partner whose trust I must earn by watching his back (Bickerton 2009, 
115). The Australopithecines were scavengers and ate mostly bone marrow 
because other scavengers would have taken all the meat. Around 2 mya, bone 
cuts reveal that its descendant, Homo habilis, had changed the eating order and 
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was the first to have the meat. This must have been made possible by chasing 
stronger animals away, which is unthinkable without cooperation. - However, 
regarding our paradox, Bickerton warns “One species, no matter how smart, can 
never think its way back into the skin of another” (229). 
To obtain the cadaver required groups larger than any other mammal species. 
This requirement exerted a strong selection pressure. The signs used for the 
location of a cadaver were probably iconic (e.g., gestures imitating the movement 
of the buffalo or sounds imitating the elephant), but the important thing is that 
they broke the “prison of the here and now” (Bickerton 2009, 145) collectively, 
constructing a social niche of power scavengers. Bickerton (165) lets language 
start here, as functional sounds used for recruitment. Subsequently, it would  
become more and more important to accurately read all the signs that the 
megafauna had left, to determine species identity and relative age, 
numbers in the group, things that indicated an animal might be injured or 
sick. Disputes would inevitably arise about how the signs should be 
interpreted. (Bickerton 2009, 220) 
The next step depends on having words and the active use of categories. This step 
was achieved only “with the greatest difficulty” (Bickerton 2009, 211) because it 
took a process that involved a threefold uncoupling: “signals would have to be 
uncoupled from situations [like a certain action], from occurrence [being near the 
object you are communicating about+ and from fitness” (216). Perhaps playing 
children helped in this process (218), and storytelling in general also helped.  
Only when this uncoupling had started, did cultural fitness begin to matter. An 
individual could enhance it by inventing new words, thereby adding further 
construction elements to the niche (Bickerton 2009, 222). This could not yet have 
been a protolanguage. For several hundreds of thousands of years, it was a hybrid 
of ACS and protolanguage, with only a few words. Because words are seldom 
complete in themselves, they ask for combinations. In other words, “language, 
like niche construction, is an autocatalytic process. Once it’s started, it drives 
itself” (231). This echoes Deacon’s remark, “Language is its own prime mover” 
(1997, 44). 
Rules for the combination of words into sentences are normally called syntax. 
Bickerton takes it as a complicated form of “merge”, the combination of actual 
words, respecting their lexical requirements (e.g., a noun needs a verb to have a 
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sentence, and a verb needs a noun, except in an imperative sentence, and so on). 
Bickerton’s evolutionary model, which he compares with Chomsky’s, is the 
following (2009, 189). 
Table 1 
 Bickerton Chomsky 
Time 1 Animals have concepts that 
won’t merge. 
Animals have concepts that 
won’t merge. 
Time 2 Protohumans start talking. Typically human concepts, 
which will merge, appear. 
Time 3 Talking produces typically 
human concepts. 
The brain gets rewired. 
Time 4 Merge appears and starts 
merging typically human 
concepts. 
Merge appears and starts 
merging typically human 
concepts. 
Time 5 The brain maybe gets rewired 
(plausibly but not certain). 
Capacities for complex thought, 
planning etc. develop. 
Time 6 Capacities for complex thought, 
planning etc. develop. 
People start talking. 
 
A proto-syntax appeared, based on words in a pidgin-like order (“beads-on-a-
string”), such as “going from the known to the unknown”, “first you mention 
something, then you say something about it” (Bickerton 2009, 231). The first 
syntax must have been very easy to comprehend; however, it must have been 
very difficult to create.  
3.3.3 Evaluation 
The dominant mechanism is obviously natural selection, but during the process, 
interpretation arises (e.g., in the scheme shown in Table 1, at “time 3,4 and 6” in 
the left column). 
Gradualism can of course be seen in the subsequent formation of speech, words, 
concepts and complex thought. The context of language as a system is described 
as arising slowly from words. The social context is the niche. Described in 
Bickerton’s dashing style, human niche construction is a paradoxical undertaking. 
Language, once it appeared, became its own enforcer. Moreover, it came to 
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dominate our niche to the extent that we cannot imagine that another animal 
would not appreciate the gift of language. We have tried to share it with other 
animals, which alone is a sign of the sociality of language. In other words, 
language is interwoven with who we are and how we see the world.  
3.4 The path of language evolution and the paradox 
Donald, Deacon and Bickerton each proposed an evolutionary story in which 
language intertwines with something else in order to develop. Donald views 
gestures as opening a semantic realm, in which language could flourish 
comfortably. Deacon offers the symbol as the solution for the cognitive problems 
of indexical cognition and a possible solution for the evolution of the brain. 
Bickerton points to the selection pressure with which hominine scavengers were 
confronted around 2 mya and shows how a lexical protolanguage might have 
given rise to syntax.  
All three accept the paradox. They use methods that integrate hermeneutics. 
Their approaches are strong on all desiderata.  
The discussion in this chapter revealed that studying language evolution using 
methods that combine hermeneutics and Darwinism is not farfetched. In Chapter 
III, I will discuss a branch of Darwinism that offers the regal road to study language 
evolution in this sense: niche construction theory.
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III. Niche construction and hermeneutics 
In this chapter, niche construction theory is introduced as the best way to explain 
human language evolution. 
In the first section, the outlines of niche construction theory are located within 
Darwinist evolutionary thinking, by comparison with similar concepts like 
behavioural ecology and co-evolution. 
The human niche is characterized in the second section. First, it is described as a 
power-niche. Humans are able, thanks to their knowledge and technology, to 
settle in very different regions of the world. On top of that, they are able to 
develop insight in the niches of other animals. The term “power-niche” expresses 
its place among the other niches, it is a relative characterization. Another 
description would be the following. Our niche consists of human cooperation that 
is open to infinite possibilities, thanks to a medium with infinite possibilities: 
language. It is the “power-niche of cooperation through language”.  
Next, the concepts of mindreading and mindshaping are introduced. It is shown 
that language and mindreading are two sides of one coin. Mindshaping is 
proposed as the threshold mechanism: it creates the public cognitive sphere in 
which a new dynamic came into play: interpretation, hermeneutics, one that itself 
influenced human evolution.  
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1. Niche construction within evolutionary theory 
I locate niche construction theory within Darwinist evolutionary thinking (section 
1.2) and compare it with similar approaches, such as behavioural ecology (section 
1.1) and co-evolution (section 1.3). In section 1.4, I offer examples of empirical 
niche research. I must stress here that I am not a biologist, so the section is written 
from a rational and interdisciplinary point of view, that is, a philosophical stance, 
using the standard literature. 
1.1 Towards niche construction: genetics, behaviour and ecology 
When Darwin wrote The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, he did 
not know how the hereditary information of parents was transmitted to their 
offspring. His discovery concerned the external force of selection. Darwin’s 
contemporary, Gregory Mendel (1822-1884), discovered the internal force of 
genetics, but his work became known only posthumously, at the beginning of the 
20th century. In the 1930s, Darwinian selectionist thinking and Mendelian 
genetics were combined into the “the modern synthesis” or “neo-Darwinism”.  
After James Watson and Francis Crick discovered DNA in the 1950s, geneticism 
took the upper hand in biology, a development that was popularized by the 
bestseller The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 1975). With hindsight, it seems that this was 
the swan-song of the predominance of the geneticist view. The awareness grew 
that “certain biological phenomena do seem to require a more complex 
theoretical structure” than the genetical, if they are to be placed in a general 
theory of evolution (Plotkin 1988, 7). Behaviour is one of them. Genetic 
reductionism cannot carry the whole explanatory burden, so the framework of 
Darwinism should be broadened: “Genetic fitness does not occur in vacuo” 
(Odling-Smee 1988, 74). If selection “is directly for the phenotype and indirectly 
for the genotype or parts of it” (Mayr 1997, 2093), and the phenotype is an 
organism in an environment, then natural selection is more complicated than the 
concept of a “selfish gene” suggests. 
The discontent with the course of Darwinism, which was voiced by Plotkin, Odling-
Smee and others, differed from the discontent of nineteenth-century thinkers, 
such as Wallace and Lyell. The latter were primarily concerned with the place of 
humans in evolution. Dissatisfied with Darwin’s view, they sought a solution in 
claiming that the origin of humans was supernatural (Richards 1987, 161ff). 
However, it is not clear that science could defend this claim. By contrast, the 
present discontent with geneticist Darwinism is not meant to save some human 
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feature from Darwinism, nor does it require a deus ex machina argument to 
support it. 
One fruit of the discontent was a new discipline: human behavioural ecology. Its 
object is the influence of the environment on human behaviour and “how the 
alternative behavioural strategies that people adopt produce cultural differences” 
(Laland/Brown 2002, 109). Thus, it looks for ecological constraints on culture or an 
“ecological leash”. It does not look for the influence of the organism on the 
environment, although that had been done by one Darwinist long before. 
Around 1900, while Mendel’s work was being discovered, the American 
psychologist J. Mark Baldwin described the influence that humans have on their 
environment and thus indirectly on their evolution (Richards 1987; Weber/Depew 
2003). Humans create a cultural environment in which certain traits prove 
advantageous and thus are selected. A famous example is the tolerance for 
lactose (milk sugar). When hunter-gatherer societies gradually turned into 
agricultural societies, cows were among the first animals to be domesticated. 
However, like most other mammals, adult humans are lactose intolerant. 
However, because lactose contains many nutrients, such as fat and vitamin D, 
there was a potential nutritional advantage for those who could tolerate  lactose, 
which has had an evolutionary influence. In populations descending from the 
ancient herding humans (e.g., Europeans), most adults are lactose tolerant. In 
other populations (e.g., Chinese), the great majority are lactose intolerant. Hence, 
animal husbandry created an environment that influenced human evolution. 
Lactose tolerance became an advantage and thus was genetically secured.  
The phenomenon that Baldwin described later became known as the “Baldwin 
effect”, although it “does not reliably refer either to a theory-neutral 
phenomenon, or to a single hypothesis, or to an identifiable hypothesis” (Depew, 
in Weber/Depew 2003, 6). Baldwin became a persona non grata in academia after 
having been spotted in a brothel (Laland/Brown 2002, 51). His views were also 
discredited in Darwinian circles, because the “effect” itself could be described in 
terms of natural selection working on the gene pool in a population. It was not felt 
that he had added—as he claimed—something essential to our understanding of 
human behaviour, which, after all, only indirectly influences the genetic makeup 
of the population.  
Baldwin pointed out that behaviour affects evolution without the need for 
Lamarckianism. Lamarck’s view on evolution preceded Darwin. The latter praised 
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Lamarck in the opening pages of The Origin for explaining evolution without the 
concept of divine creation: “He first did the eminent service of arousing attention 
to the probability of all change in the organic, as well as in the inorganic world, 
being the result of law and not of miraculous interposition” (Darwin 1859, 4). 
However, Lamarck’s explanation assumed the heredity of acquired characteristics, 
whereas in Darwin’s view, which was confirmed by Mendel, the genotype is not 
influenced by acquired characteristics. Evolution is the result of the elimination of 
phenotypes (traits) whose genotype does not result in enough adaptations. 
Behaviour, in other words, does not directly influence the genetic material (as 
Lamarck thought), but (as Baldwin suggested) it possibly influences the adaptive 
context of future generations, and through that, the genetic material of a 
population.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, when geneticism took the upper hand in biology, Conrad 
Waddington carried forward the subcultural Baldwinian line (but see Depew, in 
Weber/Depew 2003, 16ff). He called the environment in so far as it was 
influenced by organisms (e.g., bird nests and beaver dams) the “exploitive 
system”. Waddington also pointed out that organisms actively choose their 
environment: a darker moth will settle on a darker tree for better camouflage 
(Odling-Smee 1988, 76). Both types of behaviour, exploitation and environmental 
choice, play roles in selection because they influence what genotype has an 
advantage over others. Eventually, these behaviours have a better chance to be 
“genetically assimilated”. Waddington’s point is that assimilation follows the 
selection of a behaviour.  
An ascendant discipline, niche construction theory, took up the challenge to 
combine a certain Baldwinianism with ecology. It began to study the evolutionary 
role of the influence that species and their environment have on each other. 
(Kendal et al. 2011, 785) 
1.2 Niche construction theory 
Niche construction is “the process of organism-driven environmental 
modification” (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, xi). It deserves far greater prominence in 
evolutionary theory than it has received thus far. Traditional evolutionary theory 
suggests that, in the words of Richard Lewontin, “the environment ‘poses the 
problem’; the organism ‘posits solutions’ of which the best is finally chosen” 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 17). This picture, however, is too static. The behaviour 
of many animals affects their chance of survival and that of others because it 
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changes their environment. It would not be right to say that environment and 
organism “co-evolve” in such cases, for the environment did not just co-evolve by 
itself in response to the evolution of an organism. The “motor” of environmental 
change is the organism itself; it forms the environment to which it is adapted. 
With reference to John Donne’s well-known poem, we might say that no animal is 
an island. Every influence on an ecosystem by one species creates constraints and 
possibilities for other species.  
Another contribution of niche construction to the evolutionary process is 
ecosystem engineering. A stunning example is the “agriculture” of leaf-cutter ants 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 3ff). They take leaves below the earth to create fungi 
gardens. The fungi provide the ants with the food they need. One huge 
subterranean nest covered over 22 cubic meters! On the one hand, the leaf-cutter 
ants destroy human crops, but on the other hand they restore the soil in places 
where humans have destroyed primary forest. Examples such as these show that 
behaviour influences the ecosystem, and through it, one’s niche as well as that of 
other species.  
A second example is the activity of microorganisms (e.g., bacteria, fungi etc.) in 
the Negev desert. They secrete polysaccharides that bind the soil. If it rains, the 
water will not immediately be absorbed in the ground. Instead, a much of it runs 
into holes previously formed by desert porcupines digging for geophytes. The 
resulting pools offer a good place for seeds to germinate, creating oases that 
shelter to new species, thanks to the microorganisms and, I hasten to say, the 
porcupines.  
An example of human niche construction, the evolutionary consequences of 
which can hardly be overestimated, is the control of fire. Secure evidence of fire 
control is dated to around 400 kya at a Homo erectus site (James 1989). Humans 
became able to cook their food, which means that a part of digestion is done 
outside the body. As the quality of their food thus improved, their brains (which 
use much energy) grew whereas the digestive tract, including jaws and teeth, 
became smaller. The causality suggested by this formulation (known as the 
“expensive tissue hypothesis” or “gut-brain swap”), has been refuted by 
comparative research (Navarrete et al. 2011). The explanation suggested by the 
comparison is more complex. We should think of two parallel processes. First the 
costs of several physiological functions are diminishing, such as locomotion, 
growth and reproduction. Second the net energy input by an improved quality of 
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diet is increasing, in which cooking must have played a decisive role (Wrangham 
2009, 109ff; Odling-Smee 2003, 346). Hence, energy was subsidized through 
cooperation (Hrdy 2009) and cognitive buffering, which was a solution to the 
seasonal fluctuation of food availability. 
In addition to influencing the present environment, niche construction creates a 
second strand of inheritance next to genetics: ecological inheritance. An example 
is the soil of a meadow that is inhabited by generations of earthworms, which 
contributes to drainage and plant nutrition. Other examples include beaver dams 
and nests used by generations of birds.  
Niche construction is far from being a rare phenomenon. The second chapter of 
Odling-Smee et al.’s (2003) book contains references to hundreds of species and 
their niche construction. They conclude “that the ubiquity and broad impact of 
niche construction are no longer open to question” (283). 
Niche construction theory could come to “bridge” evolutionary theory and the 
social sciences “because it emphasizes the active role that organisms play in the 
evolutionary process. Humans are not just passive vehicles for genes, they . . . are 
the ultimate niche constructors” (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 27f). Niche 
construction  
is a general process exhibited by all organisms, and species do not require 
advanced intellect or sophisticated technology to change their world. 
Hence, the general replacement of a single role of phenotypes in evolution 
[as gene-vehicle] by a dual role [as niche constructors too] removes from 
cultural processes any claim to a unique status with respect to their 
capacity to modify natural selection. (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 240)  
As such, niche construction theory is the constructive answer to socio-biology and 
evolutionary psychology. The one-sidedness of the latter disciplines has been 
criticized fiercely (e.g. Rose/Rose eds. 2000). However, the genuine wish to place 
humans inside evolutionary theory remains. Niche construction theory surpasses 
co-evolutionary views by incorporating the evolutionary context, which includes 
ecology and culture and their trade-offs.  
Niche construction behaviour might benefit not only the actor but others as well. 
This poses a problem in evolutionary theory. In principle, the altruist has a 
disadvantage in getting his genes reproduced, because others take advantage of 
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his kindness. Supposed that his altruism has a genetic base, how could this genetic 
base be prevented from extinction within a couple of generations? Does not the 
survival of the fittest rule out the viability of altruism? A poignant form of this 
riddle is the “free rider problem”. It is possible that someone simulates 
cooperation in order to receive the benefits of the work of others, without the 
cost. Remember the cuckoos described in Chapter I. The free rider will be in a 
better position to mate, so his non-altruistic genes will spread through the 
population and dominate the altruism genes. However, because altruistic 
behaviour persists, evolution has solved this problem—but how? There have been 
several answers to this riddle, all of which have sought to explain that altruism is a 
kind of group-directed egoism, the group being either kin, a reciprocal community 
or a niche-construction group: 
- Hamilton showed that altruistic behaviour could evolve if the benefits of 
the costly behaviour went to kin, that is, to organisms with a similar 
genotype (this is called inclusive fitness). “I would pull two brothers out of 
the water or eight cousins”. So altruism benefits your own genotype albeit 
in other phenotypes; 
- Trivers explained altruistic behaviour towards non-kin through the 
principle of reciprocity (“tit for tat”). It is only an evolutionary stable 
strategy (cf. Chapter 1) if the receiver will return the benefits at some 
other date. “If I save him now, he might help me out later”. This requires 
memory and may perhaps have played a role in the evolution of hominine 
consciousness. Those that had a better memory could more easily debunk 
free riders. 
- Niche construction theory explains that altruism is in fact niche 
construction-directed egoism. We all benefit from this niche, so we must 
all do our share. The competition is not within the niche construction 
group, but between groups of constructors. The selection pressure pushes 
towards recognizing free riders and punish them collectively. 
Niche construction allows for cooperative, social and altruistic behaviour 
benefitting the actor in ways that are less direct—and thus more complex—than 
kin selection or reciprocity are. Cooperative behaviour can be seen as an 
investment in the social character of our niche, which helps all, including me and 
my offspring. A good chance of benefitting me and my offspring by my behaviour 
is to strengthen the niche in general, because I do not know where my children or 
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even I will be in five or fifteen years. Reversely, aggression can be explained as 
defending the niche against behaviour that threatens some aspect of it (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003, 298f).  
De Waal (2014) pointed out that one-to-one moral behaviour can be observed in 
chimps, but that morality at the community level (with the characteristics of 
“disinterestedness, apparent impartiality and flavour of generality”) is only fully 
developed in human behaviour. What he calls “community level” or “society”, I 
propose to call a “concrete niche”, because it is the social construction to which 
humans are adapted and which helps them survive. Newcomers and outsiders are 
welcome in it, and potentially every human could fit in, but its actual concrete 
form (moral rules) may be quite different from other concrete forms. 
[We humans] routinely extend our moral reasoning to the society as a 
whole, speculating what would happen to our community if everyone acted 
that way. We even extend our value system to interactions that we are not 
directly involved in. (De Waal 2014, 198) 
Human niche construction is a cultural process that enables humans to 
accumulate their knowledge in order to survive in an environment. Consequently, 
this allowed them to spread around the globe. The human adaptedness to a 
human niche, which in turn is adaptive to the natural environment, explains this 
enormous dispersion. It also explains some typical human traits: the relatively 
“unspecialized” limbs, the naked skin, the long pedagogical period and the long 
biographical period after the end of female fertility. Paradoxically, we are 
hardwired not to be hardwired, and the space that opens is filled by niche 
elements: cultural elements like pedagogy, clothing, cooking and so on.   
1.3 Co-evolution fits within niche construction 
Co-evolution occurs when two evolutionary processes intertwine. A step in one 
process becomes the selectionary force in the other process, causing a 
corresponding step and so on. In this section, I argue that the concept of co-
evolution fits within niche construction theory. 
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1.3.1 Co-evolution of cuckoos and hosting birds 
An example of coevolution was presented in subsection 1.2.2. of Chapter I. The 
brood-parasite behaviour of the cuckoo came to exploit the “hospitality” of the 
hosting bird. Some hosting birds, but not the dunnock (yet), evolved egg 
discrimination ability, as a “counter-adaptation”. In response, some cuckoos 
evolved the ability to disguise their eggs as the eggs of their host. While this can 
be described as co-evolution, it is clear that such a frame isolates it from the niche 
construction behaviour that is its context: birds build nests and birds return from 
the south to this specific region.  
1.3.2 Co-evolution of language-genes and language as culture 
A second example of co-evolution concerns the theory of “gene-culture co-
evolution” (this is the term of Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza; by contrast, Boyd and 
Richerson call it “dual inheritance theory”). The example is about the capacity for 
spoken language, which is both a genetic trait and a culturally determined 
phenomenon. The hypothesis was that “speech evolved as a channel for the 
communication of adaptive cultural traits from parents to offspring” (Aoki/ 
Feldman 1989, 181). In other words, speech serves to improve the fitness of the 
listener. Through it, the listener learns a skill (e.g., tool fabrication) that might 
help him survive. Not surprisingly, a trait that facilitates transmission and the 
reception of information will be advantageous in the genetic models described. 
The authors concede that many traits are involved, serving many purposes in 
communication, particularly memory capacity.  
However, this example is heavily loaded with suppositions. First, innovation in the 
generation (-s) preceding the offspring. Innovation is a great beneficiary of 
language. Second, the isolation of the “vertical transmission model” from 
“horizontal transmission”. Why would parents who speak to their child not speak 
to fellow tribe members? Among the Aka pygmies, “most skills are learned from 
parents” (Aoki/Feldman 1989, 182), but this does not a priori mean that spoken 
language started within the family. Third, the idea that the advantage of spoken 
language was instruction. Why could it not have been mythical storytelling, as 
Donald (1991) suggested, or cultic chant? In short, the model requires more 
context, which is provided in the niche construction theory.   
The theory of gene-culture co-evolution has another disadvantage, compared 
with niche construction theory. It puts too much stress on (typically human) 
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cultural transmission and thus on human uniqueness, whereas niche construction 
involves many species (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 250).  
1.3.3 Co-evolution of language and the brain 
A third example of co-evolution is central to Deacon’s theory, in a book subtitled 
“the co-evolution of language and the brain” (1997). Deacon described the 
evolution of the human brain in relation to body mass, compared to other 
primates, and he distinguished the brain parts to show which parts grew relatively 
more than others. This had not been done previously and made a great 
contribution to the field.  
Concerning language, Deacon proposed an original solution to the riddle of 
language acquisition: Why are human infants able to learn something as complex 
as language without explicit instruction, in a relatively short period? His solution is 
that language evolved relative to the brain of human children because they have 
to learn language. Aspects of language (mainly syntax) that are easily learnable by 
children will be used more often and thus have more presence in a language. 
Language is tailor made for children’s brains, it uses the learning biases in their 
brains. If it wasn’t, it would not have survived. 
The first cause of this might be brain plasticity. Many connections between 
neurons (synapses) are not determined by genes but by the behaviour of the 
person and through what happens in his or her brain in a selection process. “By 
initially overproducing connections that have been spread to a wide variety of 
targets [within several brain regions], and then selecting from among these on the 
basis of their different characteristics, highly predictable and functional patterns 
of connectivity can be generated with minimal prespecification of the details” 
(Deacon 1997, 202). In other words, the brain adapts to the person’s behaviour, 
which adapts to its environment.  
This process has to do with internal brain organization more than with size. If the 
relative brain size influenced intelligence, mice would be more intelligent than 
humans, because their brain-body ratio is higher. However, absolute size is not 
the solution either. If having small brains means being dumb, then why are bees 
and ants so remarkably intelligent? In a certain sense, body mass is as informative 
of intelligence as brain size is: “different-sized animals live in very different 
worlds” (Deacon 1997, 159). The smaller the animal, the quicker it must react to 
food or predators and the more advantages lie in quick decision making. The 
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period of learning is dangerous, and its upshot has less weight when an animal 
lives shorter.  
Large animals, in comparison, can get by with rather slower reflexes, can 
afford to vary their sexual and foraging behaviors in an effort to better 
optimize their behaviors, and may have considerable opportunity to learn 
by observation and trial and error. Being longer lived puts a greater 
premium on learning and memory, and less on automated preprogrammed 
behaviors. (Deacon 1997, 160) 
Relative brain size matters the most in one respect: it correlates positively with 
the ability to transfer what is learned to new contexts. This informs us about 
learning strategies and possibly about the biases in the brains of human infants 
when they encounter language.  
However, the idea of relative brain size is ambiguous. Brain sizes can vary within a 
species. Dogs are the best-known example. Between dog varieties, body size 
differs more than brain size does. The Chihuahua brain is relatively bigger than the 
Berner-Senner brain is. This encephalization does not make the Chihuahua more 
intelligent. So relative brain size must be measured according to the mean of the 
species or the genus. In fact, what seems encephalization in Chihuahua is actually 
body mass reduction, which obviously does not raise the level of intelligence. 
How does this apply to human brains? In general, primate brains show the same 
growth curve as other mammal brains do, but their bodies grow more slowly. 
“The apparent increase of encephalization in primates is then, more accurately, a 
decrease in somatization ... but primates start out with small bodies while 
Chihuahuas only end up with small bodies” (1997, 170; 172). Humans continue 
this primate trend, except our brains grow for a longer period than those of other 
primates, and our body stops growing earlier than the brain growth would 
suggest. With a brain of our size, primates would have bodies weighing 500 kilos! 
However, we are the largest primate, so we are not the Chihuahuas of our genus.  
Human encephalization is the effect of two causes. First, homeotic genes 
determine the general size and rough partitioning of the brain, resulting in a 
typical mammal brain, which is bigger than the body would suggest. The 
developmental clock that drives this is still unknown. Second, Deacon (1997, 207) 
described the displacement process, in which regions of the brain are used for 
functions other than those in the standard model, because of a change in the 
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body size of the species or in certain habits of the species. For example, the 
“blind” mole rat uses the part of the brain normally dedicated to visual input 
(which it does not have) for tactile and auditory input; an elephant’s eye is 
relatively smaller than that of a mouse, so the elephant’s brain needs less space to 
compute visual input. Thus, less specialized areas of the brain (the association 
areas) show relative growth. The human brain is special in that the dorsal 
forebrain is enlarged (twice as big as one would expect in a primate body with 
that size of brain) and the olfactory region is reduced (220). Displacement means 
that the brain connectivity changes according to such enlargements and 
reductions. Deacon suggests that the function of the enlarged parts tells us 
something about the informational input that helped select for their growth. 
Human speech (like birdsong) depends mostly upon the motor-skeleton-skill 
learning system, unlike most other animal communication systems, which depend 
upon the visceral-emotional-involuntary system. This does not mean that visceral-
emotional sounds are absent in humans. These two systems play different roles in 
our communication. The visceral-emotional system is continuous with our 
evolutionary ancestors; language and speech on the other hand are without 
precedent. As quoted above,  
it makes no sense to ask what kind of word a laugh is, whether a sob is 
expressed in past or present tense, or if a sequence of facial gestures is 
correctly stated. … Of no other natural form of communication is it 
legitimate to say ‘language is a more complex version of that’. (Deacon 
1997, 34)  
A human infant babbles, exploring all sounds it will use later in speech, but only 
when it is emotionally calm. The infant cries when it is upset. The 
disproportionally large cortex region, which allows for learning and conscious 
control, gives humans the ability to use their face, mouth and larynx muscles 
voluntarily. The gradual encephalization of humans, starting with Homo habilis (2 
mya), indicates that this ability to control has grown. It is possible that the first 
sounds relied more on the mouth muscles than on the larynx, so there were more 
consonants and clicks and fewer vowels—and of course, more gestures (1997, 
253). 
However, the main result of brain evolution is not speech production, but symbol 
processing. This does not take place in a specific region of the brain. The rule of 
thumb is that higher-order tasks depend on the collaboration of brain regions. 
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Among these, the prefrontal cortex, the net winner of human encephalization, 
causes two biases that enable language invention and language acquisition. First is 
a positive learning bias towards higher order relationships, which helped humans 
over the “symbolic threshold”. Second is a negative bias towards reacting to 
simple stimulus relationships. The second bias created the room to follow the 
first.  
Deacon’s brilliant concept of brain-language co-evolution does not need an 
Pinkerean innate language module, nor does it diminish language to a Millikanese 
input-output-plus-history system. It takes only a “symbolic spark” to enlighten a 
few australopithecine, habiline or erectine prefrontal cortices. When this occurs, 
“language is its own prime mover” (Deacon 1997, 44),12 by selecting for more 
symbolic capacity (prefrontal cortex encephalization), by selecting the best 
medium (speech) after a period of multimodal language and by evolving such that 
infants can engage in it.  
In sum, the concept of co-evolution is second to the concept of niche 
construction. Co-evolution is an important part of niche construction and fits 
seamlessly within this larger frame, which is especially true of the language-brain 
coevolution phenomenon. Language is not just something “out there”, like a 
climate or a certain vegetation. It is intimately connected to the human niche. 
Hence, Deacon’s theory can also be described as about niche-brain coevolution. 
1.4 Empirical niche research 
Although the phenomenon of niche construction seems ubiquitous, one can still 
be sceptical about its evolutionary impact. The following empirical test routes 
may counter such scepticism (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 285ff) and show how niche 
construction theory stimulates useful empirical work. 
 
                                                     
12
 The formulation reminds us of the description of the epiphany of philosophical insight, 
in Plato’s apocryphal Seventh Letter (314e): “Acquintance with it *the subject of 
philosophy] must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the 
subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping 
spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining” (1961, 1589). Please 
note that Plato mentions “instruction” and “close companionship” as a necessary 
condition – just as the social element is necessary for language acquisition. 
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(1) Compare genetically and/or phenotypically two populations over several 
generations: one population in its niche-constructed environment; the other 
population in controlled circumstances in which the niche construction is blocked.  
(2) Compare certain traits in two closely related species, one of which exhibits 
niche construction, “using established comparative methods” and statistics. 
Choose traits that are connected with the niche construction. E.g., the beak of the 
woodpecker has evolved in connection with its use for pecking the tree, which is 
done as signalling and as nestmaking. It should be possible to determine whether 
the trait preceded the niche construction behaviour or not. The theory predicts 
that certain traits, or at least some quantitative aspect of them, have developed 
after the niche construction behaviour appeared.  
(3) Compare the patterns of genetic response to changes in the environment 
between species. The theory predicts that species with strong niche construction 
behaviour display fewer genetic responses to environmental changes because 
their behaviour allows them to make a flexible response. 
(4) Specific to cultural niche construction, experiments are often impossible 
because of ethical considerations. However, some historical “natural 
experiments” are well documented in the soil archive of archaeology and later 
events recorded in writing. The idea is that cultural niche construction leads to 
cultural adaptations; however, when this route does not enhance fitness, genetic 
adaptations are possible. For example, the current involuntary “experiment” of 
global warming might cause technological innovations, such as new applications 
for air-conditioning or the improvements of embankments and other defences 
against rising sea levels. This might not be enough to shelter humans from the 
consequences of global warming, so genetic responses might follow, enabling 
humans with the right adaptations to live in the changed climatic circumstances.  
A previous “natural experiment” is the introduction of the cultivation of java 
beans around the Mediterranean (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 345). In some people, 
the bean causes the genetic disorder of favism, a kind of anaemia. The question of 
why this disorder has survived for about 8,000 years could arise. It was discovered 
that carriers of this disorder become immune to malaria, so this agricultural niche-
construction element gave them a genetic advantage against this other disease.  
Another previous “natural experiment” concerns the controlled use of fire. This is 
evidently niche construction, and it had a profound impact on our evolution. 
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Wrangham has argued that cooking is the hominization factor: “cooking made us 
human” (2009). Cooking meat and vegetables makes them more easily digestible 
and less toxic. Cooking allowed humans to spend less time in chewing or eating in 
general, and it gave them the energy to develop and maintain their energy-
consuming brains. The reduced jaw and dentition of ergaster/erectus, compared 
with australopithecines and even habilis, is a visible example of an evolutionary 
impact. Another range of evolutionary effects lies within culture, many cultural 
adaptations followed the control of fire (Goudsblom 1992). 
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2. The construction of the hermeneutic niche  
This second part of Chapter III is about human niche construction. In section 2.1, 
our niche is characterized as a power-niche. Humans are able, thanks to their 
culture of adaptive knowledge and technology, to settle in regions as different as 
the Antarctic and the Sahara desert, the Andes mountains and the Dutch 
meadows below sea level. Furthermore, they are able to develop insight into the 
niches of other animals. The term “power-niche” is relative to other niches. To 
characterize it more fully, I propose the following. Our niche is characterized by a 
cooperation that is open to infinite possibilities and therefore depends upon a 
medium with the same infinite possibilities—language. We may therefore describe 
our niche as the “power-niche of cooperation through language”.  
Section 2.2 discusses the origin of this niche. It introduces the concepts of 
mindreading and mindshaping. First, it evaluates the theories of mindreading by 
Tomasello and Mameli. It shows that language and mindreading are two sides of 
the same coin. Next, we follow Zawidzki in his arguments for the idea that human 
mindreading depends on mindshaping. “Sophisticated” mindreading has evolved 
through mindshaping.  
In section 2.3, mindshaping is proposed as niche founding because it creates a 
public cognitive sphere, of which a mechanistic account would be estranging and 
useless. Hermeneutics is needed in and for this public sphere of shared meanings. 
Hence, the title of this dissertation: the hermeneutic niche. 
Section 2.4 mirrors section 1.4 of Chapter III, which was about empirical niche 
research. It explores the possibilities for hermeneutic niche research. If these 
possibilities were not promising, it would damage the scientific value of the 
concept of the hermeneutic niche. Fortunately, hermeneutic niche research is a 
very productive and promising field.  
2.1 The power-niche of cooperation through language  
The theoretical precursor of “niche” is “Umwelt”, a term coined by Uexküll (1933). 
It means the subjectively perceived environment, and emphasizes the way the 
animal is active in it (“Werkwelt”, world of activity) and the way its sense organs 
transmit a certain picture of it (“Merkwelt”, world of perception). Umwelt is the 
environment of some species: some things it does not perceive at all, and other 
things it simply does not notice because they do not mean anything to it. For 
example, Uexküll reconstructs the niche of a tick by describing that it has no 
seeing or hearing organs. It climbs to the top of a bush and then waits for the 
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smell of the skin of warm-blooded mammals. It then drops itself. It usually misses 
the mammal and has to climb up again and wait. Ticks can “do” this, without food, 
for 18 years! However, if it reaches the body of a mammal, it crawls to a hairless 
body part and pierces the skin to suck blood, which is food for herself and her 
eggs. Once satisfied, she drops from the host, lays her eggs and then dies.  
In the real world, niches overlap. The fly in my study does not notice (let alone 
read) my books nor the toys my children used to play with. Nor do I hear the 
noises to which the dog in the street reacts and thus distracts me from my 
reading.  
The human niche is just one of many niches, but it is quite remarkable. The 
human niche rests on a powerful cognition, which allowed humans to spread 
throughout the world, including Antarctica, where no other mammal lives, and to 
visit extra-terrestrial space. Cognition made us highly adaptive to different natural 
circumstances. It enabled us to compensate culturally for the non-specialization of 
our bodies. Moreover, cognition allowed the development of the niche concept 
and further research into the niches of other animals. Our niche not only overlaps 
other niches in space, it integrates those niches into a theory. Thus it can be seen 
as a power-niche.13  
The cognition on which the human niche rests is a social phenomenon. It only 
unfolds in humans when they are raised by other humans, by which they are 
culturated. The means for achieving this process has become language. 
Ontogenetically (in infant development), language plays a role in mindshaping. 
However, that does not mean it also worked phylogenetically, that is, in human 
evolution. On the contrary, I maintain that the hermeneutic niche preceded and 
partly explains language evolution. 
The result of enculturation is cognition, which is also expressed in language. 
Therefore, language is the “construction material” of our niche. The human niche 
has become a linguistic niche. When people of different cultures and languages 
meet on a remote island, the first thing they do is try to communicate, create a 
                                                     
13
 If this sounds like it advocates the superiority of humans, I hasten to add that it is not 
humans, but their niche that is superior. Moreover, it only extends to humans if they 
embody the niche by developing the cognition of how the niches overlap, which leads to 
the counterfactual responsibility for our fellow humans, animals, organisms and planet 
(Jonas 1984).  
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common language and thereby a common sphere (Levinson 2006). However, in 
less exotic places, we habitually seek to create a social public sphere through 
language, by which we can share what we know. Humans are characterized by 
cognition, sociality and language. In the words of Aristotle, who loved to classify 
what he had patiently observed,  
- “All men by nature desire to know” (Metaphysics A, 979b); 
- “Man is by nature a social animal” (Politics I, 1253a); 
- “Man is the only animal who has the gift of speech and reason *logos+” 
(Politics I, 1253a). 
Thus, our niche is social. We tend to makes friends and foes. Our cooperation and 
conflicts depend upon cognition. We adapt to our niche. We develop even 
stronger abilities of cognition, for we know about each other and always want to 
know more. Both cognition and sociality depend upon language; therefore, the 
human niche can be briefly characterized as the power-niche of cooperation 
through language.  
Our research into the niches of other species are an expression, execution and 
strengthening of our own niche. Our cognition sets us apart, which is expressed by 
this short-breathed poem by W. B. Yeats about something as natural and 
inevitable as 
DEATH 
Nor dread nor hope attend 
A dying animal. 
A man awaits his end 
Dreading and hoping all. 
Many times he died, 
Many times rose again. 
A great man in his pride 
Confronting murderous men 
Casts derision upon 
Supersession of breath. 
He knows death to the bone. 
Man has created death. 
 
2. The construction of the hermeneutic niche 
125 
 
The role that the niche plays in human evolution exceeds that of any other niche.  
It drove Deacon to claim, “Language and symbolic culture do not merely 
constitute a niche. They are far more than that. They ... have essentially become 
the tail that wagged the dog”. Language is a “complex dynamic niche, with 
something like a ‘life of its own’, or at the very least a powerful self organizing 
dynamic that can’t be reduced to mere social dynamics, much less passive 
caricatures of natural selection” (Deacon 2003, 105/111). This has been 
formulated by primatologists as “we do not merely see language as embedded in 
culture, but identify language ... with the broader matrix of everyday life [my 
italics]” (Segerdahl et al. 2005, 7; cf. 22) where the “broader matrix of everyday 
life” refers to our niche. 
Given certain forms of “culture” in animal populations, we must stress that the 
human niche is the cultural niche; based on language, its sociality and cognitivity 
are exceptional. Wittgenstein, Gadamer and Taylor, as discussed in Chapter I, 
argued that language is interwoven with the world as we know it to such an 
extent that we cannot begin to unravel it.  
Hence, language evolution theory has a lot in common with niche construction 
theory. In the next section, we will examine the contribution of Darwinian 
mechanisms to niche construction, which will lead to the need to include 
hermeneutics in the theory. 
2.2 Mindreading and mindshaping 
The human niche is underdetermined by genetics (Mameli 2001, 604). In fact, any 
explanation of human evolution in general must face the fact that the period 
between the LCA (around 6 mya, perhaps longer, see Venn et al. 2014), which we 
share with the chimpanzee, and sapiens is too short “for normal processes of 
biological evolution involving genetic variation and natural selection” (Tomasello 
1999, 2). Therefore, we have to find other mechanisms that were involved. The 
best candidates are cultural mechanisms, on which the transmission of 
information in a cumulative and innovative manner depends.  
Cultural transmission allows individual organisms to learn from the experiences of 
others, thereby saving time, effort and risk. Although it is not exclusively human, 
humans are the species in which this has become the dominant mode. The 
sociality of humans differs from the sociality of ants or sparrows, for example, in 
that our exchange of information continues incessantly, as if it is a goal in itself, 
including ever more themes. We are biologically prepared to learn from each 
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other. Human culture created a “ratchet effect”; one cannot stay behind. 
Chimpanzees occasionally invent a tool (Kummer/Goodall 1985) or create a 
fashion (Van Leeuwen et al. 2014), but a ratchet effect among them has not been 
noticed yet. 
Two main mechanisms have been put forward that seem fundamental in this 
respect: mindreading and mindshaping. They only need a few cognitive 
adaptations, but once they are functional, they enable the accumulative effect of 
culture, in other words, the construction of our niche. They enable it because they 
tune our unfolding minds to those of others, and the minds of others are an 
important aspect of the human niche.  
Prehistory began with these adaptations. In the following subsections, I will first 
explain mindreading and then mindshaping. I will eventually argue for the best 
evolutionary sequence. 
2.2.1 From joint attention to mindreading  
The appearance of joint attentional behaviour marks the “nine-month revolution” 
(Tomasello 1995; 1999, 61). Joint attention is when infants understand pointing 
and are able to follow someone’s gaze. It increases to joint engagement and 
imitative learning. The innate drive to bond with adults and look at what they look 
at is the entrance to getting to know the objects that play a role in joint attention 
movements. The infant can influence the behaviour of the parents but not of the 
wall, the ground or the table. The intersubjective dimension widens to objects and 
thus teaches eventually objectivity.  
Once welcomed in the human circle, the infant has become in principle a part of 
the information-exchange community. It has thus enhanced its chances to survive. 
Tronick’s “still-face experiment” (Mesman et al. 2009) shows the extent to which 
an infant is tuned to human contact. The experimenter asks a mother, after an 
initial phase of normal interaction, to look at the infant without reacting by voice 
or facial expression. The infant reacts strongly to this still face. It tries the things it 
knows to reopen the contact, until it starts to cry or look away. The still-face 
phase can last from seconds to minutes. The infant also reacts physiologically 
(e.g., skin conductance and heart beat). It is obvious that the infant feels that 
situations in which the parent (and to a lesser extent, any adult) looks at me but 
does not respond are to be avoided. 
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Once joint attention is accomplished, the infant has the potential for 
“mindreading”, which is “the ability of individual organisms to understand 
conspecifics as beings like themselves who have intentional and mental lives like 
their own” (Tomasello 1999, 5). It ascribes mental states to the other, and sees 
these states as essential parts of the environment.  
Mindreading is not typically human, but humans have developed a specific form 
of it. “Unless specifically trained, chimpanzees pay attention to what others know 
when they are competing, not when they are cooperating. By contrast, humans 
pay attention to others in both spheres” (Hrdy 2009, 36). This difference has been 
described in terms of low-level and high-level (or sophisticated) mindreading. 
Although low-level mind readers are sensitive to the attitudes of their 
conspecifics, there is no evidence that they do this with a supposition about what 
is going on inside the mind of the other. High-level mindreading “typically involves 
the capacity to represent mental states as such” (Zawidzki 2013, 11). Human 
mindreading is sophisticated mindreading. It ascribes propositional attitudes and 
it allows for an extraordinary level of cooperation. It also uses a syntactically 
complex and semantically flexible language (Zawidzki 2013, 99) but in my view 
this is not a necessary condition but an effect, or a tool to intensify the process 
that got off without it. In my proposal, mindreading was a condition for the 
appearance of language.  
This distinction justifies not using the term “intentional stance” (Dennett 1987) for 
mindreading. Adopting the intentional stance is to interpret an action (by a 
human being, a chess computer or the weather) by following a rational 
(normative) line of behaviour. Mindreading differs from this in that it speculates 
about the concrete causes of those actions, whether they are rational or not. 
Mindreading a chess computer would mean to speculate about its algorithms, 
which is not the same as adopting the intentional stance.  
Applying this to quotidian interpretation of and by biological agents, 
adopting the intentional stance requires only the interpretation of bouts of 
behaviour as goal directed and rationally constrained by available 
information, not the attribution of concrete, unobservable causes with 
content represented via individually variable modes of representation. 
(Zawidzki 2013, 14) 
In a certain way, although it is in itself unobservable, humans “see” the goal of 
other humans in addition to specific behaviours. Mindreading “supports, while 
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adopting the intentional stance does not support, an appearance-reality 
distinction applied to agent behaviour” (Zawidzki 2013, 15). Perhaps even the 
human ability to understand external causality is derived from this understanding. 
This would explain the ability of animistic thinkers and children to see causal 
relations in intentional terms (Tomasello 1999, 24; Dennett 2006, 55). 
In experiments similar to Tronick’s still-face experiment, adults were the target. 
The findings showed that they too depended strongly upon the stability of the 
shared reality. They were upset or angry when the others with whom they 
interacted acted contrary to expectations. For example, their conversation 
partners began to ask for clarification of perfectly normal sentences (Garfinkel 
1991). “The perceived necessity for following the ground rules of social 
interactions is likely to stem from the evolutionary roots of human social life” 
(Mesman et al. 2009, 156). 
Low-level mindreading creates a shared sphere in which information about the 
world can be exchanged and social bonds are experienced and strengthened. 
Mindreading skills let an infant tune to the minds of others, and these minds 
represent the human niche to him or her. What mechanism explains the scaling 
up from low-level to sophisticated mindreading?  
2.2.2. Mindshaping  
The minds of others are an important part of the human niche. We influence each 
other’s minds by doing things that cause emotions, by saying things that cause 
beliefs and so on. We can even create the future by saying that something is the 
case. If I express my conviction that a pupil is able to pass the exam, I enhance his 
chance to do so. If a mother expects her baby to call her, she will interpret every 
sound as a call, which the infant will notice and might use to call her in that way. 
This is the expectancy effect, which is also known as self-fulfilling prophecy or 
behavioural confirmation. There are long-term and short-term effects, as well as 
superficial and developmental effects. “Many studies show that often people tend 
to behave in ways that confirm the beliefs about them held by the persons they 
interact with”, negative as well as positive beliefs, including the beliefs they have 
about themselves. This is called “expectancy confirmation” (Mameli 2001, 610). 
The influence of expectancies on the behaviour and ultimately on the minds of 
those to which the expectancy refers is called mindshaping. 
The fact that this includes my expectations about myself stresses that it is not 
always the actual belief of the other, but also might be the belief I attribute to him 
2. The construction of the hermeneutic niche 
129 
 
that influences me. This caveat does not deny the effect; on the contrary, it adds 
another layer to the expectancies. The same applies to the internalization of the 
judgements of others (Mameli 2001, 614). Thus, it is paradoxically possible that 
the belief I internalize was internal because I attributed (projected) it to the other. 
This is an example of a hermeneutic circle. 
The following two examples of mindshaping, taken from Mameli (2001, 611f), 
show the mechanism in principle: one concerns tidiness and the other concerns 
gender. A class of elementary school children was divided into three groups. The 
first group was told they were tidy, the second group was told they ought to be 
tidy; and the third group was the control group and received no message about 
tidiness. The first group became more tidy, to a greater extent than the second. 
The persuaded second group showed a smaller improvement, which in time 
disappeared so that they fell back to the tidiness level of the control group. 
Regarding the example of gender, people tend to interpret crying as anger when 
they think the infant is a boy or as sadness or fear when they expect it to be a girl. 
These interpretations are in fact expectations that influence the behaviour of 
adults and thus influence the development of the infant. 
Now that we can identify the mechanism, we may project it on the origin of 
humans. In early hominins, expectancies might have created a resource for 
developing social and communicational skills. The development subsequently 
created a ratchet effect. Expectancies increased, and no one stayed much below 
the expectations. Mindshaping in human evolution happened through human 
practices that aimed to get another human being to match the behaviour of some 
model. Once this sensibility to expectancies was strong enough, teaching and 
learning took hold. Mindshaping became a continuous further moulding. Not only 
sensibility but also expectancies are perpetuated intergenerationally, allowing for 
mutations. In the case of gender, sexual liberation substitutes certain 
expectancies for other ones.  
Zawidzki (2013) views Mameli’s picture as intuitively compelling. However, he 
distances himself from Mameli on two connected points. The first is that Mameli 
stresses the continuity between niche construction by humans and other animals. 
In Zawidzki’s view, mindshaping differs qualitatively from other niche construction 
in four aspects (2013, 99): 
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a. it is intrinsically motivated (both by “shaper” and “shaped”, e.g., in the 
case of imitation); 
b. it is maximally flexible in the aspects of model behaviour it wants 
targets to match; 
c. it often involves socially distributed mechanisms (like pedagogy); 
d. it often involves non-actual models, taken from idealized agents or 
fictional characters. 
The resulting human mindshaping makes the inhabitants of the human niche 
more cooperative, homogeneous and predictable: “mindshaping practices like 
imitation, pedagogy, norm enforcement, the institution of social roles, and 
narrative self-regulation are directly targeted at social niche construction [my 
italics]” (2013, 20). Common to all these mindshaping practices is that they 
involve “more than aiming at just a onetime behavioural match between some 
target and model” (2013, 32); they involve the shaping of behavioural 
dispositions. 
2.2.3 Mindshaping precedes sophisticated mindreading 
The second difference between Zawidzki and Mameli concerns how it began. 
Mameli sees mindreading as a supposition for mindshaping and subsequent 
mindshaping as human niche construction. Animals are capable of mindreading 
but not of mindshaping. This fact suggests strongly that proto-humans must have 
started mindreading. However, Zawidzki pointed out that this leads to a problem 
in evolutionary logic. I will explain this problem and then explain why Zawidzki 
views this problem as avoidable. 
Human mindreading, as we saw, is sophisticated mindreading. It ascribes a 
propositional attitude (PA) to someone. This is philosophy-of-mind jargon for a 
mental attitude, such as fearing, craving, believing, denying, suspecting, with 
respect to a proposition, such as “It will snow tomorrow” or “The bottle is empty” 
or “1+1=11”. The ascription of a PA is a delicate matter because more than one PA 
is consistent with every part of (human) behaviour. This is a case of holism, in 
which the whole of our behaviour is in principle connected with the whole of our 
beliefs and convictions. Nonhuman mindreading on the other hand is slightly 
more than the reading of behaviour. For example, the other chimp yells; she is 
upset. This does not mean that the mindreader has no PAs, only that he does not 
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project them. This in turn suggests that neither has strong PAs; otherwise, they 
would have started the projection.14  
Hence, it is plausible that low-level mindreading was the evolutionary starting 
point for sophisticated mindreading. However, without a strong selection 
pressure, this ability would not have evolved. Selection pressure is often seen in 
the social character of chimpanzee populations, of which we have fascinating 
descriptions both in the wild (Goodall 1971) and in captivity (De Waal 1982). This 
raises the problem of why only humans evolved sophisticated mindreading. 
Would it not also have been advantageous for chimpanzees and other primates? 
The answer is no. Nonhuman primates have, if at all, a far less complicated set of 
PAs (Zawidzki argues against the view that they do not have PAs [2013, 71]). 
Sophisticated mindreading is accompanied by costs (e.g., brain energy and time), 
so it is only affordable when it is absolutely necessary, such as in a population 
where PAs are more complicated. What pressure forced humans to sophisticated 
mindreading? 
Zawidzki presents mindshaping as the best candidate for that pressure. 
Mindshaping made humans more predictable and mindreadable to each other. 
Although we are cognitively homogeneous, we are not predictable because our 
cognition is strongly influenced by motivation. The resulting possibility of social 
divergence must be counteracted by mindshaping. A mind is being shaped when a 
person tries to behave in a way that has proven to have the wanted effect, such as 
attention. 
Mindshaping could have preceded sophisticated mindreading because 
mindshaping does not depend on an understanding of mind. The “model” that the 
other has to match need not be represented in order to create the moulding 
expectancy. Only in so far as the mind is gradually shaped, can it be read. 
Furthermore, only shaped minds will use language, which subsequently refines 
mindshaping. Language is, in this sense, “a mindshaping device” (Zawidzki 2013, 
23), but only secondarily.  
Mindshaping does not depend on a representation of the mind of the other if it is 
seen as a “proper function”, in Millikan’s sense. The function of the practice is 
selected by evolution, not by the individual. This concept allows for a low-level 
                                                     
14
 Our youngest daughter at the age of 4 or 5 used to ascribe trains of thought to our dog 
when the animal looked at her silently. 
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representation, which can be ascribed to infants and primates, such as the maps 
and goals needed to find a mate, a prey or a toy. Mindshaping depends on a 
mechanism within the actor that “can be some pattern or activity in an individual 
brain, as in basic forms of imitation, where the target’s own neurally based 
mechanisms function to bring about a match between target and model” 
(Zawidzki 2013, 31). Thus, some mechanism within me leads me to do something 
that makes you act differently in certain circumstances (represented in a low-level 
way).  
Zawidzki claims that mindshaping is the necessary condition for creating a more 
cooperative, homogenous and predictive population, in which sophisticated 
mindreading is possible. Interestingly, Zawidzki made a case for the prevalence of 
mindshaping with the help of interpretation:  
The distinction between the mindreading- and mindshaping-focused 
understanding of human social cognition cannot be captured in terms of 
simple empirical tests. No crucial experiment can vindicate one 
understanding at the expense of the other. In fact, the mindshaping-
focused understanding embraces many of the same empirical results as the 
mindreading-focused understanding, although it interprets them differently 
[my italics]. (Zawidzki 2013, xii)  
Based on the prevalence of mindshaping, I will now describe the human niche as 
the “hermeneutic niche”. 
2.3 The hermeneutic niche 
2.3.1 Mindshaping: the niche-founding mechanism 
The human niche is based on mindshaping mechanisms. These mechanisms target 
the mind of a conspecific not for one event only, but more to obtain a change in 
behavioural disposition, so for many events to come. The goal is taken from 
another conspecific or from an ideal (narrative). Mindshaping mechanisms create 
the space for sociality, culture and knowledge. In the human niche, understanding 
potentially transforms mechanisms.  
A newly born human infant does not have much innate information about its 
environment. However, it directs its attention to the other humans around, 
recognizing face-like forms when only a few hours old (Fantz 1963; Johnson/ 
Morton 1991). Somewhat later, it seeks and enjoys contact (Horsch 2008; 
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Trevarthen 1993). The next important transition in this early development occurs 
around six months. The redundant talking of “motherese” and “fatherese” has 
been absorbed so that an infant of about six months is primed to the language of 
his surroundings (Kuhl et al. 2006). From now on, it will be much more arduous to 
learn another language than the one which is imprinted. In these first months, the 
infant is led by strong mechanisms to let its mind be shaped by those of the 
surrounding humans. 
An example of a mindshaping mechanism is imitation, which does not necessarily 
imply mindreading. Young infants imitate not because they read the mind of the 
adult but because they classify actions by what these are supposed to achieve. 
Apart from that, they do not distinguish between their own mind and that of the 
adult.  
In a famous experiment (Gergely et al. 2002), 14-month old infants observed 
adults pushing a light button with their foreheads. Some adults carried something 
in their hands, others did not. The infants who saw the first group of adults 
imitated them by pushing on the light button with their hands. They apparently 
interpreted the head action as something that was necessary because the hands 
were full. The infants who saw the adults with empty hands imitated them by 
pushing the button with their forehead. This however does not mean that the 
infants read the minds of the adults; they only interpreted their behaviour in a 
rational way. “Infants seem to focus on whatever novel, generalizable behaviour 
follows ostensive [like eye contact or speaking motherese] and referential signals 
[like gazing or pointing], including completely outlandish acts like turning on a 
light with one’s forehead” (Zawidzki 2013, 49). Thus, adults provide (often 
unintended) a “scaffold” (Vygotsky) for the adaptation of the infant to the human 
socio-ecological niche. 
The fact that mindreading is not necessary for imitation does not mean that 
human imitation is similar to animal imitation. The difference lies in three things. 
First, as we saw, chimpanzees do it only in competition, whereas humans do it in 
cooperation and competition (Hrdy 2009, 39). Second, nonhuman animals imitate 
only a certain aspect of the behaviour, such as a goal or an abstract feature that is 
constant in a variety of behaviours, whereas humans are able to imitate detailed 
sequences. Third, non-human animals are extrinsically motivated (as primates are 
by the famous banana), whereas humans see the imitation as the goal: to 
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humans, behavioural matching “is its own reward” (Zawidzki 2013, 39). Human 
imitation skills are important mindshaping-mechanisms.  
Imitation uses a mechanism in the target’s mind to create homogeneity. There are 
more examples of this mechanism, none of which presupposes mindreading. One 
is the “perception-behaviour link”, which explains the “chameleon effect” 
(Chartrand/Bargh 1999). This link is effective when people are engaged in a 
conversation, for example, and one imitates the other in nonverbal actions, such 
as smiling or shaking a foot. Normally, people are completely unaware of their 
imitations of mannerisms or facial expressions. Another conformism mechanism is 
“priming”. For example, people who are first confronted (“primed”) with the 
words “Florida”, “wrinkle” and “sentimental”, are unconsciously influenced by 
them: they walked more slowly down the hallway than those in the control group, 
who had not been exposed to these words. A third mechanism of conformity is 
the sensitivity of infants and toddlers to social norms. These norms vary across 
cultures, but they are always intrinsically motivating. They are ends in themselves, 
and infants tend to punish transgressions with aggression. Human norms are open 
to evaluation and sometimes need justification. These norms are abstract things, 
not concrete models, such as an imitated teacher. The fourth mechanism of 
conformity relies on narratives. We “actively regulate *our+ behaviour so that it 
conforms to the normative requirements of self-constituting narratives”. The 
narratives of a culture provide implicit means for self-regulation, thereby creating 
homogeneity. The existence of a mechanism that actively creates such conformity 
with oneself and others (“it is hard to disentangle the self and group-constituting 
functions”) has been shown in experiments with split-brain patients (Zawidzki 
2013, 51-59). 
Strong conformist mechanisms are within us. A recent popular scientific overview 
of our knowledge of the “power of others” recounts famous social scientific 
research conducted in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Asch’s line experiment, 
Milgram’s obedience experiment and Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison experiment 
(Bond 2014, 63-76). However, we also know anecdotes that relate how non-
conformists follow their perceived bond with others, even if they do not know 
them. Famous acts of resistance during the Second World War, such as the Danish 
clandestine evacuation of Jews in October 1943 across the Sont or the Bulgarian 
action to save as many as 4,000 Jews (“our sufferings are their sufferings, our joys 
their joys too”) were motivated by (a) a strong group identity, often strengthened 
by universalist beliefs like Christianity or communism, and (b) the perception that 
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the Jews were people like themselves. After WW II, a Dutch resistance officer said, 
“You should always be aware that every other person is basically you”. Famous 
individuals who found in themselves the strength to counter a violent mob, such 
as Paul Rusesebagina in Rwanda in 1994, described the source of this strength as 
their belief in humanity, our community. “The lone man is ridiculed and despised, 
but he is the only one who can stand between humanity and the abyss.” Many 
victims of solitary confinement and adventurers who were alone for long periods 
imagined a companion. (Bond 2014, 108; 103; 215) 
Pedagogy is a typically human phenomenon. “Our species appears to be the only 
one capable of such mindshaping” (Zawidzki 2013, 42). The apprentice who learns 
by observing the master at work is helped by the master’s speaking while he 
works, slowing down when necessary, using a particular order and so on. This kind 
of mindshaping only became possible after a niche began to arise, that is, after 
much mindshaping through imitation had occurred. For example, adults do not 
know that their making eye contact with the infant is an important clue for it to be 
attentive (46). Simultaneously, the adult uses mindreading to assess what the 
infant needs to know.  
Recently, the view has been defended that mindshaping started at the emotional 
level:  
From an evolutionary perspective, anatomically and behaviorally modern 
humans are remarkably recent. However, I am convinced that emotionally 
modern humans date back much further. By emotionally modern I mean 
bipedal apes born with giving impulses [impulses to give and share] and 
empathic, intersubjective aptitudes profoundly different from those we see 
in chimpanzees today. (Hrdy 2009, 66)  
This emotional modernization was caused by new ideas about rearing conditions, 
which created a selection pressure to be mind-shaped and learn to mind read. In 
these conditions, mother and child depended on the community for safety and 
nutrition, and in turn, her vigilance of the infant’s wellbeing was not accompanied 
by the hyper-possessiveness that mother apes display towards their young (Hrdy 
2009, 73). Mothers needed to trust the others to whom they handed over their 
young. They knew that their infant needed a bond with them in order to survive. 
This is the evolutionary meaning of the saying “it takes a village to raise a child”.  
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Mothers with more social support are more responsive to the needs of their 
infants. Indeed, the “greater the risk factors, the more evident do correlations 
between alloparental support, maternal sensitivity and child well-being become” 
(Hrdy 2009, 103). Alloparents are grandmothers, or men who think they could be 
the father, or men who use their support to gain sexual access to the mother, or 
tribemembers whose previous parental experience made them sensitive to the 
needs of all infants (157ff; 250). This environment of “mothers and others” 
mindshaped children to attend to the moods of the surrounding humans, to react 
to their approaches and to smile when they looked at them. The attachment of 
infants to their mothers and the need for mothers to put their baby regularly in 
the care of others so that they could forage, gave way to “motherese”, reassuring 
talk, and “babbling”, which is the imitation of sounds to attract attention. This 
must have begun in the Pleistocene, from 2 mya onward. 
However, cooperative breeding is not uniquely human. We find it in nine percent 
of bird species (e.g., choughs) and in three percent of mammal species (Hrdy 
2009, 177). Human evolution began because two strands converged: cooperative 
breeding met nascent social intelligence.  
2.3.2 Mindreading: animating the human niche 
Sophisticated mindreading then animated the human niche. From this point, 
human evolution cannot be explained without recourse to cultural developments, 
cultural constraints and cultural pressures. Mindreading is a hermeneutic process, 
it relies on the capacity to interprete behaviour. Mindshaping, on the other hand, 
allows descriptions from both sides—the natural sciences (in terms of 
programming and conditioning) as well as hermeneutics. It does not depend on 
culture; instead, culture depends on it.   
The cultural human niche also influenced human evolution in ontogenetical 
processes. A newly born infant is virtually helpless for an extremely long period, 
and this helplessness is lethal in a purely natural environment. In contrast is the 
wildebeest, whose calves stand on their feet minutes after birth and are able to 
follow the herd within days. Cuckoo fledglings leave their host nest about 20 days 
after they hatch. Human infants, after having learned to move and eat, are fed, 
educated and coached over a period that equals one quarter of the average 
human lifecycle. Not sexual maturity but psychological maturity, adulthood, marks 
the end of the educational period in the human lifecycle. Developmental 
psychologists distinguish more phases, even after adulthood (Erikson 1950; 
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Loevinger 1976). They suggest that conformism from a certain stage may cease to 
be as dominant as it was in previous biographical phases. Later phases of ego 
development are defined through an increase in the need to justify one’s actions 
in an autonomously responsible way. Possibly, this ontogenetic pattern reflects 
the phylogenesis. Mechanisms created a mental space for minds that began to 
interprete each other. The “moment” that this space was opened, some habilis- 
or ergaster/erectus-individuals crossed the threshold and became human. 
The following table proposes an order of evolutionary appearance. The second 
arrow concerns mindshaping. The third phase is the scene of hominization. 
Private 
meaning 
Communication Communication in  
public realm of meaning: 
the hermeneutic niche 
Linguistic 
communication 
Table 2 
Ontogenetically, language enables mindshaping. Phylogenetically, as shown in 
table 2, mindshaping and sophisticated mindreading preceded and enabled 
language. We shared a public realm of meanings on an emotional and cognitive 
level, before we could express them in words (Levinson 2006), just as we 
perceived meanings before sharing them, or shared them without unfolding a 
public realm (Hurford 2007). Language made the sharing so efficient that it moved 
to the centre of the stage. It became a precious gift to infants, welcoming them in 
the human niche. 
2.3.3 The paradox revisited 
 
 
The transparent cube depicted on the left can be 
seen in two ways. Do you see its upper side from the 
inside or the outside? Both are possible, because the 
cube allows both ways of seeing. 
 
Similarly, we face a choice concerning any mental 
process. We must see it as either mechanistic or 
hermeneutic. Both approaches make sense. 
However, the difference is that in this case, contrary 
to that of the cube, the choice has consequences. 
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We look at the mind either externally or internally and with or without recourse 
to the deliberations of the subject, regardless of whether they are hermeneutic or 
non-hermeneutic. According to Sellars (1956), we must place a mental process 
either in the “space of nature” or in the “space of reasons”.  
Humans became able to take a viewpoint (to start hermeneutics) when 
sophisticated mindreading began. Humans became able to see the mental process 
as mechanistic – in itself a magnificent example of our hermeneutic ability - only 
with Hobbes in the 17th or Helmholtz in the 19th  century.  
Sophisticated mindreading is a hermeneutic enterprise for the following three 
reasons. First, it interprets, based on previous experiences, the context in which 
we see the other behave. What matters and what does not matter? Second, it 
interprets how the other views this context. We complete his or her perceptible 
behaviour by adding mental attitudes (e.g., convictions, intentions and feelings). 
We do not intend to design a causal explanation. “Rather, we are reading the 
other’s expression (the action, the gesture, the facial expression) for meaning” 
(Gallagher 2004, 12). We interpret the actions of others as being rational, goal 
directed and led by reasons. Third, it is open-ended in the sense that behaviour 
can always be reinterpreted. Combined, these three points comprise the 
hermeneutic circle. 
Mindreading becomes a mechanistic process if we choose to see it in the 
cognitivist perspective. Cognitivism is a research program that defines cognition 
as the calculation-like processing of discrete internal states, sometimes described 
as “computation”. This approach obviously is modelled on the image of the 
natural sciences; hence, it is popular among psychologists and philosophers. 
However, it creates a problem it cannot solve: the “frame problem”. 
The frame problem arises because the elements of human cognition are not 
context-free bits of perception or conceptualisation. Instead, they only mean in a 
context that is not given in the same way and therefore is not representable 
within the same calculus. If every situation has innumerable features, and if the 
same feature (e.g., someone is silent, or it is raining, or a soft humming is heard in 
the distance) can mean different things in different situations, computing all 
possible meanings and checking them is impossible because the possibilities are 
innumerable. Reducing these by starting to let the system chose a frame leads to 
an infinite regress because to choose a frame that dictates relevance depends on 
having a frame:   
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Fodor (1987) glosses the frame problem as the problem of how a robot, 
when working out the consequences of its actions (and thus what it should 
do), could ever be completely confident that it hadn’t failed to consider 
something important. The frame problem is thus ‘Hamlet’s problem: when 
to stop thinking . . .  viewed from an engineer’s perspective’. . . . (Wheeler 
2008, 326) 
Fortunately, this problem does not arise in normal every-day human life. It is 
“owned” by Artificial Intelligence-scientists and cognitivists, because their models 
cannot copy this ability with which sensible organisms relate to their world: 
Only if we stand back from our engaged situation in the world and 
represent things from a detached theoretical perspective do we confront 
the frame problem. That is, if you strip away relevance and start with 
context-free facts, you can’t get relevance back. (Dreyfus 2005, 49) 
As long as the frame problem is not solved, a cognitivist view of mindreading is 
weaker than a hermeneutic one. In hermeneutics, the “frame” is given as the 
interpretational horizon. The fact that the frame evades a full description is not a 
weakness within hermeneutics. On the contrary, it is a core supposition. 
If one nevertheless denies the hermeneutic character of sophisticated 
mindreading, two problems arise. One is the origin of the hermeneutic viewpoint. 
It must have arisen at some point, for it is currently everywhere in daily life, even 
in science (Chapter I). Which moment was better suitable for its emergence? The 
other problem is language evolution. The theories of language evolution that 
were able to handle the paradox (those of Donald, Deacon and Bickerton) have 
hermeneutic elements and can easily be placed within niche construction theory. 
Putting their explanatory power aside is tantamount to returning to unsatisfactory 
theories of language evolution, which are not able to face the paradox. 
Interestingly, the unintentional processes that gave rise to intentionality did not 
“end” somewhere. We can only establish intentionality because unintentional 
processes work incessantly. By projecting first moments of human awareness on 
ergaster/erectus or perhaps even habilis, we suggest a small but definite 
transformation of the force of natural selection on the individual, which was 
proportionate to the increase of the strength of the human niche. This niche 
provided cooperation against predators and in scavenging, traditions of clothing, 
tool making, food preparation and metaphysical certainty in mythical storytelling.  
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There is no way to determine scientifically the chronological moment of the 
“dawn” of the hermeneutic niche. Our urge to ascribe it is so strong that we also 
tend to ascribe it to animals. We have a natural tendency to share our meanings 
with animals. Mythical is the person of the tribe who is said to understand the 
language of the animals. Francis of Assisi preached to the birds. Rilke described 
the reaction of the animals to Orpheus’ music  (Sonnette an Orpheus, 1): 
...Tiere aus Stille drangen aus dem klaren 
gelösten Wald von Lager und Genist; 
und da ergab sich, daβ sie nicht aus List 
und nicht aus Angst in sich so leise waren, 
 
sondern aus Hören. Brüllen, Schrei, Geröhr 
schien klein in ihren Herzen. Und wo eben 
kaum eine Hütte war, dies zu empfangen, 
 
ein Unterschlupf aus dunkelstem Verlangen 
mit einem Zugang, dessen Pfosten beben,- 
da schufst du ihnen Tempel im Gehör. 
 
Perhaps we should counterbalance this anthropomorphic bias by placing this 
moment as recent as possible or by leaving the matter relatively undecided. After 
all, ergaster/erectus lived from 1.9 mya until about 1.5 mya (ergaster in Africa 
gave way to archaic sapiens) and about 200 kya (extinction of erectus in Asia).  
Recall the Laetoli footprints in volcanic ash, which were evidence of early 
hominine bipedal locomotion. Three individuals must have walked there, as well 
as several animals. These tracks were studied with the help of natural scientific 
methods. For example, the volcanic ash was dated around 3.6 mya (Raichlen et al. 
2010), and the prints allowed for determining the kind of bipedalism. There was a 
debate around gradualism: Did early hominins walk bipedally for a long 
evolutionary phase in the energetically costly manner of primates (with bent 
knees and hip) or did their bipedalism quickly reach the modern human stride of 
extended limb mechanics? Recent research in biomechanics has suggested the 
latter possibility. “The relative toe depths of the Laetoli prints show that, by 3,6 
Ma, fully extended limb bipedal gait had evolved” (Raichlen et al. 2010, 2). 
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Apart from these natural scientific contributions, the palaeoanthropologist Mary 
Leakey, who found the tracks, made the following hermeneutic observation about 
one of the individuals who made the Laetoli tracks, whom she supposed was 
female:  
At one point, and you need not be an expert tracker to discern this, she 
stops, pauses, turns to the left to glance at some possible threat or 
irregularity, and then continues to the north. This motion, so intensely 
human, transcends time. Three million six hundred thousand years ago, a 
remote ancestor—just as you or I—experienced a moment of doubt. 
(Agnew/Demas 1995)  
Leakey gave meaning to the tracks by ascribing to the supposed female a mental 
life similar to ours.  
In a similar vein, all evidence of human evolution deserves the cooperation of the 
available approaches. This cooperation remains a paradoxical undertaking 
because one side uncovers as many mechanisms as possible, whereas the other 
side reads as many meaningful behaviours as possible in the evidence. This 
paradox is inevitable. It should not be destroyed by claiming one approach is the 
best road to scientific knowledge. It should be accepted as part of what it means 
to be human. 
2.4 Hermeneutic niche research 
Section 1.4 of this chapter gave examples of empirical niche research conducted 
by biologists. If the human niche is a hermeneutic niche, then the method of 
investigation needs to include hermeneutics. The interpretative processes 
between humans do not exist for the natural sciences.  
We might distinguish empirical from non-empirical methods, and non-
hermeneutic from hermeneutic approaches. They need not contradict each other. 
On the contrary, they potentially illuminate and enrich each other. I agree with 
Mesoudi (2011, 208) that the theoretical framework of Darwinism offers them 
opportunities to cooperate. (Unfortunately, his theory - like those in Chapter II 
section 1 on cultural evolution - ignores both niche construction theory and the 
paradox of language evolution, although his diagram on p. 211 almost visualizes 
the latter.) 
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Table 3 
NICHE 
RESEARCH 
Hermeneutical Non-hermeneutical 
Empirical 
 
Cultural anthropology 
Sociology 
 
Physical anthropology 
Ecology 
Morphology etc. 
Non-
empirical 
 
History of metaphysics 
Philosophical hermeneutics 
- 
 
What does empirical hermeneutic niche research look like? Not only is it a 
promising science; it also has been very productive, although until now it was not 
seen as continuous with Darwinism. It is done in the social sciences, like sociology 
and cultural anthropology (cf. Mesoudi 2011, 161ff).  
Malinowski’s study of the people in New Guinea (1922) and Turnbull’s study of 
the pygmies in the Congo (1961) are magisterial examples of hermeneutic 
research. They participated in these cultures as much as they observed them, and 
they reflected on their experiences. In their studies, the scientists are 
“instruments” in describing the culture of the tribe. We cannot have it otherwise 
(Evans-Pritchard 1965; Geertz 1973). 
Turnbull described his participation in the culture of a pygmy tribe in the Ituri 
rainforest in the Congo. In the first chapter, he distinguishes an insider’s view 
from an outsider’s view. Insiders are “from the forest”:  
If you are from the forest it is a very different place. What seems to other 
people to be eternal and depressing gloom becomes a cool, restful, shady 
world with light filtering lazily through the tree-tops that meet high 
overhead and shut out the direct sunlight ... If you have ears for it the forest 
is full of different sounds: exciting, mysterious, mournful, joyful. (Turnbull 
1961, 17)  
This is the experience of an insider. Turnbull lived with them for years and gained 
entrance to their everyday lives as well as their rituals. The central ritual, the 
molimo, expressed their deep trust of the forest, their “mother and father”. One 
of the songs, the music of which is wonderfully intriguing, has the following text, 
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which refers to a recent hardship. “There is darkness all around us; but if darkness 
is, and the darkness is of the forest, then the darkness must be good” (Turnbull 
1961, 85). This seems to me a beautiful example of a human niche: socially 
constructed, historically developed and adapted to the environment, allowing 
humans to live and breathe there. 
Malinowski was the first to describe the notion of “participating observation” as 
“minute, detailed observations . . . made possible by close contact with native 
life” (Malinowski 1022, 23f). In the following passage about investigating family 
life in a foreign tribe, he concretized what it means to participate by not only 
joining in the activities, but also observing them in a hermeneutic light: 
We all know that ‘family life’ means for us, first and foremost, the atmo-
sphere of home, all the innumerable small acts and attentions in which are 
expressed the affection, the mutual interest, the little preferences, and the 
little antipathies which constitute intimacy. That we may inherit from this 
person, that we shall have to walk after the hearse of the other ... Exactly 
the same applies to a native community. (Malinowski 1922, 19)  
Recall the studies of Nepalese marriage habits and Western time structures 
described in Chapter I. These are examples of empirical hermeneutic niche 
research as well, because they are directed at elements that are not primarily 
observable to those who experience them but explain these experiences. They are 
also hermeneutic because their research questions and assumptions depend on 
human experiences for their content and relevance. They both describe important 
changes in the human niche, both of which have to do with “modernization”. 
Perhaps this is better called “westernization”, for we cannot say that all cultures 
inevitably develop towards modern Western culture. That would imply an inner 
standard, as in the development from infant to adult. Instead, what we often call 
“modernization” is a sociological evolution, a contingent process in which human 
needs and ideas, as well as political and economic powers play a part, unaware of 
the total picture, without intentions towards the total picture. However, empirical 
research sometimes discloses near-universal patterns (commonalities within the 
differences), like that of agriculture leading to the appearance of villages, causing 
craft specialisation and social differentiation, and to performing religious rituals 
(cf. Drennan/Peterson 2006).  
Humboldt, whom I quoted in the Introduction, contributed to empirical 
hermeneutic niche research as well. His linguistic inquiries were directed to the 
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understanding of reality that is expressed by a language (1836). This tradition 
entered anthropology through one of its pioneers, Boas, who propagated the 
“four-field-approach”: in addition to social or cultural anthropology, one should 
study linguistics, physical anthropology and archaeology (Eriksen 2010, 15). One 
of Boas’ collaborators was Sapir, known for the “Sapir-Whorff thesis”, which 
states that language determines reality to the extent that there is no extra-
linguistic reality (Lukes 1982). However, its relativist consequences are too 
extreme for Humboldt’s position (Habermas 1999, 69f). 
Physical anthropology is an example of empirical non-hermeneutic research. 
Another example is research on the ecological constraints of marriage habits or 
acceleration. These aspects should be researched in combination with 
hermeneutic aspects, such as the following. What psychological mechanisms 
influence the choice of a marriage partner? Does economic subsistence influence 
marriage habits, and if so, in what way? What economic pressures drive the 
acceleration? What psychological mechanisms make humans prone to 
acceleration? What linguistic forms are connected with this phenomenon?  
Examples of non-empirical hermeneutic niche research are: a history of 
metaphysics, and philosophy as a post-metaphysical criticism of ideology. For 
centuries, neither time structures nor the relation between males and females 
changed intergenerationally. Therefore, humans usually perceived them as 
universal and eternal. As such, these aspects could become the object of 
metaphysics, i.e. an a priori research of reality. However, the process of 
modernization or acceleration taught us that what seemed unchanging was prone 
to change. Also, the discoveries and descriptions of other cultures have taught us 
that what seemed universal was culturally constrained. Therefore, what 
metaphysicians thought universal and eternal turned out to be a culturally and 
temporally determined opinion, something intersubjective instead of objective. I 
guess Dennett meant this when he spoke of the “enveloping, enabling, life-
shaping, conceptual atmosphere of intentional action” (2006, 10). We can now 
read metaphysical treatises on reality as niche-historians. 
The ascendance of cultural and social anthropology in the last century (Eriksen 
2010, 15ff) taught us that there is no such thing as “the” human niche, just as 
there is no such thing as “the” human culture. We saw that Bickerton 
distinguished seven niches. (cf. Ch. II.3.3.) The fact that humans from different 
backgrounds can pragmatically get along does not mean that they are able to 
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understand each other. We can only say that all humans are hermeneutically 
inclined, that is, they will strive to understand the other. Whether an encounter 
will fullfill that intention is not guaranteed.  
However, one day there might be only one human niche. Why would one general 
all-embracing human niche be an impossibility? If every human has hermeneutic 
abilities to absorb the niche characteristics, then these same abilities perhaps 
allow a convergence of niches, of cultures. Such convergence is not given by 
nature nor by a deus ex machina. If it appears, long after our century, it will be 
after intensive human endeavour, perhaps along the lines of the United Nations 
and the Red Cross/Red Crescent.  
This perspective might have inspired the choice of the Beethoven/Schiller hymn as 
anthem of the European Union. Its central line, Alle Menschen werden Brüder, 
contains a paradox. Brothers normally are defined by descent, but here, fraternity 
is futural. Projected on our past, this reflects the plausibility that individuals of 
several hominin species joined one niche. In other words, man’s genetical descent 
may be pluriform and only his cultural (niche) descent might have had a unifying 
influence.  
In this section, I have connected the hermeneutic social sciences and humanities 
with niche construction theory, as a branch of Darwinism. In the next chapter, we 
will mirror this by describing a hermeneutic Darwinism.  
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IV. Hermeneutic Darwinism 
In the first section, I elaborate further on my claim that Darwinism has a 
hermeneutical component. It means foremostly – as we saw in Chapter III - that 
the human niche is a hermeneutic niche and that this hermeneutic character has 
shaped human evolution, mainly through language. In the present Chapter I add 
that there is also a hermeneutic aspect in Darwinism, in the sense that e.g. Darwin 
and De Waal use lifeworld-concepts in their research. This makes their studies on 
animal emotions and chimpanzee politics more recognizable to us. The 
interpretational element is undisputed – but I hope that its acknowledgment helps 
in accepting the hermeneutic character of the niche as part of a Darwinian theory. 
In section 1.4, I offer a synopsis of the cooperation of sciences in the research on 
human evolution, which shows how hermeneutics fits the other approaches. 
This hermeneutic element in Darwinism being thus established, I focus in the 
second section on a philosophical hermeneutic digestion of Darwinism, in the 
tradition of Ricoeur and Habermas – which means with an emancipating thrust. 
This is the third meaning of hermeneutic Darwinism: focussing on what our 
knowledge of Darwinian meachanism “means” for us.  
The disclosure of Darwinian forces in human psychology is a cultural factor, and in 
consequence, potentially a niche-constructing factor. Once the false naturalistic 
self-understanding is abolished, these hidden forces are no longer causes that 
have an effect, regardless of circumstances. Instead, the hidden forces are brought 
to light in a hermeneutic circle. The resulting awareness of these mechanisms 
changes the context in which they operate.  
Hermeneutic Darwinism offers themes for reflection on possible outcomes, on the 
space for political choices, thus shaping the future human niche. In this respect, 
Darwin resembles the “masters in the school of suspicion”, as Ricoeur called them: 
Freud, Marx and Nietzsche. The recent application of Darwinism in economics is 
particularly suited to contribute to this goal. 
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1. Varieties of hermeneutic Darwinism  
In this section, I want to defend the claim that Darwinism cannot avoid being 
hermeneutical. I present a number of high-profile Darwinist studies by Darwin 
himself (section 1.1), primatologists, such as Goodall and De Waal (section 1.2) 
and researchers in other disciplines (section 1.3) that rely on hermeneutics. This 
argument by cases intends to show that hermeneutics is and has always been a 
part of Darwinism. My point is not that Darwinism should be hermeneutical, but 
that it has an intrinsic hermeneutical component. The cooperation of biology and 
the humanities is dictated by the way of life of the human species. In section 1.4, I 
show how hermeneutic Darwinism connects with the other evolutionary sciences.  
1.1 The hermeneutic Darwin  
Chapter I offered an operational definition of hermeneutics and contrasted it to 
the methods of the natural sciences: 
 
A scientific method is hermeneutic if it uses life-world concepts to refer to 
topics of research and proposed explanations. 
In contrast to the empirical cycle, interpretation requires previous experiences, 
life-world knowledge and understanding of the context. The hermeneutic circle 
involves this pre-understanding, but it has no end. There will always be new 
questions, conflicting interpretations and so on. As Geertz noted, “Anthropology, 
or at least interpretative anthropology, is a science whose progress is marked less 
by a perfection of consensus than by a refinement of debate” (1973, 29).  
Similar to the natural sciences, hermeneutics often results in descriptions that 
exceed the purely observable. In contrast to the natural sciences, the level of 
description is not that of particles, but of meaningful structures. Many observable 
elements are omitted, and other elements are “read” instead of described. The 
“tension” of a drawn line on a piece of paper is an example of such reading, as is 
the reading of a word where others only see traces of ink. 
Darwin used hermeneutics when he investigated the subject of human evolution. 
He excluded the subject of human origin from his The Origin of Species (1859, 
referred to as Origin), in order to let the ground-breaking theory be judged 
without this ideologically loaded subject. Had he been explicit in Origin regarding 
our ape ancestry, religious opposition would have been much stronger. He admits 
this in the introduction of The Descent of Man (1871, referred to as Descent). In 
the conclusion of the Origin, however, he wrote, “In the future, I see open fields 
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for far more important researches . . . . Much light will be thrown on the origin of 
man and his history” (1859, 373).  
The subsequent two books on man, the Descent and The Expression of Emotions 
in Man and Animals (1872, referred to as Expression) have an integral 
hermeneutic component. In the Descent, Darwin noted, “The fact that the lower 
animals are excited by the same emotions as ourselves is so well established, that 
it will not be necessary to weary the reader by many details” (1871, 448). He then 
gave a few striking examples of terror, suspicion, courage, ill-temperedness, the 
lust for revenge and love. However, he did not reflect on how this similarity of 
emotional life is “so well established”. Had he done so, he would have noticed 
that this observation is in fact an interpretation. This is also evident in his 
excursions on the mental faculties of higher animals. They have vivid dreams, 
which is  
shewn by their movements and the sounds uttered. ... There must be 
something special, which causes dogs to howl in the night, and especially 
during moonlight. ... Houzeau thinks that their imaginations are disturbed 
by the vague outlines of the surrounding objects, and conjure up before 
them fantastic images; if this be so, their feelings may almost be called 
superstitious. (1871, 453)  
In the Expression, Darwin focuses on physiological and physiognomic changes that 
occur when we express joy, grief, jealousy and so on. Darwin showed photographs 
of people displaying certain emotions to his compatriots and asked them whether 
they recognized the emotion. He also asked expatriates about the native people 
with whom they lived. Finally, he used many observations concerning animals and 
humans. He concluded that our basic emotions are expressed in a way that similar 
to that of animals. This conclusion, confirmed by later research that used a better 
method (Ekman 1999), led to the thesis that the expressions of emotions are 
independent of culture and have a natural origin. Darwin’s Expression illustrates 
this thesis. He describes the physiological occurrences in animals and humans 
while expressing certain emotions, and makes plausible that these have (or had) a 
functional explanation. “With mankind some expressions, such as the bristling of 
the hair under the influence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth 
under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood except on the belief that 
man once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition” (1872, 12). Thus, 
“every true or inherited movement of expression seems to have had some natural 
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and independent origin. But when once acquired, such movements may be 
voluntarily and consciously employed as a means of communication” (1872, 356). 
Certain forms came to have meaning because of their association with certain 
feelings, through experience (e.g., the facial expression of a screaming baby 
wanting food).  
However, as physiologically and physiognomically minded as Expression is, it is 
also a hermeneutic study, in so far as it uses the life world concepts of emotions. 
The emotions are intimately known, in order to recognize them in animals and 
humans. To say that some occurrences are an expression of something else is to 
start interpreting, that is, to do hermeneutics. It resulted in a description in which 
much is omitted and only some observations are well juxtaposed.  
It might seem possible to avoid this conclusion by offering a naturalistic account 
of understanding. The natural objects that are the best candidates for such a task 
are “mirror neurons”, the neural cells firing similarly when I have a pain in my 
back or when I see that you have a pain in your back. The mirror neuronal system 
could lead me to understand the emotions and intentions of other organisms 
(Gallese/Goldman 1998). Evolutionarily, such an understanding is advantageous in 
so far as it helps to build alliances, enhance group coherence and so on. However, 
this does not appear to be a viable escape route for naturalism. After all, mirror 
neurons do not understand the situation; they are part of the neurological events 
that serve my understanding. Knowledge of the role of natural objects, such as 
mirror neurons, “illuminates” (Slors 2010, 456) our understanding of human 
understanding, instead of substituting it. In other words, mirror neurons as the 
subject of understanding are prone to the same paradox as Darwinist mechanisms 
are.  
Darwin was aware of the hermeneutic aspect of his enterprise when he made the 
following methodological warning. The first sentence is about participation, and 
the second is about context.  
When we witness any deep emotion, our sympathy is so strongly excited, 
that close observation is forgotten or rendered almost impossible (...) Our 
imagination is another and still more serious source of error; for if from the 
nature of the circumstances we expect to see any expression, we readily 
imagine its presence. (1872, 13; my italics)  
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This suggests that previous experience throws light on our perceptions, but that it 
should be shunned as much as possible. Had he reflected on the reason that it 
nevertheless throws light, he might have noticed that previous experience in fact 
is indispensable for his undertaking. To describe something as an emotion is to 
project previous life world-experience.  
Our paradox was not noticed by Darwin, but only the most ahistorical of 
philosophers could use that as a criticism. In Darwin’s time, it did not seem 
important to lose time on an account of how we know emotions or how they 
function in the contemporary human life. Only since Dilthey’s methodological self-
reflection within the humanities have we become aware of the constitutive power 
of prior knowledge. Prior knowledge has not only an epistemological role but also 
an ontological one. Without it, some phenomena (e.g., emotions in animals) do 
not exist. At least in the case of humans, this knowledge is obtained through not 
only the empirical cycle but also the hermeneutic circle. 
Plessner (1961b) offered a study on the present human function of expression of 
emotions. He noted that laughing and crying are exceptional. They are 
expressions, in contrast to physiological reactions to situations, such as gooseflesh 
or sneezing, but they are non-symbolic, in contrast to gestures. Both laughing and 
crying happen to us (although weeping needs to be “allowed” to a higher degree 
than laughing), but they are still only seen in humans. (The sounds of playing 
chimpanzees are only partly similar.) Their expressional meaning, according to 
Plessner’s interpretation, lies in the message, now to THIS I can only react by 
losing control, which is the composed way to allow oneself to be decomposed for 
a time. “The effective impossibility to find an adequate expression and fitting 
answer is simultaneously the only adequate expression and the only fitting 
answer” (1961b, 87). My point is that this approach to human emotions is non-
genealogical and hermeneutical, and it yields knowledge. To juxtapose it with 
Darwin’s evolutionary findings would lead to our paradox.  
1.2 Hermeneutic primatology 
Primatology, the biology of apes and monkeys, plays an important role in 
Darwinism. The field contains many clues to human evolution, because the bigger 
apes share with humans a LCA, which, compared with the timescale of evolution, 
is quite recent. The LCA of humans and gibbons is dated at about 20 mya; humans 
and orang-utans 15 mya; gorillas 10 mya; chimpanzees 7 mya (FL 2004, 225). 
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I will now defend the claim that primatology also has a hermeneutic aspect. I offer 
an argument by cases. I am content if I can show hermeneutics in the two most 
famous primatologists (Goodall and De Waal) and in two recent primatological 
studies (Segerdahl et al.; Massen). Saying that primatology includes hermeneutics 
is obviously not meant as an accusation in a study that promotes the cooperation 
of natural science, social science and the humanities. 
Hermeneutics makes particular sense in primatology, for by trying to understand 
the primates from a human point of view, we can convince ourselves how close 
they are to us. It is at least psychologically convincing, because a hermeneutic 
approach to  chimpanzees makes them more or less “one of us” and that seems 
something we like to hear and that strikes us as evident.  
Goodall’s (1971) pioneering work with the chimpanzees in Gombe, Tanzania, 
opened the world of chimpanzees for us. Her approach to the animals amounted 
to respectful, careful observation. However, the opportunity to do so only 
appeared because she tried to be on the same “wave length”, cause no fear and 
so on. This feature gave her approach a hermeneutic character. This is how she 
described the moment two chimps no longer fled from her: 
Less than twenty yards away from me two male chimpanzees were sitting 
on the ground staring intently. Scarcely breathing, I waited for the sudden 
panic-stricken flight that normally followed a surprise encounter between 
myself and the chimpanzees at close quarters. But nothing of the sort 
happened. The two large chimps simply continued to gaze at me. Very 
slowly I sat down, and after a few more moments, the two calmly began to 
groom one another... Without a doubt whatsoever, this was the proudest 
moment I had known. I had been accepted by the two magnificent 
creatures grooming in front of me... and then, just before the sun vanished 
over the horizon behind me, David [one of the two] got up and stood 
staring at me. (Goodall 1971, 24) 
De Waal’s study on chimpanzee politics (1981) followed Goodall’s footsteps, 
albeit with three differences. First, the chimp community lived in captivity, in 
Arnhem, the Netherlands. Second, he only observed and did not make contact. 
Three, the argumentative context is not about raising awareness of our 
responsibility towards animals, but about our self-understanding as humans.  
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De Waal interpreted his perceptions with the help of terms, such as politics, 
coalition, consolation and reconciliation.  
Ethological research is interpreting, with the eternal nagging doubt that one 
might be wrong. ... At some points I will perhaps doubt too much, and at 
others my interpretation will go too far. That is inevitable. Balancing 
between these two extremes all animal behavioral research is done. (1981, 
27)  
This does not mean that these interpretations were arbitrary. Van Hooff had 
determined that certain actions are statistically related, which allows for a better 
understanding. For example, a certain sound is connected with fleeing, evading 
and so on, which are non-dominant behaviours.  
The computer only counts associations between [previously interpreted 
and defined] patterns of behaviour and cannot tell what is behind the 
behaviour. That is why Van Hooff reluctantly spoke of ‘behavioral systems’ 
instead of emotions or motivations. To make it easier, I do not join this 
reluctance. When I write that one chimpanzee ‘pants kindly to another’, I 
refer to his audible panting which would have been called in Van Hooffs 
analysis ‘affinitive’. This affinitive behavioral system bears that name 
because it refers to kind forms of contact, like hugging, kissing and social 
grooming. (1981, 44) 
Inspired by De Waal, in the 1980s, the Machiavelli Intelligence hypothesis was put 
forward (Byrne 1996). This hypothesis suggests that intelligence in general, and 
primate intelligence in particular, had a strong selection pressure for social 
complexity. Both also correlate with brain size. When the relations between group 
members become more complex, those that understand these and are able to 
manipulate them, have the advantage, so their genes will be more likely to be 
reproduced. In general, this hypothesis is quite convincing; in fact, the social 
complexity obviously prefigures the human niche. One only wonders how the 
process began because a certain degree of social complexity presupposes a 
certain degree of intelligence. However, such questions about origins are not 
particularly interesting to the evolutionist. Obviously, the process did start, but to 
suppose that this happened contingently is not as startling. However, to explain 
the hypothesis, experiments and observations, terms are used as the following 
(Byrne 1996): reciprocation, alliance, deciding the outcome of conflicts, 
friendships, deception and tactics. The hermeneutic part of this hypothesis is in 
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the fact that it requires interpretation to decide whether these terms can be 
applied to certain behaviours. Of course, one can operationalize them, but this 
step would be interpretation and therefore open to debate. 
A specific branch of primatology chose a method of participatory interfering 
instead of observing, which is the approach of a “social or cultural anthropologist” 
(MacIntyre, cit. in Segerdahl et al. 2005, 2). This experimental path is justified by 
the following idea. Human infants talk because they are immersed in language 
from birth. If we want to know how much innate capacity for language primates 
have, we must enculturate them in a similar way. This has been called “cultural 
initiation” (subtitle of Segerdahl et al. 2005) and the result has been a  
shared culture between researchers and subjects, the bonobos Kanzi, 
Panbanisha, Nyota and Nathan. ... We began to interact more 
spontaneously with the apes, we did things that both humans and apes 
found exciting and we began to improvise the research on the basis of how 
our interactions actually developed. In some sense, we became ourselves 
the subject of a research that no one controlled in advance. ... The idea was 
not that symbolic language should finally make it possible to share 
perspective with Kanzi... Kanzi already shared perspective with his human 
companions when his language developed. His linguistic development 
deepened the shared perspective – what we call the intermediary 
Pan/Homo culture – but language was not a prerequisite for a shared way 
of living. It was rather the other way round. (Segerdahl et al. 2005, 3, 4, 20) 
Massen (2010) observed and experimented with macaques in order to determine 
whether their behaviour displayed “friendship”, which was defined as follows: 
“showing marked preferences in affiliative behaviour for particular individuals” 
which are unrelated. This is an interesting topic because “friendship” relations 
allow for altruistic behaviour. Altruistic behaviour towards non-kin only fits in a 
theory of natural selection when some kind of reciprocity is included, that is, 
when seemingly altruistic behaviour could be interpreted as part of a tit-for-tat 
strategy. In human life, a friendship is tolerant to long periods of imbalance 
concerning reciprocation. Can similar phenomena be seen between macaques 
(rhesus and long-tailed macaque), a primate family whose LCA with humans is 
dated at 30/25 mya? This broad question is divided into narrower ones, such as 
whether the inequity aversion (a low tolerance for an unequal pay-off, which is 
often seen with apes and monkeys) is less between “friends”. 
1. Varieties of hermeneutic Darwinism 
155 
 
The assumption is that “friendship” can be measured through two things: 
“proportion of time spent sitting in contact, and proportion of time spent 
physically touching each other (e.g., social grooming)” (Massen 2010, 20). This 
assumption is justified by its parallel in human life. “Although human friends are 
able to endure long separations, time spent together is one of the main measures 
of friendship in humans” and “humans report to be emotionally closer to those 
people with whom they also have frequent close physical proximity” (Massen 
2010, 20)  
One of Massen’s interesting conclusions is that in general macaques, like humans, 
react to friends and group members in a way that is governed by emotions. The 
emotional bond is not bookkeeping, but it may have evolved as something that 
nevertheless benefits all who belong in the long-run. Hence, every member of a 
group of macaque is a “friend”. Massen sometimes puts the macaques “friends” 
in parentheses, and sometimes he does not. I suspect this small and innocent 
inconsequence indicates the paradoxical problem of having to rely on 
interpretation in a biological study. 
So far, we saw hermeneutics in Darwinism in the following way. Life world-
concepts like emotions and friendship are used within research and theory. This is 
done, it seems, to observe how much of “us” can be found in the life of animals. 
To narrow the gap between animals and humans is of course the thrust of 
Darwinism. My point is that by doing this, Darwinism shifts from natural science 
to hermeneutics. It has no alternative, because the “gap” exists only in our 
interpretation as well. However, why would we want to approach animals 
hermeneutically in Darwinism and forget this method as soon as humans ar the 
object of research, returning to a narrow definition of Darwinism? 
In the next section, I show that hermeneutics are also an integral part of other 
branches of Darwinism. My examples are taken from the fields of evolutionary 
epistemology and cultural evolution.  
1.3 Non-primatological hermeneutic Darwinists 
1.3.1 Evolutionary epistemology 
Evolutionary epistemology is a school of thought that applies Darwinism to the 
theory of knowledge. It includes two claims that can be defended separately. The 
first claim is that scientific knowledge evolves in a Darwinian way, analogous to 
biological species. The second claim is that the cognitive processes of humans and 
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other animals are evolutionarily related. In the beginning, these strands were not 
distinguished, as is clear from William James’ observation in 1880: “A remarkable 
parallel . . . obtains between the facts of social evolution and the mental growth 
of the race, on the one hand, and of zoological evolution, as expounded by Mr. 
Darwin, on the other.” (cit. in Buskes 1998, 21) 
Evolutionary epistemology unfolded its wings a century after Darwinism did, a 
delay for which Buskes offers three reasons (Buskes 1998, 23ff). First, 
evolutionary biology was incomplete. Only after the 1930s did it incorporate 
Mendelian geneticism, which in the 1950s accelerated immensely after the 
discovery of the molecular structure of DNA. Second, the philosophical climate 
was hostile to a naturalized epistemology. Neo-Kantians, neo-Hegelians and 
logical positivists agreed on the primacy of epistemology to science. Third, 
philosophers and biologists generally worked in their own fields, without taking 
much notice of the other, let alone cooperating.  
The first claim of evolutionary epistemology, about scientific theories, cannot be 
defended without hermeneutics. To describe the “environment” in which theories 
have to survive, as I did in the previous section, citing Buskes’ three reasons, one 
has to understand human action and human thinking—in short, the human 
context. 
A typical example of the second claim, about cognitive mechanisms, is the 
following:  
There is for instance growing evidence that elementary logic and 
mathematics are universal among human populations, despite the many 
cultural differences we may encounter. Why should elementary logic and 
mathematics be endowed to us by evolution? Well, the answer should not 
be surprising. Consider the harsh conditions with which our ancestors had 
to cope. One can easily imagine lots of everyday situations in which 
elementary logical and mathematical reasoning would be useful. For 
example, suppose that proto-humans regularly had to travel across a sun-
baked savannah to get to their home base or foraging grounds. It surely 
would be sensible to take the distance to be travelled, the temperature, the 
position of the sun, the specific conditions of the terrain and other variables 
into account. An ability to process or ‘calculate’ these variables would 
immediately pay off. Likewise, suppose that two sabre-toothed tigers were 
seen going into the cave. Only one came out. Is the cave now safe? Or take 
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the law of non-contradiction: a tiger cannot be simultaneously in the cave 
and not in the cave. (Buskes 1998, 37)  
In hindsight, such processes always seem smooth, but a counter question would 
be: If it was so easy, why did not every mammal or indeed every other animal 
develop these logical faculties? In other words, knowing that evolution is always 
about costs and benefits, why was the development of these faculties so 
beneficial to humans and not to others? Such questions are usually answered by 
pointing out that many animals (e.g., jackdaws and apes) have rudimentary forms 
of logical abilities (Buskes, ibid.), which invites the question of why these 
remained rudimentary. I only point out this criticism to redirect our attention to 
our paradox. Looking back, knowing what we know, we imagine that we see 
where and why thinking began. This is interpretation because it requires the 
ability about which the story of origin is told.  
A specific version of evolutionary epistemology is memeticism (cf. Chapter II, 
section 1), because memes influence our cognition and are themselves subject to 
evolution. In the present context, I claim that memeticism presupposes 
hermeneutics because identifying memes is a hermeneutic enterprise. Dawkins 
does not deny that “Each individual has his own way of interpreting *the meme 
of+ Darwin’s ideas” (1976, 195) or the meme “god”, of which he writes:  
We do not know how it arose in the meme-pool. Probably it arose many 
times by independent ‘mutation’. In any case, it is very old indeed . . . . The 
survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from its great 
psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer to deep 
and troubling questions about existence. It suggests that injustices in this 
world may be rectified in the next. The ‘everlasting arms’ hold out a cushion 
against our own adequacies which, like the doctor’s placebo, is none the 
less effective for being imaginary. (Dawkins 1976, 192f)  
To be consoled by an idea, we must interpret it, for we have to understand the 
nature of our sorrow and the aspect of the content of the idea that corresponds 
to it in a soothing way. A fortiori, this goes for Dawkins himself, when he 
understands how other people can be consoled by only “superficially plausible” 
ideas, such as “god”. 
Although it depends on hermeneutics, memeticism is estranged from it in so far 
as it describes evolution on a subhuman level, where meanings are detached from 
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the context. “The meme of Darwin’s theory is therefore that essential basis of the 
idea which is held in common by all brains that understand the theory. The 
differences in the ways that people represent the theory are then, by definition, 
not part of the theory” (Dawkins 1976, 195f). This is not the place to ask whether 
it is the brain that understands. Instead, the quote raises the question of how to 
decide on “the essential basis of the idea”. If it is the commonality of the ideas in 
the minds and brains of those “who understand the theory”, who decides 
whether someone understands it? Furthermore, why would we trace a meme’s 
proliferation after 1859, if we do not ask relevant (hermeneutic) questions about 
the context? (e.g., who received the meme, what reasons did they have to accept 
it, did they modify it and if so, in what way?) 
By contrast, in hermeneutics, the differences are interesting and are part of the 
theory of “effective history”(Wirkungsgeschichte). For example, hermeneuticists 
have investigated Darwin’s influence on Freud, Marx and Nietzsche. It does not 
matter whether, but how these minds and brains “understood” the theory. The 
misunderstanding, interpretations and additions all matter. Therefore, if a history 
of ideas is relevant (e.g., Lovejoy 1936), it would be hermeneutic and not 
memeticist.    
1.3.2 Cultural evolution 
Salient examples of hermeneutic Darwinism are theories of cultural evolution, 
such as those we discussed in the first section of Chapter 3. The research on this 
topic has grown explosively since the pioneering work of Boyd and Richerson in 
the 1980s (cf. 2005a). I cannot and need not discuss the main topics here. In my 
argument, I only need to give an example of a recent discussion that clearly shows 
that hermeneutics are an intrinsic part of the method.  
If cultural evolution is not taken as “the evolution of culture” but as “culture 
influencing human evolution”, culture must be a factor in group selection. This 
forces Darwinism to look at not only genes as the source of variation on which 
selection acts but also groups of individuals. The survival of a group depends not 
only on the genetically afforded adaptiveness of its individuals but also on the 
cultural ideas that the group carries and with which its members identify.  
An example of this idea is the obligation to mutual aid, even if this is 
disadvantageous to the giver of aid. This need not be an evolutionary 
impossibility, because “(a)ltruists, who contribute to the average group fitness at 
a personal cost, are outperformed by selfish individuals within groups, but 
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altruistic groups outperform selfish groups” (Smaldino 2014, 245f). Obviously, it 
takes hermeneutics to decide whether a group “expresses a particular cultural 
idea”. Equally obviously, this hermeneutics is essential to Darwinism because 
without it, human evolution would be insufficiently explainable. 
Smaldino added a new component to this theory of cultural multilevel group 
selection, positing that the group has emergent traits that are not visible at the 
individual level (e.g., the expression of an idea of altruism). He calls it 
collaboration instead of cooperation, or “within-group differentiation”: a typical 
trait of human societies, i.e., of the human niche. Animals with within-group 
differentiation (like eusocial ants) have a high degree of genetic relatedness. “In 
contrast, group-level traits in humans are transmitted culturally rather than 
genetically, requiring different explanations for their emergence and evolution” 
(Smaldino 2014, 249). 
The human niche has been explained by two psychological mechanisms: “First, 
cultural learning biases (e.g. conformity, learning from prestigious individuals)15 
and a suite of psychological mechanisms evolved for dealing with social norms 
combine to maintain within-group similarity and between-group variation. 
Second, competition between groups selects for groups with cooperative social 
norms” (Smaldino 2014, 247). This however does not contain the notion of within-
group differentiation and the collaborative interdependence of unrelated 
individuals, which is the trait that is ubiquitously developed in human societies.  
Interdependence sustains cooperation and provides a stable environment 
of mutual aid in which differentiation, division of labour and complex group 
organization can emerge.... Once cooperation between individuals evolves, 
the stage is set – via persistent association, interdependence and cultural 
transmission – for the evolution of nuanced collaboration  between 
individuals with differentiated roles in a meaningful social organization. 
(Smaldino 2014, 248; italics added)  
Smaldino distinguishes three partial explanations for this evolution of nuanced 
collaboration. First, some individuals display an amount of leadership by planning 
projects and dividing tasks between group members according to their 
characteristics. “Good directing is 90% casting”. Second, on this differential base, 
                                                     
15
 For the moral aspects of these mechanisms, see Strawson (1962) on “reactive 
attitudes”.  
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a division of labour emerges. Third, this emerging organization is enhanced by 
repetition across generations—“repeated assembly”—until a tradition has settled 
in which the young are initiated by the experienced, which is termed “scaffolded 
social learning” (Smaldino 2014, 250). 
MacDonald (cit. in Smaldino 2014, 263) added that human groups are able to 
structure themselves in the way Smaldino described because of explicit 
processing: “conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, . . . [it is] involved in 
creating hypothetical scenarios and in planning for future contingencies (e.g. by 
groups).” Explicit processing “enables ideologies that rationalize group aims” (see 
the next section). 
This branch of human evolutionary research refers continuously to the meanings 
humans attributed to their social environment. I conclude therefore that we may 
safely call it hermeneutic.  
1.4 Hermeneutic Darwinism within the evolutionary sciences 
Corbey (2006) deplored the fact that cultural and evolutionary anthropology often 
do not cooperate. He stressed, as I do, that the subject of human evolution 
dictates cooperation. His proposal for attaining cooperation is similar to mine, but 
his formulation is different: “archaeology, anthropology and philosophy should 
get rid of their anthropocentrism!” In the context of Corbey’s argument, this 
means the following. The sciences he mentioned should be open to the findings of 
the natural sciences, thus reducing the “gap” between humans and other animals. 
I endorse that idea. I propose niche construction theory as a bridge connecting 
these different scientific disciplines. We may remind e.g. cultural anthropologists 
that human culture is a niche – and evolutionary anthropologists that the human 
niche is culture, to a degree uncomparable to animal “culture”.  
Human evolution is part of the larger evolutionary process of hominid and 
mammal species. Hence, it is the subject of biology and other natural sciences. 
Human evolution led to language and art, that is, symbolic expression. This aspect 
of evolution is also studied by the historical sciences and other humanities. They 
will find more differentiation than the natural sciences in the same period of 
human evolution. Between the emergence of hominins and the emergence of 
language and art is a phase that is also the subject of economy, psychology and 
other social sciences.  
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In table 4, I intend to show how human evolution invites more and more sciences 
to cooperate. The third part, on the right, refers to the stage in which linguistic 
and symbolic abilities started to evolve somewhere along the ergaster/erectus 
line. It should be remembered that the third stage is presupposed chronologically 
for the sciences about the previous stages. 
Table 4 
 
Hermeneutics belong to not only the humanities but also the social sciences, as I 
explained in Chapter 1. (Just as philosophical hermeneutics made us aware of the 
hermeneutic moment in natural science.) Evolutionary processes are prima facie 
found on the phenotypical/genotypical level. Research of the last decades has 
shown that these processes involve a cultural context and are influenced by 
higher levels, of which culture is the most encompassing. The central social and 
natural sciences of hominin evolution are palaeoanthropology and archaeology. 
Researchers in these domains are keen on any finding that bears a trace of 
symbolic behaviour. They always must have “one hermeneutic eye open”, to be 
alert on e.g. symbolic art preceding that of the Blombos Cave (Kuckenburg 2001).  
Organic 
evolution 
Natural 
sciences  
Primate 
evolution 
 
Social sciences 
Natural 
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Humanities 
Social sciences 
Natural 
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2. Circle and niche 
We have seen how in Darwinism hermeneutics are used. We will now focus on 
how Darwinism fits in a philosophical hermeneutic approach. However, 
philosophical hermeneutics is a wide field. I will only give an outline of that part of 
the tradition which reflected on the use of science in human self- understanding.  
The meaning of disclosing hidden Darwinian forces in human psychology is a 
cultural factor, and in consequence, potentially a niche-constructing factor. If this 
idea is connected with that of the hermeneutic circle, we discover a dynamic to 
which we can contribute by making political and societal choices.   
In section 2.1, it is proposed that there is no opposition between psychological 
mechanism and awareness. Instead, we should speak of the relations between 
psychological urges and behaviour as mechanistic and in a continuum reaching 
from non-awareness to full awareness. The question then is whether the 
“mechanism of awareness” influences other, less aware mechanisms. This is where 
the second section begins. 
Section 2.2 shows that the ethos of science regarding humans is to offer a 
transforming awareness. The contribution of hermeneutic Darwinism to our 
knowledge can be seen as a part of the tradition that Ricoeur called “the school of 
suspicion”. On the one hand, hidden forces in human nature and human society 
are revealed, problematizing the Enlightenment ideology of autonomous rational 
persons. We are not what we thought we were. On the other hand, the knowledge 
of these forces is published and given back to us in a hermeneutic circle. The 
resulting knowledge allows for greater personal autonomy, in the sense that 
autonomy supposes knowledge instead of ideology. This is illustrated by the 
examples of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, as “masters in the school of suspicion”. I 
propose seeing Darwin as the visiting professor at this “school”.  
In section 2.3, we look at recent examples of a hermeneutic awareness of 
mechanisms that are the result of natural selection. One field of research is 
psychology and involves stress and stress reduction, the other is economics. In 
both fields, the description of mechanisms can be seen as presenting knowledge to 
the public, thus enable their transformation and influencing the future human 
niche. 
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2.1 Hidden mechanisms and the mechanism of awareness 
I have used the term “mechanism” to denote a causal or correlational relation 
between two things or processes, particularly processes that happen without 
conscious monitoring. They happen to organisms, not by them. In this 
interpretation, the opposite of mechanism is “intended action”. In my paradox, 
the “blindness” belongs to the mechanism, whereas the “sight” belongs to the “I”, 
that is, the awareness. 
Psychological mechanisms bear the mark of the Freudian “id”, whose power is 
inversely proportional to that of the “I”, the personal awareness. In 
psychotherapy, persistent personal problems are seen as caused by mechanisms, 
the power of which should decrease through awareness as strengthened in a 
therapeutic process. Freud’s dictum, “there where ‘it’ ruled, the new ruler should 
be ‘I’” (Wo Es war soll Ich werden). Another psychotherapist wrote, “awareness 
per se—in and by itself—is curative” (Perls 1969, 16).  
Awareness changes our attitudes, which is well known in social science. “If 
someone today writes a monograph on, say, a South-African neighbourhood, the 
book will necessarily influence South-African society: it will be read by some of 
the ‘natives’ and thus becomes part of the social reality of the informants” 
(Eriksen 2010, 35). 
Interestingly, in psychology, awareness is also seen as a mechanism (Shapiro 
2006). The term “mechanism” does not necessarily connote what I called 
“blindness” but refers to natural (causal or correlational) relations between 
psychological elements, whether awareness is a part of the relation or not. Thus, 
we can now improve the picture. Mechanism and awareness are not contrasting 
classes. Instead, I take mechanisms as belonging to a continuum in which “no 
awareness” constitutes the one extreme and “full awareness” the other. These 
extremes then correspond, respectively, with the “blindness” and “sight” of the 
paradox. The consequence of this new picture is that there is a middle state, that 
of a dream-like awareness that is comparable to sight in near darkness. We all 
know such states. However, our experience of them is only understandable from 
the end of the continuum where “full awareness” resides. 
Regardless of the level of awareness, mechanisms can put other mechanisms out 
of play by changing the context. For example, the conformity that was an 
important mechanism in the emergence of the human niche (Chapter 3) changed 
the context of human infants in so far as it helped them to integrate into the 
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group. Infants with a lesser inclination to conform were possibly less cared for and 
therefore prone to starvation, disease or predators, which are the usual 
mechanisms of “raw” natural selection.  
Other cognitive mechanisms are the following (Ferguson 2008, 346f): 
1. Availability bias, which causes us to base decisions on information that is 
more readily available in our memories, rather than the data we really 
need; 
2. Hindsight bias, which causes us to attach higher probabilities to events 
after they have happened (ex post) than we did before they had happened 
(ex ante); 
3. The problem[atic tendency] of induction, which leads us to formulate 
general rules on the basis of insufficient information; 
4. [W]e tend to overestimate the probability that seven events of 90 per 
cent probability will all occur, while underestimating the probability that at 
least one of seven events of 10 per cent probability will occur; 
5. Confirmation bias, which inclines us to look for confirming evidence of an 
initial hypothesis, rather than falsifying evidence that would destroy it; 
6. Contamination effects, whereby we allow irrelevant but proximate 
information to influence a decision. 
 
Moreover, Ariely (2008) summarizes many similar “hidden forces” behind our 
decision-making with the goal of letting the reader “rethink” about what drives 
him and others, hopefully “to learn to avoid” certain mistakes (2008, xii). This 
invokes a set of questions. What happens if these hidden forces and biases are 
revealed? If we learn to avoid them, can we then say that the awareness has 
diminished their power? Concerning evolution, does science work against 
evolutionary “mechanisms” or is science just a product of evolutionary 
mechanisms like these “hidden forces”? 
  
The latter question may remind the reader of a debate about the place of morality 
in evolution. We should briefly recall it in order to set off on the right foot in the 
next subsection. Thomas Huxley thought that morality was artificial in competitive 
nature, “a strange microcosm spinning counter-clockwise”, whereas Kropotkin 
saw in animal nature not competition but mutual aid and mutual support. In 
Kropotkin’s view, human morality does not pose a problem for evolutionary 
theory because “already” animals have it. Morality, for Kropotkin, is not 
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something that has to conquer (our) nature, - as opposed to the Victorian view 
implied in Huxley’s thought (Harman 2014). It is of course a matter of estimation 
whether morality runs counter the rest of the evolutionary process or not. 
However, I fear that debates about estimative matters generate more heat than 
light. Hence, I would like to determine only the common ground of the clashing 
views. I see the common ground in the view that (a) morality did appear in 
evolution and (b) in humans we find its most impressive expression, as well as—I 
hasten to say—its most heart-breaking deviation.  
Like the picture of cooperating sciences that I provided at the end of section 4.1, I 
propose to sketch in the next section a paradoxical picture of an evolved creature 
whose awareness of evolution opens new possibilities for future evolutionary 
paths.  
2.2 The “school of suspicion” 
The ethos of science has always been to serve humanity by leading it to reality. 
Plato’s distinction between appearance and reality is the start of all criticism and 
therefore of secure critical knowledge, which is knowledge that is justified by its 
own measure. Bacon’s dictum “knowledge is power” implies that science 
improves man’s grip on reality. Kant’s “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from 
his self-incurred immaturity” suggests progress, development and maturation. 
Combining these three strands, we might detect a hint of the reality of ourselves, 
of which we should obtain critical knowledge in order to mature genuinely. 
Conversely, does this knowledge in no way alter our situation? The famous dictum 
inscribed on Marx’s grave, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways. The point, however, is to change it”, seems to suppose that 
interpretation and knowledge change nothing in the world. However, Marx is, in a 
way, his own counter-example. This is explained by Apel by our hermeneutic 
ability to 
react at causal-analytic explanations of [our] behaviour with new 
behaviour. This can only be explained by the fact that we are able to 
translate the psychological-sociological explaining language into the 
language of a deepening self-understanding. (Apel 1971, 42) 
Not only “psychological-sociological language” but also that of the natural science 
can work in this way: 
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The self-understanding we can gain from science can help us put our moral 
lives on a new and better foundation, and once we understand what our 
freedom consists in, we will be much better prepared to protect it against 
the genuine threats that are regularly misidentified. (Dennett 2003, 1) 
Ricoeur combined a certain kind of cultural science under the heading “the school 
of suspicion”, the masters of which were Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. “[S]eemingly 
mutually exclusive”, all three strived to “a reduction of the illusions and the lies of 
consciousness”, that is to a “demystification” (1977, 32). In other words, they are 
not just sceptics. Their suspicion is eventually creative and constructive.  
[Marx, Nietzsche and Freud] clear the horizon for a more authentic word, 
for a new reign of Truth, not only by means of a ‘destructive’ critique, but 
by the invention of an art of interpreting . . . . If consciousness is not what it 
thinks it is, a new relation must be instituted between the patent and the 
latent; this new relation would correspond to the one that consciousness 
had instituted between appearances and the reality of things. (1977, 33) 
Marx’s suspicion was that the consciousness of the members of the bourgeoisie is, 
by virtue of their social position, unable to grasp reality. Only those at the bottom 
of the social scale, the members of the proletariat, have the ability to perceive 
reality, if they are not deluded by religion, the “opium of the masses”. Nietzsche’s 
suspicion was that behind all objectivity and compassion, there is only the will to 
power. Freud’s suspicion was that civilized culture prohibited certain 
psychological needs (e.g., sexual instincts and desires), which then find adapted 
(“sublimated”) expressions. The psychoanalytic craft is to “read” these to 
determine what they really express.  
I suspect that Ricoeur was not familiar with Darwin when he designed the 
metaphor of the “school of suspicion” (I will from now on drop the quotation 
marks); otherwise, he would have made him at least its visiting professor. 
Historically, Freud (Ritvo 1990) and Nietzsche (Richardson 2004) were inspired by 
Darwinian thinking and to a certain extent, they depended on his theory in their 
own domains of psychology and philosophy. Marx’ attitude to Darwin was 
somewhat more complex. He admired Darwin’s theory because of its materialism, 
but opposed the suggestion that the principle of the “struggle for life” should be 
applied to human culture (Colp 1974).  
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However, the fact that the three masters of suspicion recognized (some of) their 
own intentions in Darwin’s theory does not yet fully justify making him visiting 
professor of the school. We should also find suspicion as a method in his work. 
However, Darwin went to great lengths to create the impression that he, as a 
scientist, was not aware, and should not be aware, of the possible cultural effects 
of his theories. In the introduction to Descent, he wrote that for a long time, he 
intended not to publish his thoughts on humans. He was afraid it would “add to 
the prejudices” against his views. However, because Origin has been received well 
by many, especially young, biologists (he uses the term “naturalists”), he felt his 
views should be published as an example of applying a general theory to “a 
species taken singly”. This is important because those “who are not scientific” also 
learn from these things (1871, 389).  
Thus, the method of suspicion is present only between the lines. The appearance 
is that species are immutable and therefore have been independently created. 
The reality is that, as the Introduction to Origin states, “those belonging to what 
are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally 
extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one 
species are the descendants of that species” (1859, 14). In Darwin’s hands, the 
distinction between appearance and reality becomes the distinction between the 
unscientific and the scientific. The appearance (the idea that species are 
immutable) is readily believed because of extra-scientific motives (religion). The 
idea of an immutable species is akin to an illusion (Freud/Nietzsche) or an 
ideology (Marx).  
However, having this distinction as the mark of a theory is too general to count as 
a reason for being appointed a visiting professor of the school of suspicion. There 
should be a constraint: the theory should offer knowledge of human nature. This 
is why Copernicus and Lyell, though they successfully discarded illusions 
concerning the place and age of the earth, do not, in my view, belong to the 
school of suspicion.  
This “constructive destructionism” is an element in the Darwinian tradition as 
well. For example, a well-known Darwinist study ends as follows: “The very notion 
of niche construction asserts the autonomy of the organism, the power latent in 
species to influence its own destiny. Our niche gave us language, language gave us 
intelligence, but only the wise use of that intelligence can keep us free and fully 
human” (Bickerton 2009, 249). 
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Should we conclude that Darwin gave us insight into a mechanism, just as Freud, 
Nietzsche and Marx did, in order to let us see reality? The picture is somewhat 
less straightforward. An old philosopher’s trick is to test a theory by applying it to 
itself. E.g., an errant scepticism can be refuted through that procedure: if you are 
sure that nothing can be known, how do you know that for sure? This procedure 
also works against Nietzsche, whose denial of any objectivity and embrace of any 
force leaves him in no position to argue for any position. Freud and Marx, 
however, as well as Darwin, avoid this trap. They affirm that it is possible to do 
science and to get a clear view of the mechanisms that have driven humans 
without their knowing about it. These mechanisms do not prevent the awareness 
of them. Freud and Marx go even further, expecting humanity to gain knowledge 
and develop a culture in which health (Freud) or justice (Marx) will flourish. 
Darwin, on the other hand, does not offer such an utopia. Doing evolutionary 
science is not working against evolution in the way that doing psychoanalysis 
works against the power of the unconscious. It belongs to the process. In 
Darwinism, evolved awareness meets some of the hidden forces behind 
evolution.  
On human evolution, Darwinism finds itself in a situation similar to the 
humanities: “the first supposition for the possibility of a historical science is that I 
am an historical being; that the one who researches history is the same as the one 
who makes history” (Dilthey 1927, 189). Substitute “evolution” for “history” and 
the sentence could be about Darwinism: the first supposition for the possibility of 
an evolutionary science is that I am an evolved being. The one who researches 
evolution is a product of evolution.  
In other words, both the historian and the evolutionary scientist try to obtain a 
clear view of a process of which they are a part. This does not necessarily destroy 
their undertaking, but it would be naive to dismiss it as irrelevant. In at least two 
respects, it is relevant for the content of the theories on evolution and history. 
First, the studied process has led to this theory and the theorist, which means that 
evolutionary theory and history need to account for the phenomenon of science 
and theoretical thinking. This implies that science and cognition should not be 
discussed in a derogatory way, stressing our imprisonment, describing humans as 
driven without being aware of it. Inevitably, such a derogatory approach backfires. 
Second, the process is not a finished object; it has a future, influenced by the 
activity of science, among other influences. This “historical conscience” makes 
both biologists and historians aware of the openendedness as well as the niche-
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constructing meaning of their thinking. In other words, the conscious intentional 
actions of the scientist have become a defining part of the process that began as a 
purely unconscious unintentional one.    
2.3 Hermeneutic awareness of Darwinian mechanisms 
2.3.1 Stress mechanisms 
Recent neurological findings concerning the development of the human brain 
have shown that it is “much less (pre-) determined by genes than previously 
thought. Our brain is characterized by an enormous degree of experience-
dependent plasticity” (Hüther 2006, 340). In order to develop synaptic 
connectivity, the child should not experience constant stress and anxiety. “The 
enduring activation of an uncontrollable stress response will seriously hamper and 
suppress the elaboration and stabilization of the complex neuronal and synaptic 
connections in higher cortical association areas” (2006, 340).  
The knowledge of the influence of experience on brain development moved 
Hüther to a plaidoyer of “a culture of peace and non-violence”, in which children 
are protected “against insecurity, anxiety and stress during early childhood” (342), 
such as by promoting learning at school by supportive action instead of by reward 
and punishment.  
Stress is not confined to children. Scientific research can determine how adults 
could cope with stress. One recently developed method is that of “mindfulness-
based stress reduction”, which has been experimentally tested and proven 
effective (Grossman 2004). This approach assumes that humans are able to pay 
attention to their own mental (“internal”) states, instead of only the “external” 
things to which the mind is directed. It is possible to teach humans to pay a 
“dispassionate, nonevaluative and sustained moment-to-moment awareness of 
perceptible mental states and processes” in a non-deliberative manner (Grossman 
2004, 36). Activating this capacity, and making it a habit, has transformative 
power. It increases the veridicality of our perceptions, so we have additional 
information about our situation, which gives us a greater sense of control. 
(Obviously, this can also be stated in the language of neuroscience.) 
These studies offer fine examples of the way that knowledge of our situation has 
the potential to alter it. Obviously, the “mechanism” itself is not abolished or 
changed. However, because the application of this knowledge would lead to 
different behaviours, the mechanism would be triggered less often.  
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These studies taken together can be seen to describe a hermeneutic circle. The 
circle starts with questions about a ubiquitous phenomenon as stress. According 
to Rosa (2005), one cause of stress is social acceleration, as described in Chapter 
1. What are the effects of stress on human development, for example? To 
investigate such effects, “stress” must be operationalized to certain neurological 
phenomena. Neurological research, such as Hüther’s studies, leads to conclusions, 
which are then offered to the public. What are the effects of making the public 
aware of these neurological mechanisms? Hermeneutic awareness of the role of 
stress in human development potentially leads to altering our pedagogical 
behaviour. Our life practice then raises a new question and so on. And so on: 
these often-used words carry an extra meaning in this case. The circle continues 
because humans will not cease to live and interpret. Studying evolution means 
studying and influencing this ongoing process. 
2.3.2 Darwinism in economics 
Recently, Darwinism has been applied to economics. In this subsection, I will 
briefly describe some of its content in order to show how it fits into the “school of 
suspicion”. It would fit, as we recall, if it discloses new mechanisms about 
ourselves and if the insights have a potentially emancipating character. Economic 
choices eventually shape our niche, and our niche shapes the next phase of the 
ongoing evolution.  
Economics is about scarcity of resources, the satisfaction of needs and how much 
time, effort and money we are willing to spend to satisfy a certain need. 
Darwinism offers two ideas that, according to Frank (2011), throw light on key 
economic processes. 
The first economic idea in Darwinism is that context shapes evaluation (Frank 
2011, 27). Visitors of restaurants tend to choose the next-to-most-expensive dish. 
All the host has to do to make a certain dish much chosen, is to ensure that only 
one dish is more expensive (Ariely 2008, 14). The cognitive mechanism involved 
possibly evolved because it had a relatively good outcome. It explains much of our 
economic behaviour: why we choose the things we choose to satisfy our needs. 
The second economic idea in Darwinism is that “the interests of individuals are 
often in conflict with those of broader groups” (Frank 2011, 40). For example, 
although hockey players definitely wish that wearing helmets during play is 
obligatory, no one wears a helmet if it is voluntarily, because it gives the wearer a 
slight disadvantage. In the interest of the happiness of the “broader group”, a 
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regulation should be established to restrict the freedom of individuals. This idea 
supports the idea that a “free market”, without regulation, does not result in the 
highest happiness of those involved. Some things that we need are only 
satisfactory if they are obligatory. A governing body should impose them and 
thereby restrict the freedom of the market. The relative disadvantage of wearing 
a helmet in a field where no one else does makes us choose the absolute 
disadvantage of running the risk of being injured. This teaches us why the invisible 
hand does not bring us happiness, in other words, why economic markets left to 
their own dynamics will not have a beneficial effect on society:  
the real reason to regulate is to protect ourselves from the consequences of 
excessive competition with one another... For the harm principle to make 
any sense at all, it must be understood to mean that the legitimacy of a 
restriction must be decided by weighing its cost to those being restricted 
against the harm others would suffer if the behavior weren’t restricted. 
(Frank 2011, 28, 85) 
So “more egalitarian distribution of resources can be defended not just in abstract 
moral terms, but also in terms of mutual advantage” (Frank 2011, 139). This 
seems to contradict Darwin, who spoke about “one general law . . ., namely, 
multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die” (1859, 208). However, 
the strongest and the weakest both gain from maintaining a certain equality in 
society (Wilkinson/ Pickett 2009), acknowledging a mutuality, a fairness which 
belongs to the human niche. It is Darwinian to stress interspecies competition but 
it is no less Darwinian to stress interniche cooperation (Mesoudi 2011, 177ff.). 
These findings are coherent with other evolutionary theories: “a far-reaching 
political invention, namely, hunter-gatherer egalitarianism as defined by 
anthropologists . . . had a profound and fundamental effect on Darwinian 
selection mechanics” (Boehm 1997, 101). This cultural trait of egalitarianism 
included the suppression of within-group variation, the strengthening of between-
group variation, and a strong awareness and repression of free riders. Because 
this culture probably existed for hundreds of millennia, it created the genetic base 
of fairness, altruism and cooperation. “Underlying this suppression of competition 
and domination are counter dominant attitudes . . . that spring from a natural 
aversion to being dominated” (Boehm 1997, 104). The alternative to domination 
is consensus seeking. Paradoxically, this stimulates individuality to be a 
contributing factor (e.g., through knowledge and experience) instead of a 
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competing factor. It has even been suggested that the between-group variation 
was not as “red in tooth and claw” as the vulgar Darwinian image suggests by 
quoting Tennyson. Early hunter-gathere groups seem to have been avoiding war if 
possible (Fry/Söderberg 2013).  
So much for economics. At the end of this Chapter, I like to point out that the lines 
drawn thus far converge to a background against which modern political 
dilemmas  gain meaning. Martin Luther King reminded us that  
A genuine revolution of values [Nietzsche] means in the final analysis that 
our loyalties must become ecumenical rather than sectional. Every nation 
must now develop an overriding loyalty to mankind as a whole in order to 
preserve the best in their individual societies. This call for a worldwide 
fellowship that lifts neighborly concern beyond one's tribe, race, class, and 
nation is in reality a call for an all-embracing -- embracing and unconditional 
love for all mankind. This oft misunderstood, this oft misinterpreted 
concept, so readily dismissed by the Nietzsches of the world as a weak and 
cowardly force, has now become an absolute necessity for the survival of 
man [my italics]. (1967) 
It seems that we have evolved the trait of being happy if the community of the 
inhabitants of our niche fares well. The first UN research study of happiness found 
that “Happier countries tend to be richer countries. But more important than 
income are social factors like the strength of social support, the absence of 
corruption and the degree of personal freedom” (Helliwell/Layard/Sachs 2012). 
This goes some way towards explaining the Easterlin paradox that although higher 
income increases happiness, happiness does not increase proportionally. A social, 
embracing, welcoming tendency marked the appearance of humans and began in 
the Pleistocene: “Back in the Pleistocene, any child who was fortunate enough to 
grow up acquired a sense of emotional security by default” (Hrdy 2009, 290), 
thanks to mothers and alloparents. 
The opposite tendency also exists: to keep one’s property for oneself or one’s 
family or group. This tendency became culturally dominant, according to Hrdy, in 
the post-Pleistocene culture of agriculture, in which property accumulated and 
inheritance patterns became patrilineal.   
This kind of anthropological reasoning describes and evaluates the biases and 
prejudices (Gadamer 1960) that come with our niche. In this sense, niche 
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resembles hermeneutic circle: both are preformed and are open to be reformed – 
hopefully on the basis of being informed.  
The Anthropocene is [after Pleistocene and Holocene] the new epoch in 
which humanity, through its technological prowess and population of 7 
billion, has become the major driver of changes of the Earth’s physical 
systems, including the climate, the carbon cycle, the water cycle, the 
nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity. The Anthropocene will necessarily reshape 
our societies. If we continue mindlessly along the current economic 
trajectory, we risk undermining the Earth’s life support systems – food 
supplies, clean water, and stable climate. ... On the other hand, if we act 
wisely, we can protect the Earth while raising quality of life broadly around 
the world. (Helliwell/ Layard/Sachs 2012, 4)  
Interestingly, both trajectories for our niche are evolutionarily feasible. We can 
follow the mechanisms that make us perceive the other primarily as a competitor. 
This appears to lead, eventually, to either a Hobbesian war of “all against all” or, 
to prevent that, a Hobbesian NSA-superstate (cf. Bickerton 2009, 247). - We also 
have the “wise” possibility of maintaining a middle way by enhancing a 
community (“rasing quality of life broadly around the world”). This entails e.g. to 
judge economic activities by their relation to the common good. Such a middle 
way does not repress Darwinian mechanisms, nor does it impose mechanisms on 
us (Dennett 2006, 6; Campbell 1975, 1115).  
The sketched trajectories of either war & NSA-superstate or community are 
increasingly mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, both would fit into a Darwinian 
narrative, as told by future generations. Retrospectively, the evolutionary path 
will perhaps seem to have been inevitable. However, if I am right about the 
hermeneutic niche, human evolution would not have been possible without our 
efforts to play our part in the story. 
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Conclusion 
It is impossible that man should not be a part of 
nature or that he should not follow her general 
order; but if he be thrown among individuals 
whose nature is in harmony with his own, his 
power of action will thereby be aided and 
fostered. 
Spinoza, Ethica 
 
In this thesis I have argued that fitting language evolution into a Darwinian theory 
on the evolution of mankind requires giving up naturalism and accepting 
hermeneutics as an ineliminable element in Darwinism. In this Conclusion, I 
recapitulate my argument, structured by the five claims set out in the 
Introduction, and explore some consequences and possibilities. 
1. The indispensability of hermeneutics for a theory of language evolution 
makes Darwinism incompatible with, and a contradiction to, exclusive 
naturalism. 
This claim rests, apart from the support it receives from claim 3, on the language 
evolution paradox. The fact that intentionality cannot be denied without denying 
science makes it inevitable that evolutionary science recognizes mindlessness as 
well as mind, unintendedness as well as intentionality, the “logical space of 
nature” as well as “the logical space of reasons” (Sellars 1956). Contrary to this 
idea, methodological naturalism claims that the first of these pairs is in principle 
enough to explain humans. It sees the methods of the natural sciences as 
sufficient for this goal, excluding hermeneutics. However, we can say with Dilthey: 
the humans that are thus explained are not equal to the humans that explain.  
Perhaps it is surprising that Darwinism is used in an argument against 
methodological naturalism. However, this move is not original; it is inspired by the 
philosopher Hans Jonas. He pointed out that the case for ontological naturalism 
(what he calls materialistic monism) against Cartesian dualism was decidedly 
helped by evolutionary theory because it showed how mental phenomena 
(ascribed to a res cogitans) gradually emerged from natural phenomena and were 
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not separate substances (res) after all. However, according to Jonas, this was a 
Pyrrhus victory of materialism:  
[I]f humans are akin to animals, then animals are akin with humans: animals 
carry a degree of the interiority [Innerlichkeit] of which humans are self-
aware. ... So where else than at the beginning of life itself can we put the 
origin of interiority? If however interiority is coextensive with life, then a 
purely mechanistic interpretation of life, with concepts referring to the 
exterior only, is insufficient. (Jonas 1973, 84f)  
 
The strategy conveyed in this passage attracted me more than its content. 
Whereas Jonas pulled ontological conclusions from this argument (although his 
latter remark is methodological), I use Darwinism against methodological 
naturalism. Contrary to Jonas, I suspect that ontological questions are 
unproductive disguises of methodological questions. Putting ontology first 
suggests that when we know the nature of something, we can decide how to 
approach it methodologically. However, this reasoning is circular. How can we 
know the nature of something without having approached it? Hence, any 
ontology is premature.  
My term “hermeneutic Darwinism” may seem an oxymoron - but this is not the 
case in my interpretation, which is based on two distinctions. First, there is a 
distinction between a narrow and broad definition of Darwinism. The narrow 
definition views the “algorithm” of variation, heredity and selection as blind 
unintentional processes only. It sees variation as contingent, heredity as genetic 
or along genetic lines (like memes) and selection as unintentional. The broad 
definition allows these mechanisms to be influenced by human choices as well, 
e.g. heredity through  learning, a process relying on interpretation. Such 
hermeneutic cultural heredity (a) has evolved and (b) will shape further human 
evolution.  
Second, there is a distinction between (quotidian) interpretation, historical 
interpretation and philosophical hermeneutics. “Narrow” Darwinism and 
philosophical hermeneutics are not easy to reconcile, because they differ strongly 
in method. However, “broad” Darwinism uses, and thus recognizes implicitly, 
quotidian interpretation, e.g. in primatology (Goodall and Savage-Rumbaugh 
being hermeneuticists, De Waal the social scientist). This is not far from historical 
interpretation in palaeoanthropology, i.e. a hermeneutic approach of early human 
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behaviour, concerning e.g. fire control, migration or early art objects. From there, 
the step to philosophical hermeneutics, albeit not obligatory, introduces nothing 
but self-awareness. In my view, there is no methodological objection to be made 
against it from “broad” Darwinism.  
There is a tendency to use Darwinism as a scientific cloak to a biological or 
memeticist determinism concerning humans, to a “colonizing the social sciences” 
(Rose 2000, 128) and the humanities. My claims contradict this “colonization”, 
and instead propose a “multilateral cooperation”. Hermeneutic Darwinism means 
that the evolutionary anthropologist – during research and valorisation - is an 
interpreter like everybody else, trying to understand the deeper currents in 
human life. His/her interpreting is not something alien to Darwinism – except in 
the narrow definition of Darwinism. She/he joins the public in trying to make 
sense of a complex world in which we feel called to live a life according to 
standards we project outside ourselves. She/he must speak “the language of the 
community and individual intentions” (Sellars 1962, 40), a language game loaded 
with normativity. Normativity however does not fit in a narrowly defined 
Darwinism, if only because norms require interpretation and commitment.  
2. Niche construction theory is the best Darwinist framework for human 
evolution. 
Human niche construction is cultural niche construction. Biologically, we are 
adapted to culture. Culture initiated an “inheritance” passed on through the 
genetic line. In the complex interplay between these two inheritance lines, 
hominization has taken place and it still takes place.  
If those who work in language evolution recognize this claim, niche construction 
theory will gain centre stage, as in the three outstanding studies that crowned the 
150th anniversary of Darwin’s The Origin (2009): Bickerton’s Adam’s Tongue, 
Hrdy’s Mothers and Others and Wranghams’s Catching Fire.  A brilliant example of 
combining natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities is Deacon’s The 
Symbolic Species (1997). It offers detailed material on brain evolution and 
compares hominine brains with those of other species. It also contains a social 
scientific theory of the need for symbols. New forage strategies caused hunters to 
leave the tribe in search of mega-fauna. Combined with the need to know 
whether his wife’s children are his own was the need to express in ritual the bond 
between man and wife, in the promise to live monogamously. Moreover, it uses 
e.g. the semantic categories of icon, index and symbol from the humanities. 
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In my third claim, hermeneutics is in the content, not the method. 
3. The human niche is the hermeneutic niche. 
Hermeneutics is concerned with what is going on between us. It is something to 
which we are uniquely adapted, neurologically and psychologically. This claim 
therefore supports claim 1, about the indispensability of hermeneutics for a 
theory of language evolution. Acts of interpretation cannot be identified, let alone 
researched, without a hermeneutic approach.  
This dissertation explains the evolutionary significance of the hermeneutic niche 
by addressing several theories. I could not conclude this dissertation without 
offering a sketchy proposal of how to bind the several strands together. I cannot 
prove that the eclectic logical and chronological order of table 5 is correct, but I 
argue that however speculative, it is a possibility. Moreover, it is an example of 
hermeneutic Darwinism in the double sense that I proposed: method and content 
both have a hermeneutic element.  
Table 5 
 
Habilis Mindshaping Fire control - Wrangham  
                 Zawidzki 
 
Alloparental care – Hrdy 
Ergaster/erectus Mindreading Mimetic culture – Donald 
                 
 
          
Archaic sapiens? Symbolic threshold  
                 Deacon 
 
 
Sapiens Protolanguage Mythic culture 
                 Bickerton           
      Language Theoretical culture 
   
 
Each phase in table 5 is explained below. 
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a. Mindshaping: fire control and alloparental care 
The control of fire was a watershed. (cf. Ch.1; 1.3, Ch.3; 1.2) The oldest evidence 
of fire control accepted by most palaeoanthropologists is dated at 400,000 BCE. 
Wrangham offered circumstantial evidence suggesting a much earlier date: the 
appearance of ergaster/erectus, whose earliest specimens are dated at 1.8 mya. 
From the formation of hand, pelvis and foot, we learn that this species lived on 
the ground. How did these individuals keep predators at distance in the dark? Fire 
would have given them safety, warmth and light – and it enabled cooking. Cooked 
food yields high quality nutrition, and thus allowed for the development of the 
small mouths, reduced dentition and small intestines that we see in ergaster/ 
erectus. Thus, fire control could explain the transition from habilis to ergaster/ 
erectus.  
Mindshaping appeared in this context. First, fire enabled a sufficient amount of 
high-quality nutrition and thus reduced the need to look for food all day long. This 
temporal space could be used to strengthen social bonds, such as by instructing 
the young, or laying back and reflecting on the last journey. Second, fire created a 
spatial realm for sociality. The evolution from wolf to dog had been initiated when 
wolves were attracted to villages in search of food. This meant an  
intense natural selection in favour of calmer individuals, because the calmer 
wolves were able to get closer to the settlements...  In effect, dogs 
experienced a form of self-domestication. The first cooks probably 
experienced a similar process. Among the eaters of cooked food who were 
attracted to the fireside meal, the calmer individuals would have more 
comfortably accepted other’s presence... They would have been chased 
away less often. (Wrangham 2009, 184) 
So fire traces predating 400,000 BCE (1.4 mya in Kenya and 1.7 mya China) need 
not be taken as “natural fire cases until the opposite is proven” (James 1989), but 
as possible cases of controlled fire. After all, the absence of proof need not be 
mistaken for the proof of absence, especially if circumstantial evidence is strong. 
This early start of the “groundwork for niche construction” has the major 
advantage that it allows for the adaptation of hominins to their niche. The shorter 
the period is, the less plausible any gradual development would be and vice versa. 
So much for fire control. 
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Human children are socially tuned, “less self-centered, more spontaneously 
cooperative, and more strongly inclined to share than chimpanzees are” (Hrdy 
2009, 36). This evolved trait of humans can be traced back to the Pleistocene era. 
Emotional modernity preceded anatomical or behavioural modernity; therefore, it 
preceded language. Plausibly, it functioned as “groundwork” for the appearance 
of language.  
Although infant primates are tuned to faces and contact, as human babies are, 
this trait does not develop into a sociality of human degree. “What other apes 
lacked was an environment in which the components of mind reading and sharing 
could first develop and then be subjected to selective pressures that favoured 
their possessors” (Hrdy 2009, 67). The environment that drove human evolution 
beyond the level of chimpanzees is characterized by alloparental care or 
cooperative breeding. Mothers with greater social support are more responsive to 
the needs of their infants.   
This environment of “mothers and others” mindshaped children to attend to the 
moods of the surrounding humans, react to their approaches, smile when they 
looked at them. The infants’ attachment to their mothers, and the need for 
mothers to put their baby regularly in the care of others so that they could forage, 
gave way to “motherese”, reassuring talk, and “babbling”, or imitating sounds to 
attract attention. This probably began roughly simultaneously with fire control, 
marking the transition of habilis to ergaster/erectus.  
The sounds and gestures of mothers and others were semantically redundant 
because the context was clear. Consider our talking to a baby. It creates a 
reassuring shared environment and attracts the infant’s attention. We are 
apprehensive about the sounds to which the infant reacts, so we continue to 
behave in a way that pleases the baby. This mindshaping creates a shared sphere 
in which mindreading starts to make sense of words. To Zawidzki, who thought it 
“difficult to identify selection pressures that could have driven the evolution of 
*the mindreading+ capacity before the evolution of language” (2013, 140), I would 
suggest that fire control and alloparental care created such pressures.  
b. Mindreading, mimetic culture, public space  
Apes make excellent use of their episodic memory, that is, their memory of events 
that occurred at a specific place and at a specific time. This allows them to 
respond to the subtleties of social or pragmatic situations. Ape culture, therefore, 
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can be called an episodic culture. Humans broke away from primate cognition by 
constructing an archaic culture, which was mimetic and in which intentional—but 
not yet linguistic—gestures or sounds had a meaning and represented something. 
The start of mimetic culture is the construction of the hermeneutic niche.  
In mimetic culture, all aspects of behaviour can be repeated for one-self 
(mimicked) and used in pre-linguistic storytelling. Both cases require further 
development of cognitive skills to handle meaning. Certain elements can be re-
used in different circumstances and in different mimetic acts. These become 
chunks of meaning and proto-words. An example is the infant who refers to an 
animal by imitating its sound.16  
Human children routinely re-enact the events of the day and imitate the 
actions of their parents and siblings. They do this very often without any 
apparent reason other than to reflect on their representation of the event. 
This element is largely absent from the behaviour of apes. (Donald 1991, 
172) 
Because these acts are public, and therefore open to interpretation by others, 
mimesis leads to a shared realm of meaning, in which mindreading and 
communication happen. This public realm included a shared history, shared 
memories, shared “stories” (albeit told by gestures). Mimetic culture appeared 
with ergaster/erectus. The fabrication of Acheulean bifacial hand axes, from 1.5 
mya, required strong imitation capabilities. Perhaps the instructor directed his 
attention to the pupil, going slowly through the motions, making sounds and 
gestures in order to emphasize a particular aspect. After the fabrication, the use 
of the axe would also require instruction, such as in cleaning hides, fighting 
predators, cutting wood, fishing and so on. The pupil‘s mind was shaped in this 
joint attention and in the sound making and gesturing. These may have translated 
into meanings, such as “now at this point, be extremely careful”, “put all your 
power in”, “show reverence”, “I want you to do the following”, “back, all of you!” 
and so on. Redundant sounds and gestures were re-used in similar situations and 
thus became imbued with meaning. 
                                                     
16
 A few months before her second birthday, our youngest daughter formed her first 
“sentence” this way. It wasn’t Dutch yet, it was just – well, language. From the backseat of 
the car in Northern Wales, seeing a cow where we had only seen sheep for miles and 
miles: “Hey:...” (look!) “boo,...” (a cow) “haha!” (how nice).  
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I allow myself a second speculation. Turnbull described (1961) the central role of 
jokes and humour in pygmy tribal life. If humour is indeed a central element in 
tribal life, and is therefore not confined to societies with villages, it could have 
originated at this point in human evolution when tribes offered the only cultural 
niches, yet language did not exist. Cognitively, humour is possible from the 
moment the prison of the here and now is broken. For a good laugh, all you need 
is an expectation that turns out to be incorrect17 and the ability to take a mental 
step back. Consider the bonding function of humour: to laugh together is to 
display trust and wellbeing in each other’s presence. It helps unfolding the public 
realm.  
c. Symbolic threshold  
The public realm prepared for crossing the symbolic threshold because the former 
trains its inhabitants in taking the viewpoint of “one”, like in “one sees”; “man 
sieht” (German); “on voit” (French). The newcomer understands that “one 
understands”  the symbolic system,  and therefore feels obliged to understand it 
as well. It is a “shared virtual world” and includes abstractions, impossibilities and 
paradoxes. This symbolic virtual world is the heart of the human niche.  
Recall the Peircean distinction between icon, index and symbol. To conditioned 
animals, a new bell sound is an icon of previous similar sounds. The fact that food 
is available every time the bell sounds means that the animals can learn to use it 
as an index for food. However, if the correlation breaks down, the association and 
condition will disappear. This means that the symbolic threshold had not been 
crossed; would it have been crossed, the correlations between the symbols 
remain after perceptional correlation disappears. Moreover, symbolic learning is 
facilitated by forgetting those perceptions. Understanding symbols is not 
conditioning because it essentially requires no time. It resembles the “method” of 
the late sociologist Jacques van Doorn, who advised “Keep watching. Then you 
will see it”.18 However, “watching” is meant metaphorically. Cassirer retold the 
moving story about Helen Keller who was born both mute and blind but was 
                                                     
17
 For the role of expectation in the joke, consider the following three examples from the 
Edinburgh Fringe of the last years. "I was adopted at birth and have never met my mum. 
That makes it very difficult to enjoy any lap dance." (Bobby Mair) “I took part in the sun 
tanning Olympics – I just got Bronze.” (Tim Vine) “I needed a password eight characters 
long, so I picked Snow White and the Seven Dwarves.” (Nick Helm) 
18
 VPRO Radio Marathon interview, July 2007. “Je moet blijven kijken. En dan zie je het.” 
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eventually able to cross the symbolic threshold. He quoted Helen’s teacher, Mrs. 
Sullivan, who described what happened to Helen when she was six years old. 
This morning, while she was washing, she wanted to know the name for 
‘water’. When she wants to know the name of anything, she points to it and 
pats my hand. I spelled ‘w-a-t-e-r’ and thought no more about it until after 
breakfast ... [Later on] we went out to the pump house, and I made Helen 
hold her mug under the spout while I pumped. As the cold water gushed 
forth, filling the mug, I spelled ‘w-a-t-e-r’ in Helen’s free hand. The word 
coming so close upon the sensation of cold water rushing over her hand 
seemed to startle her. She dropped the mug and stood as one transfixed. A 
new light came into her face. She spelled ‘w-a-t-e-r’ several times. Then she 
dropped in the ground and asked for its name and pointed to the pump and 
the trellis and suddenly turning round she asked for my name. I spelled 
‘teacher’. All the way back to the house she was highly excited and learned 
the name of every object she touched, so that in a few hours she added 
thirty new words to her vocabulary ... Everything must have a name now ... 
She drops the signs and pantomime she used before as soon as she has 
words to fill their place ... And we notice that her face grows more 
expressive each day [my italics]. (Cassirer 1954, 53f)  
When and how did hominids cross this threshold? This question suggests that it 
only happened once, which seems implausible. Instead, we might expect that it 
happened several times, died out again, re-emerged, and that slowly cultures 
emerged in which all members of the tribe were led over the symbolic threshold.  
Knowing that symbolic thinking demands a strong prefrontal cortex, Deacon 
predicted that the growing ability to compute symbolic information would 
correlate with increasing prefrontalization, which is the relative growth of the 
prefrontal cortex. Knowing that tool manufacture demands attentional skills, we 
can make the same prediction. However, the question remains: What came first, 
the physiological or the cultural change? This we will possibly never know. The 
resulting biological development was a convergence of several strands, including 
cultural influences. Humans became humans because they began to act as 
humans. There were 
at least two biological species that could be considered intermediate in 
time and morphology between australopithecines and homo erectus. One 
[homo rudolfensis] had a large brain but australopithecine-like facial and 
Conclusion 
183 
 
teeth features, and the other [homo habilis] had a small brain but other 
features more like homo erectus. Which of these was our biological 
ancestor? In terms of our mental evolution it will not be easy to determine, 
and may not much matter. Either could have been. (Deacon 1997, 348) 
Simultaneously, these hominids developed formal ways of connecting the symbols 
through what we now know as logic (in thinking) and syntax (in language), as well 
as how to use them in a concrete social environment. These connections act as 
constraints in the symbolic system. 
The same interdependence can be seen in speech. Sound making formed a 
selection pressure on the vocal tract, such as the control of breathing and the 
lowering of the larynx. It also formed a selection pressure on encephalization. 
Instead of the visceral-emotional involuntary system, which is the base of any 
animal communication system, this slow communication depended on a 
muscular-skeletal learning skill (Deacon 1997, 253). In other words, the first 
communication with sounds and gestures at that early stage required emotional 
calmness and cognitive cueing of the actions. Hence, the pressure to develop 
abilities connected with the pre-frontal cortex enhanced crossing the symbolic 
threshold. 
d. Protolanguage and mythic culture 
This phase is connected with my next claim. 
4. Language evolution presupposes the hermeneutic niche. 
Only in the hermeneutic niche (a public realm in which symbolic meanings are 
shared) can language emerge and make sense. The idea of the hermeneutic niche 
is the bridge between the quotes of Humboldt and Darwin in the Introduction. It 
takes reciprocal trust and intensive attention to convey symbolic meanings or to 
decipher them in the expressions of others. It takes even more attention to keep 
these in memory in such a way that they become construction elements of the 
public space. The hermeneutic niche is the social environment where the 
inhabitants have invested in social trust and attention and have constructed a 
symbolically marked public space.  
I would hypothesize (my third and last speculation, as far as this conclusion is 
concerned) that there has never been one first word. Instead, there were a few 
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first words that in combination covered an opposition. These oppositions or triads 
would have already been known through non-linguistic symbols on the basis of 
our bodily experiences (Lakoff 1987). Candidates are:  
- “night, dark, unknown” and “light, day, known”;  
- “man” and “wife”; 
-  “young, fresh, inexperienced” and “old, physically weaker, experienced, 
mentally strong”; 
- “cold, winter, need for shelter/warmth” and “hot, summer, need for 
coolness”; 
- “sacred” and “non-sacred”; 
- “animal, living moving being” and “tree, plant, remaining in one place”. 
Perhaps, the triads appeared simultaneously, such as  
- “yesterday and accomplished”, “today, now, the task at hand” and  
“tomorrow, the future assignments and dangers and possibilities”; 
- “father”, “mother” and “child”.19  
If these “conceptual categories” have thus been deeply engraved in our cognition, 
it would explain some of the intuitive attractiveness of ideological concepts that 
use oppositions (e.g., Persian Zoroastrism) and triads (e.g., Christian Trinity, or 
Churchill’s “blood, sweat and tears”).  
As the idiom20 grew, a proto-syntax appeared, with words in a pidgin-like order 
(“beads-on-a-string”). An evaluation of recent theories on this topic has been 
given by Hurford (2011); my claims luckily do not require going into that immense 
field. 
e. Language 
The selection pressure drove the development of idiom and syntax, that is, a 
language. Within our species 
                                                     
19
 As a toddler, our eldest daughter recognized this meaning indefatigably in every triad. 
Three horses in the field, three trees standing apart, three apples on the table, three 
parked cars. What helped this impression was the difference in size, so that the smallest of 
the three inevitably became the child, and so on.   
20
 The Dutch word for idiom is “treasure of words” (woordenschat). 
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major advances would probably be driven by this competition between 
subspecies [and] the survival strategies of groups . . . and would test 
particularly their ability to act as a cohesive society... Thus, the evolution of 
humanity is likely to have been driven at the level of cultural change. 
(Donald 1991, 208) 
Every human society, including primitive ones, possesses myths that place the 
tribe in the context of a cosmological whole, particularly myths of death, creation, 
divine wrath and divine gifts. These stories transmit tribal values. In myths, words 
are used as symbols, that is, as meaningful chunks that until now have been 
intended as mimesis. Great inventors introduced words for these common 
symbols. The subsequent invention of a language had been a collective enterprise, 
in which one voted for an invention by using it. Language indirectly strengthened 
social cohesion through storytelling around the fire before it strengthened it 
directly through cooperation. 
This suggests that (a) the hermeneutic niche has been constructed by erectus/ 
ergaster, and (b) the symbolic threshold has been crossed by later descendants of 
ergaster/erectus, probably archaic sapiens. After all, symbolic art dates from 
before sapiens (Kuckenburg 2001).  
If archaic sapiens crossed the symbolic threshold, then neanderthalensis –who 
came later – possibly had symbolic abilities, which seems confirmed by a recent 
finding (Rodriguez-Vidal 2014). More speculative, and therefore hotly debated, is 
the claim that neanderthalensis might have been able to speak (Dediu/Levinson 
2013; Berwick/Hauser/ Tattersall 2013). In any case, the “emotional modernity” of 
neanderthalensis explains the crossbreeding suggested by recent genetic evidence 
(Green et al., 2010).  
The independent role of language in human evolution is expressed by Deacon’s 
remark, “language is its own prime mover”, which reminds us of Humboldt’s 
“Language originates through itself” (Introduction), but it is firmly placed within a 
Darwinian context. Every step along this trail of unfolding symbolic thinking and 
speech created a selection pressure because the community expected all its 
members to follow suit. Once the niche was hermeneutic, language offered itself 
as a means of intensifying this hermeneutic character. Deacon is not sure whether 
we would recognize the first languages as such. However, they must have been 
sufficient at that moment. After all, even we listen for intentions, not separate 
words or morphemes. 
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What appeared was not “the” human niche, but human niches, in several places, 
in more or less intensive forms. Less intensive meant less cooperation and 
therefore lower ability to survive as a group. A converging process started, 
perhaps driven by human mechanisms in order to adapt to human niches. 
Presently, this niche-convergence is still going on, as “globalization” – with 
countertrends (like “localization”), as is normal in social processes. 
To define our niche as hermeneutic entails that the members of our niche 
interpret the world, through myth and science. The motivation of science is to 
make knowledge available to the community.  
5. Interpretation of Darwinian mechanisms further constructs our niche. 
The speciality of the masters of the school of suspicion is to offer knowledge that 
destroys false or ideological images of us and to put something better in their 
place. Darwinism, broadly defined, fits within this tradition. It tells us how we got 
here, and it shows us something about the mechanisms that shape our future by 
shaping our niche. If Darwinism were taught in the school of suspicion, where it 
deserves prime time, it would fuel a hermeneutic conversation of everyday 
understanding with scientific understanding.  
Knowing that our thoughts and deeds shape the lives of the future inhabitants of 
our niche entails a responsibility that deepens our awareness of what it means to 
be human.  
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Samenvatting  
 
Het is niet denkbaar dat de mens géén deel der natuur zou zijn en 
haar algemene orde niet zou volgen. Indien hij evenwel verkeert 
onder individuen, die met zijn eigen menselijke aard overeen-
stemmen, zal zijn vermogen tot handelen daardoor vanzelf 
worden gesteund en versterkt.   Spinoza, Ethica 
De wetenschapsfilosofische vraag van dit proefschrift is: “onder welke 
voorwaarden past de evolutionaire taalverwerving in het Darwinisme?” Het 
antwoord: “met uitsluiting van naturalisme, en met acceptatie van hermeneutiek, 
methodisch zowel als inhoudelijk”. Hermeneutiek omvat het spectrum van 
alledaagse interpretatie, historische interpretatie en filosofische hermeneutiek. 
Methodisch is hermeneutiek nodig omdat taalverschijnselen alleen herkend 
worden in een interpreterende benadering. Inhoudelijk is hermeneutiek nodig 
omdat de evolutionaire taalverwerving (verder “taalevolutie” genoemd) 
verklaarbaar is met behulp van het begrip “constructie van de hermeneutische 
niche”.  
Het proefschrift bepleit dat het Darwinisme, of preciezer: de evolutionaire 
antropologie, zijn immanente hermeneutische component erkent. Dat is 
belangrijk omdat Darwinistische verklaringen doorgaans een natuurweten-
schappelijk, modelmatig karakter hebben dat zo min mogelijk verwijst naar, dan 
wel gebruik maakt van, de hermeneutische factor: de sprekende en luisterende 
mens, met bedoelingen, in een sociale context. Wij zijn terecht benieuwd naar 
onze oorsprong, maar in een theorie die deze dimensie van taalevolutie negeert 
kunnen wij ons nauwelijks herkennen. 
Hoofdstuk 1 begint in paragraaf 1 met een schets van voorbeelden van evolutie 
uit cultuur en natuur. Evolutie wordt in het Darwinisme in principe verklaard via 
een algoritme: reproductie, variatie (mutatie) en selectie. Deze drie processen 
hebben een  eindeloos proces op gang gebracht dat tot steeds grotere 
complexiteit en diversiteit is gekomen. Het zijn echter “blinde” factoren, zonder 
bedoeling, zolang tenminste – en dat gebeurt doorgaans – reproductie genetisch 
wordt opgevat, variatie als doelloos en selectie als redeloos.  
In paragraaf 2 betoog ik dat het Darwinisme het zich niet kan veroorloven, 
taalevolutie onverklaard te laten. Echter, taal bestudering vergt interpretatie. Om 
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iets te identificeren als taal, moet je de situatie en het gedrag van spreker en 
luisteraar interpreteren. Interpretatie heeft in veel wetenschappen omtrent de 
mens zijn plaats, zoals in geneeskunde en economie.  
Zo bereiken we de paradox van taal-evolutie (paragraaf 3). Deze bestaat eruit dat 
evolutionaire verklaringen een mechanistische vorm hebben, terwijl degene die 
de verklaring opstelt, niet kan beweren dat zijn verklaring mechanistisch tot stand 
is gekomen. In dat geval kon hij namelijk geen aanspraak erop maken, iets te 
bedoelen. Immers, mechanismen bedoelen niets. Daarmee is niet gezegd dat een 
mechanistische verklaring fout zou zijn, eerder - wat taal betreft -  onvolledig. De 
paradox van niet-intentionele processen die ten grondslag liggen aan intentioneel 
handelen, verdient aandacht. Ik vermoed dat het een niet-oplosbare paradox is, 
die behoort bij het menszijn. Mijn claim is dat de paradox een contradictie wordt 
indien wij uitgaan van het naturalisme. Naturalisme is de opvatting dat de 
menselijke werkelijkheid afdoende bestudeerd kan worden met natuur-
wetenschappelijke methodes. Zo kom ik tot mijn eerste stelling. 
1. Een theorie over de evolutie van het menselijk taalvermogen kan niet 
zonder interpretatie; dit maakt Darwinisme onverenigbaar met, en een 
tegenstelling tot, een exclusief methodisch naturalisme. 
Wanneer reproductie niet slechts genetisch wordt opgevat maar ook cultureel, en 
wanneer culturele overdraging niet slechts automatisch kopiëren omvat maar 
leren in de breedste zin, is Darwinisme het naturalisme ontstegen. 
Paragraaf 3 concludeert met twee desiderata aan een theorie over taalevolutie.  
Allereerst moet er niet alleen sprake zijn van mechanismen maar ook ruimte 
worden ingeruimd voor begrip. Immers, een spreker drukt met zijn taalact een 
bepaald begrip uit: daarin verschillen de eerste mensen niet van wetenschappers 
van nu. Een theorie die de sprekers als automaten beschrijft, schiet tekort in dit 
opzicht. Een tweede desideratum is dat het noodzakelijke gradualisme wordt 
aangevuld met aandacht voor de context, die in het geval van taalevolutie twee 
aspecten heeft: de sociale context waarin spreken zin krijgt en de semantische / 
syntactische context dankzij welke spreken zin heeft. Een theorie die deze 
contexten weglaat, maakt het zich te gemakkelijk. Evolutie is een proces waarin 
organismen worden afgestemd op de omgeving – en in taalevolutie zijn deze 
contexten een essentieel deel van die omgeving. 
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In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik toonaangevende studies over de intrede van taal in 
de menselijke evolutie, om te zien of en hoe de desiderata erin voorkomen. 
Paragraaf 1 behandelt theorieën waarin taal zelf als evoluerend wordt gezien. Het 
gaat hen niet om de evolutie van het taalvermogen van de mens dus ik kan hen 
verder buiten beschouwing laten. In de rest van het hoofdstuk draait het om 
Darwinistische theorieen over taalevolutie. 
In paragraaf 2 volgen naturalistische theorieen. Millikan beschouwt taal als 
biologische categorie. Zij behandelt ons desideratum van begrip echter in een 
continuum met mechanismen, zonder een “interessante theoretische 
overgangslijn” tussen beide. Dat is een miskenning van de paradox. - Pinker 
verklaart ons taalvermogen vanuit een taal-instinct. Dit instinct is tot stand 
gekomen door een selectiedruk van de sociale groep waarin de mensen 
verkeerden: we niet mee kon in de taal die ontstond, was minder aantrekkelijk als 
partner en dus minder goed in staat om het eigen genetisch materiaal door te 
geven. Pinker maakt dus voldoende plaats voor de sociale context en voor 
gradualisme. Kritiek verdient vooral zijn invulling van het instinct. Hij projecteert 
daarop (Chomsky’s) universele grammatica en lokaliseert het in de hersenen. 
Echter, de talen in de verschillende contexten van de eerste mensen verschilden 
zeer. Het waren deze concrete talen die de stimulus voor de hersenen vormden 
en zij kunnen door hun verschillen niet een universele grammatica hebben 
opgeleverd. Bovendien is het de vraag hoeveel ervan in de hersenen is 
“opgeslagen” (in plaats van via “nurture” verworven).  
Een gemeenschappelijk artikel van Hauser/Chomsky/Fitch benadrukt de 
homologie tussen dierlijke en menselijke communicatiesystemen. Taal verschilt 
van de andere doordat een generatief systeem is met een open einde, waarin de 
woorden bijna elk begrip kunnen betekenen. Het onderliggende vermogen moet 
een keer zijn ontstaan, al dan niet gradueel, maar pas toekomstig onderzoek kan 
daarop licht werpen. Echter, als evolutionaire theorie schiet dit tekort omdat 
gradualisme ontbreekt: er is geen schets van welke mensensoort welke stap zette 
in de verwerving van taal. Bovendien is in deze visie de sociale context vooral een 
programmeur. De sociale omgeving bestaat echter vanaf een bepaald moment, 
fylogenetisch en ontogenetisch, dankzij mijn begrip van de context. Vanaf dat 
moment zijn taalgebruikers medescheppers aan die taalscheppende context.  
Paragraaf 3 beschrijft denkers die onze desiderata tot hun recht laten komen. 
Voor Deacon is de essentie van taal het feit dat het gebruik maakt van 
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symbolische betekenis, in samenhang met concrete betekenis (verwijzing). Hij 
beschrijft een graduele ontwikkeling, zoals wat het ontstaan van taal betreft (van 
signaal via icoon en index naar symbool) als van de hersenen die de symbolische 
betekenis verwerken, en dateert deze voorzichtig binnen de menselijke evolutie. 
Doorslaggevend in zijn verklaring is de sociale context die, zoals bij Pinker, de 
selectiedruk schiep voor het ontwikkelen van taalvermogen. 
Donalds theorie beschrijft een cognitieve ontwikkeling aan de hand van culturele 
stadia: van mimetische via mythische naar theoretische cultuur. Vanuit elk 
stadium moet het volgende te bereiken zijn. Taal definieert de overgang naar het 
mythische cultuurstadium. Dat is een geloofwaardige stap omdat in mimetische 
cultuur via nonverbale “verhalen” een publieke ruimte is geopend waarin men 
aandacht heeft voor wat de ander wil melden, niet alleen expressief maar ook 
descriptief. Selectiedruk in de mimetische cultuur richting taal bestond uit het 
verminderen van ambiguïteit en onze behoefte aan verhalen, mythen, die onze 
ervaringen integreren. Talen ontstonden dankzij creatieve geesten, anderen 
accepteerden hun bijdrage en door het gebruik ontwikkelde de taal zich verder.  
In de theorie van Bickerton creëerden de vroege mensen een niche waarin een 
voorloper van taal werd gesproken, bestaande uit enkele woorden die 
langzamerhand een grammatica kregen. Gezien het belang van de groep voor het 
overleven, vormde de zich ontplooiende taal, als niche-element, de Darwinistische 
selectiedruk. Hierdoor gingen mensen hun eigen evolutiepad, los van dat van 
andere primaten die, zelfs als hen het begin van taal wordt geleerd, de 
mogelijkheden ervan niet benutten. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ingegaan op de niche constructietheorie. Paragraaf 1 
beschrijft de theorie binnen het Darwinisme. Niche constructie vindt plaats 
wanneer dieren zelf bijdragen aan de omgeving waaraan zij zijn aangepast. In 
bepaalde zin wordt zo de Darwinistische logica van “de omgeving eist; het 
organisme antwoordt” omgedraaid. Niche constructie theorie is een aanvulling 
op, en dus een onderdeel van, het Darwinisme, inzoverre dat niche constructie 
niet alleen zelf Darwinistisch verklaard kan worden, maar vooral een feedback-
dynamiek toevoegt aan de evolutionaire processen.   
Paragraaf 2 gaat nader in op de menselijke niche, waarnaar ook de titel van deze 
dissertatie verwijst. De mens heeft communicatieve en technologische 
vaardigheden ontwikkeld. Hiermee is hij in staat om zijn natuurlijke omgeving 
veilig en bewoonbaar te maken. Een onderdeel hiervan is de samenleving in 
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groepen, waarin samenwerking, informatie- en arbeidsdeling cruciaal werden. 
Dankzij deze bebouwde en sociale niche is de mens het enige zoogdier dat op alle 
continenten leeft en in concentraties van een omvang die we vooral van insecten 
en sommige vogelsoorten kennen. Ik spreek, mede om die reden, van power-
niche. Taal is het medium van zowel communicatie als technologie-onderwijs, dat 
maakt dat onze niche bijeengehouden wordt door taal. Wij zijn evolutionair 
aangepast aan dit talige karakter van de niche.  
2. Niche constructive theorie biedt, binnen het Darwinisme, het beste 
raamwerk voor een verklaring van de evolutie van ons taalvermogen. 
Hoe werd de menselijke niche dan geconstrueerd? Mechanismen die het ontstaan 
van de niche helpen verklaren zijn mindreading en mindshaping. Mindreading is 
het interpreteren van het gedrag van de ander tot wat er in hem of haar omgaat. 
Chimpanzees hebben dit vermogen ook, zodat we mogen aannemen dat onze 
gemeenschappelijke voorouder er ook over beschikte. Bij mensen is mindreading 
echter hoger ontwikkeld, doordat wij de toestand van de ander ook concreet ons 
kunnen voorstellen en deze beschrijven. Welk mechanisme heeft ons de stap van 
lagere orde naar hogere orde mindreading laten zetten? Ik volg Zawidzki in het 
idee dat dit mechanisme mindshaping was.  
Mindshaping is wat er gebeurt als in een interactie de verwachtingen van de een 
invloed hebben op de ander, zonder dat deze invloed geïntendeerd moet zijn. De 
brabbelende baby die tussen alle klanken ook “mamama” zegt, gaat door de 
reacties die klank associeren met het prettige gedrag dat erop volgt. Zo versterken 
baby en moeder de onderlinge band. Belangrijk is dat dit geen bewuste 
voorstelling van de mentale toestand veronderstelt, bij moeder noch kind. Op 
grotere schaal worden mensen door verwachtingen, imitatie, pedagogie en 
wetshandhaving meer cooperatief, homogeen en voorspelbaar. Mindshaping 
versterkt de niche wanneer de invloed algemene cognitieve en gedragspatronen 
betreft en niet alleen de band tussen twee mensen. In de evolutie moet dit 
begonnen zijn als bijvoorbeeld de verwachting dat de ander op je let als je iets 
voordoet. Op deze manier ontstond een selectiedruk die gevoeligheid voor 
verwachtingen stimuleerde en daarmee meer en diepere verwachtingen mogelijk 
maakte. Wij beschikken nog altijd over sterke conformistische neigingen.  
Twee studies uit 2009 helpen om deze fase in de evolutie beter in beeld te krijgen. 
In de eerste, Catching fire, dateert Wrangham de introductie van de controle over 
het vuur op bijna 2 miljoen jaar geleden. Dat veranderde onze leefwijze, onze 
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voeding, en maakte een toenemende encephalisatie mogelijk die nodig is om 
mindshaping te intensiveren. In de tweede, Mothers and others, beschrijft Hrdy 
hoe  grootouders en andere stamgenoten deelnamen aan de opvoeding van 
kinderen in het Pleistoceen.“It takes a village to raise a child.” 
Hogere orde mindreading is interpretatie van zowel de context als hoe de ander 
deze context ziet. Deze interpretatie is gestoeld op eigen ervaring. Het is een 
proces met een open einde omdat er ruimte is voor herinterpretatie. Onze neiging 
tot mindreading is zo sterk dat wij vanzelf ook dieren en dingen allerlei gedachten 
en meningen toeschrijven. Het menselijke “hermeneutische” gezichtpunt is 
ontstaan met de hermeneutische niche, ongeveer 2 miljoen jaar geleden, met 
homo ergaster / erectus.  
3. De menselijke niche is de hermeneutische niche. 
Binnen de menselijke niche is het ontstaan van taal voorstelbaar. De “bewoners” 
van de niche waren al op elkaar gericht. Die tussenmenselijke aandacht schept de 
ruimte om niet alleen expressieve uitingen te doen maar ook descriptieve – en die 
tot hun recht te laten komen. Zo ontstond – in wat Donald noemt het mimetische 
cultuurstadium - de publieke ruimte en daarmee een gedeeld verleden, een 
geschiedenis. Beide werden langzaamaan steeds beter gearticuleerd met behulp 
van taal. Taal is het geheel van tekens, geluiden en gebaren die verwijzen naar 
zowel aspecten van een gedeeld systeem van symbolen (betekenissen) als naar 
concrete elementen in de waarneming.  
4. Taalevolutie veronderstelt de hermeneutische niche. 
Voorzover de menselijke niche hermeneutisch is, moet hermeneutiek gebruikt 
worden om de niche te onderzoeken. Hermeneutische processen ontgaan een blik 
die alleen let op mechanismen. Culturele antropologie, geschiedwetenschap en 
economische wetenschap zijn voorbeelden van empirisch hermeneutisch niche-
onderzoek. Niet-empirisch hermeneutisch niche-onderzoek gebeurt in de 
metafysische traditie en in de filosofische hermeneutiek. 
In hoofdstuk 4 laat ik in paragraaf 1 zien dat Darwinisme al een interpretatief 
(hermeneutisch) element heeft, namelijk daar waar gedrag of culturele uitingen 
worden geïnterpreteerd, door o.a. Darwin (diergedrag, menselijke gelaats-
expressies), De Waal (gedrag van mensapen) en Dawkins (memen, culturele 
uitingen). Hierdoor staat het Darwinistische onderzoek naar de menselijke 
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evolutie dichtbij – dichterbij dan soms wordt aangegeven – de economische, 
historische en cultureel-antropologische interpretatie. Die nabijheid zou een 
samenwerking of afstemming moeten vereenvoudigen. Bovendien is niet duidelijk 
waarom wij in het kader van het Darwinisme dieren hermeneutisch zouden 
mogen benaderen en mensen niet. 
In paragraaf 2 onderzoek ik vanuit de hermeneutische kant wat kennis van 
evolutionaire mechanismen voor ons betekent. Ik schaar mij hier aan de zijde van 
Ricoeur, een van de hermeneutische filosofen die dichtbij de empirische 
wetenschappen bleef. Hij sprak van “de school van het wantrouwen”, die ons 
heeft geleerd dat wij minder autonoom en keurig zijn dan we soms denken. 
“Leraren” aan deze denkbeeldige school waren Freud, Marx en Nietzsche. Ik zou 
daar Darwin aan toevoegen, als inspirator van het Darwinisme dat vanaf de jaren 
1970 zich richt op de mens, via sociobiologie en evolutionaire psychologie. De 
“leraren aan de school van het wantrouwen” leggen mechanismen bloot. Een 
hermeneutische benadering is nodig doordat vanaf dit moment de context waarin 
deze mechanismen functioneren, is veranderd door de menselijke interpretatie 
van deze context. Wij weten van deze mechanismen en kunnen er rekening mee 
houden. Ook dat is een aspect van de power-niche: een zelflerend vermogen. 
Emanciperend hermeneutisch-Darwinistisch onderzoek toonde aan dat niet alleen 
zelfbelang maar ook en vooral rechtvaardigheid leidend is bij onze beslissingen.  
Het karakter van de menselijke niche beïnvloedt onze evolutie. Aangezien wij 
onze niche mede vormgeven, is evolutie niet iets dat ons alleen overkomt, maar 
iets waaraan wij – zij het op microschaal - ook als actoren deelnemen. Dit geldt 
voor meer diersoorten. Het verschil met ons is dat wij ook beseffen dat wij dit 
doen en er mogelijk intenties mee hebben, ook al is het betwijfelbaar of ons 
handelen het geïntendeerde effect zal hebben.  
5. Darwinistische mechanismen kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd, bewust 
gehanteerd; dat is potentieel een verdere constructie van onze niche. 
Welke richting de niche-constructie ook opgaat, achteraf zal de ontwikkeling altijd 
passen in een Darwinistische verklaring. De consequentie van mijn betoog is dat 
deze evolutie niet zonder hermeneutiek kan worden beschreven (historisch en 
filosofisch), d.w.z. als proces waarin natuurlijke factoren niet alleen causaal 
werken maar ook en vooral worden geïnterpreteerd, met de daarop gebaseerde 
keuzes en reflecties - of het gebrek daaraan.  
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around 1990 from Theo de Boer, Ad Peperzak, Maarten Coolen and Jan Keij. It is 
satisfying to see such a dear period returning in a “digested” way. 
Michiel ter Horst and Ignaz Anderson of the IONA Foundation, thanks for your 
trust and support. At my school, Arjan Hakkert, Oscar Westers and Bartel 
Geleijnse kindly cooperated. Willem and Margreet In ’t Veld supported the project 
as true (grand-) parents: thank you so much. 
Ik schreef deze dissertatie in figuurlijke zin naast Ruth, met wie ik het leven deel 
(steeds dieper) en vermenigvuldigde:  
Jaël, vol overgave strevend naar dem Wahren, Schönen, Guten;  
Ida, de hartekwaliteiten ontplooiend die haar tot een unieke vrouw maken;  
Arthur, zich ontpoppend als een mannelijke, open persoonlijkheid met humor;  
Adinde de eigenzinnige: “dieren zijn ook mensen”. 
 
Deep thanks flow to “Monte Ventósola”: a life changer if ever there was one. 
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Maurits In ‘t Veld verwierf een lesbevoegdheid geschiedenis in 1990 in Utrecht. 
Zijn doctoraal wijsbegeerte behaalde hij in 1992 in Amsterdam bij prof. dr. Th. de 
Boer met een scriptie over Hegel en Levinas.  
Hij werkt als leraar geschiedenis en filosofie in het voortgezet onderwijs.  
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